MCA4climate: A Practical Framework for Planning Pro-Development Climate Policy by Scrieciu, Şerban et al.
U
N
IT
E
D
 N
A
T
IO
N
S
 E
N
V
IR
O
N
M
E
N
T
 P
R
O
G
R
A
M
M
E
A PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR PLANNING  
PRO-DEVELOPMENT  
CLIMATE POLICY
3M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
   
   
  I
nt
ro
d
uc
ti
on
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
Contributors                     
 Copyright © United Nations Environment Programme, 2011.
This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form 
for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission 
from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is 
made. UNEP would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that 
uses this publication as a source.
 No use of this publication may be made for resale or for any 
other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in 
writing from the United Nations Environment Programme.
 Disclaimer
 The designations employed and the presentation of the 
material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion 
whatsoever on the part of the United Nations Environment Programme 
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of 
its authorities, or concerning delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 
Moreover, the views expressed do not necessarily represent the 
decision or the stated policy of the United Nations Environment 
Programme, nor does citing of trade names or commercial processes 
constitute endorsement.
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
Fo
re
w
or
d 
by
 U
N
E
P 
 Climate is an inordinate challenge but also an inordinate 
opportunity to transform economies onto a low-carbon, resource-
e!cient Green Economy path. 
 Catalyzing clean energy will not only cut greenhouse-gas 
emissions as part of e"orts to limit a global temperature rise to under 
2 degrees C or more, it also represents a way of curbing health-
hazardous air pollution while o"ering a rapid path to address energy 
poverty, especially in rural areas of developing economies.
 Meanwhile enhancing ecosystems such as forests, 
mangroves and seagrasses in order to conserve their carbon stocks 
can also trigger multiple benefits from boosting water supplies 
and improving agriculture to maintaining natural sea defences and 
nurseries for fish. The 17th Conference of the Parties meeting in 
Durban, South Africa, later this year presents the world with another 
opportunity to advance the climate agenda and co-operative action 
under the UN Climate Convention.
 It is crucial that those actions are designed within a coherent 
and robust policy-planning framework to ensure that they are both 
cost-e"ective and compatible with broader social, economic and 
environmental goals. For developing countries, sound climate-
policy planning will also enhance access to climate finance from the 
developed ones.
 Climate-policy planning is a complex undertaking. Many 
developing countries are only just starting to consider how to go 
about it and some require improved access to the requisite knowledge, 
expertise and technical skills. Drawing upon best practices, tried 
and tested in other parts of the world, is clearly an advantage. 
The MCA4climate, a new UNEP initiative, is designed to assist 
policymakers, particularly in the developing world, in that endeavour. 
It o"ers concrete guidance and recommendations on a number of 
critical issues and proposes a formal framework for evaluating climate 
mitigation and adaptation policies, paving a practical way forward so 
that countries evolve sustainably and grow their economies in a way 
that keeps humanity’s footprint within planetary boundaries. It draws 
on the work of leading experts on climate policymaking from around 
the world and uses an innovative approach to assessing policies 
that ensures that climate policies and strategies take full account of 
developmental concerns and objectives. 
 The MCA4climate initiative reflects UNEP’s mission to 
provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the 
environment by inspiring, informing and enabling nations and 
peoples to improve their quality of life without compromising that of 
future generations—issues at the centre of Rio+20 next year in Brazil 
as governments look to scale-up and accelerate the implementation 
of the agreements, including those relating to climate change, 
established in Rio in 1992. 
 Achim Steiner,
UN Under-Secretary General and Executive Director 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
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UNEP is the convenor of the MCA4climate initiative, which was launched 
at the end of 2009 with financial support from the Government of Spain. 
Our role is to bring together leading experts from around the world, to 
co-ordinate their analysis, to manage the consultation process and to 
ensure the legitimacy of their formal submissions. The UNEP team, part 
of the Division of Technology, Industry and Economics based in Paris and 
working on MCA4climate comprises:
      ›  Şerban Scrieciu: project management, climate economics and 
policy evaluation framework.
      ›  Sophy Bristow: multi-criteria decision support tool, case 
studies and outreach.
      ›  Daniel Puig: programme management.
 UNEP also acknowledges the assistance of Trevor Morgan in 
preparing this report.  
 Main partners
 Several acclaimed international experts have contributed 
towards the development of the MCA4climate initiative and on 
di"erent parts of the guidance package. Some have helped us define 
our approach and develop guidance documents, while others have 
applied the generic methodology to a specific mitigation or adaptation 
theme. Our main partners are listed below in alphabetical order:
      ›  Frank Ackerman (Stockholm Environment Institute US): 
guidance on climate-change economics and critical issues for 
climate-policy analysis.
      ›  Valerie Belton (University of Strathclyde): guidance on multi-
criteria decision analysis and methodology development.
      ›  Kornelis Blok (Ecofys): mitigation theme guidance on 
improving energy e!ciency and saving energy.
      ›  Ariane de Bremond (University of Maryland): adaptation 
theme guidance on increasing terrestrial ecosystems 
resilience.
      ›  Zaid Chalabi (London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine): methodology development and adaptation theme 
guidance on reducing human health impacts and risks.
      ›  William Cheung (University of East Anglia): adaptation theme 
guidance on increasing marine ecosystems resilience.
      ›  Heleen de Coninck (Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands): mitigation theme guidance on capturing and 
storing emissions of CO2.
      ›  William Easterling (Penn State University): mitigation theme 
guidance on improving land use management.
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 At the UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun in 
December 2010, the countries of the world laid the foundation for the 
most far-reaching collective e"ort the world has ever seen to reduce 
carbon emissions, and to build a system which makes all countries 
accountable to one another for those emission reductions. 
 Under the Cancun Agreements, all industrialized nations 
made o!cial their reduction pledges, and committed themselves to 
develop low-carbon development plans or strategies. Developing 
countries made o!cial their nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs) which seek a deviation from business-as-usual emissions by 
2020, and were encouraged to develop low-carbon growth strategies.
 In addition, the Cancun Agreements provide the strongest 
signal countries have ever given to the private sector that we are 
moving toward low-carbon economies,  by committing to a maximum 
temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius, and a consideration of a 
maximum of 1.5 degrees in the near future. 
  It is clear that the poorer developing countries will 
need substantial financial and technical support in preparing and 
implementing mitigation and adaptation actions. The agreements 
in Cancun on mobilizing finance for developing countries, including 
the establishment of a Green Climate Fund and a registry to match 
action with funding and other types of support, constitute major steps 
forward. So do the agreements on a new Technology Mechanism and 
Adaptation Committee.  
 All countries accept the need for collective action on climate 
change. But national responses to it will need to vary according 
to each country’s circumstances and potential. It is the job of 
governments to set laws and regulations to drive changes in business 
and public behaviour that mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and 
enhance our capacity to adapt to climate change. 
 For the developing countries, climate plans will need to 
be compatible with and supportive of their development goals. If 
developing countries are convinced that there are major development 
benefits to be drawn from climate action, such as faster long-term 
growth, better employment prospects and reduced poverty, they 
will be much more likely to embark on policies to put them on a 
low-carbon development path. 
 That is why UNEP’s MCA4climate initiative, which provides 
valuable guidance to policy makers on drawing up and improving 
their climate plans taking account of the full range of socio-economic 
and environmental concerns, can prove highly e"ective in stimulating 
cost-e"ective national actions. 
 I wish this initiative every success.
 
Christiana Figueres,
Executive Secretary, United Nations Framework Convention  
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
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      ›  Paul Ekins (University College London): guidance on 
interactions between climate change and fiscal sustainability.
      ›  Nathan Engle (Battelle — Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory / Joint Global Change Research Institute): 
adaptation theme guidance on increasing terrestrial 
ecosystems resilience.
      ›  Günther Fischer (International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis): adaptation theme guidance on reducing 
agricultural output losses.
      ›  Stéphane Hallegatte (Centre International de Recherche sur 
l’Environnement et le Développement): adaptation theme 
guidance on increasing infrastructure resilience.
      ›  Sari Kovats (London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine): adaptation theme guidance on reducing human 
health impacts and risks.
      ›  Reinhard Mechler (International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis): adaptation theme guidance on reducing extreme 
weather event impacts.
      ›  Kathleen Miller (National Center for Atmospheric Research, 
Colorado): adaptation theme guidance on improving water 
resources management.
      ›  William Moomaw (Tufts University): mitigation theme 
guidance on increasing the share of low-carbon energy 
sources in the fuel mix.
      ›  Trevor Morgan (Menecon Consulting): guidance on 
measurement, reporting and evaluation.
      ›  Robert Nicholls (University of Southampton): adaptation 
theme guidance on improving coastal zone management.
      ›  Stefan Speck (European Environment Agency): guidance on 
interactions between climate change and fiscal sustainability.
      ›  Elizabeth A. Stanton (Stockholm Environment Institute US): 
guidance on developing baselines.
      ›  Rashid Sumaila (University of British Columbia): adaptation 
theme guidance on increasing marine ecosystems resilience.
      ›  Erika de Visser (Ecofys): mitigation theme guidance on 
improving energy e!ciency and saving energy.
 Other contributing experts
 We would also like to acknowledge the contribution of other 
experts who have been involved in di"erent stages of the MCA4climate 
initiative. These include: Robert Wilby (Loughborough University) 
and Bekele Debele Negewo (World Bank) on the Sana’a Basin, Yemen 
adaptation case study; Glynn Morris (AGAMA Energy) on the South 
African mitigation case study; Benjamin Jones (formerly with the IMF) on 
providing guidance on the linkages with fiscal policy; Jan Corfee-Morlot 
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(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and K. 
Narayanan (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay) on the Mumbai, India 
adaptation case study; and Thanakvaro Thyl De Lopez and Anne Olho" 
(UNEP Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development) on 
helping define the themes and objectives of the project. 
 Steering committee
 We are grateful to the following, who have acted as a Steering 
Committee, particularly in the earlier stages of the MCA4climate 
initiative: Preety Bhandari (UNFCCC); Rémy Paris (OECD); Alicia 
Montalvo Santamaria and Ana Pintó Fernández (Spanish Climate 
Change O!ce, Ministry of Environment, and Rural and Marine 
A"airs); Juan C. Mata Sandoval (Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources of Mexico); Colin Kirkpatrick and Clive George (University of 
Manchester); and Mark Kenber (The Climate Group).
 External reviewers
 We would also like to thank our external reviewers of the 
several documents issued under the MCA4climate initiative: Ian Parry 
(International Monetary Fund); Anthony Janetos and Elizabeth Malone 
(Joint Global Change Research Institute - Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory / University of Maryland); Susanne Akerfeldt (Ministry of 
Finance of Sweden); Terry Barker (University of Cambridge); Stephen 
DeCanio (University of California, Santa Barbara); Ellina Levina 
(International Energy Agency); Brendan Beck (South Africa’s National 
Energy Research Institute / IEA); Raghu Murtugudde (University of 
Maryland); Chu Thai Hoanh (International Water Management Institute, 
Laos); Bob Scholes (Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in 
South Africa); Jared Bosire (Kenyan Marine and Fisheries Research 
Institute); Sumana Bhattacharya (Windrock International India, New 
Delhi); Mala Rao (Indian Institute of Public Health, Hyderabad); Carlos 
Corvalan (The Pan American Health Organisation / WHO); Shri P.G. 
Dhar Chakrabarti (National Institute of Disaster Management, Ministry 
of Home A"airs, Government of India); Hilary McMahon (United 
Nations Development Programme); Roger Street and Patrick Pringle 
(UK Climate Impacts Programme); Heather McGray and Margaret 
Steadman (World Resources Institute); Jane Ellis (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development); Ana Pintó and Sara 
Aagesen (Spanish Climate Change O!ce); and Noriko Yamada (UNEP).
 
 This report draws on inputs from all main partners and experts 
mentioned above. We fully and gratefully acknowedge the Government 
of Spain for financially supporting the MCA4climate initiative and 
providing helpful reviews through its Spanish Climate Change O!ce.
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1  Introduction MCA4climate is a major new UNEP initiative providing 
practical assistance to governments in preparing their climate change 
mitigation and adaptation plans and strategies. It aims to help 
governments, particularly in developing countries, identify policies and 
measures that are low cost, environmentally e"ective and consistent 
with national development goals. It does this by providing a structured 
approach to assessing and prioritizing climate-policy options, while 
taking into consideration associated social, economic, environmental 
and institutional costs and benefits. In doing so, it seeks to counter the 
widely held perception that tackling climate change is costly, highlight 
the potential developmental benefits of addressing climate change 
and encourage action to that end.
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 Background and rationale
 At the climate talks in Cancún in December 2010, the 
long-term goal of limiting global warming to below 2 degrees Celsius 
in comparison with pre-industrial levels and Annex I and non-Annex I 
pledges of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets were formally 
incorporated into the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
The Cancún Agreements further encourage non-Annex I parties — 
mainly developing countries — to develop low-carbon strategies and 
require them to take national appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) 
in the context of sustainable development aimed at achieving a 
deviation in emissions relative to business-as-usual emissions in 2020. 
They also take on board a commitment made by developed countries 
at the Copenhagen meeting a year earlier to provide $30 billion in 
fast-start finance in 2010-2012 for developing country NAMAs and 
national adaptation plans and actions (NAPAs), and to mobilize $100 
billion a year of public and private finance by 2020. 
 In addition, the Agreements establish a Green Climate Fund 
to manage a portion of this funding. Many developing countries are 
still at an early stage of developing formal climate change policy plans, 
identifying specific mitigation and adaptation policy options, and 
deciding on which ones to adopt. There is widespread and increasing 
willingness to take this process forward and to take advantage of the 
funding that is on o"er. But, in many cases, the planning process is 
complicated by the sheer complexity of the linkages and trade-o"s 
between climate-related policy goals and broader developmental 
policy goals, as well as a lack of communication about the range of 
policy options available and how to go about evaluating their e"ects. 
Developing countries can often benefit from assistance in devising 
sound, low-cost and pro-development climate action plans. 
 Objectives and scope of the MCA4climate initiative
The MCA4climate initiative is intended to help meet this need, by 
providing practical help and guidance to governments, especially 
in developing countries, in formulating their climate-policy plans in 
the context of broader economic and social policymaking. It hopes 
to support current and future work on assessing how investment 
in low-carbon and climate resilient technologies could lead to job 
creation, growth, improved health prospects and other development 
benefits. Specifically, it enables governments to:
      ›  Identify the developmental benefits of climate mitigation 
and adaptation in order to strengthen the case for such 
action and better integrate climate policy into national-level 
development-policy planning.
      ›  Assess systematically the complex linkages and trade-o"s 
between the multi-faceted dimensions of climate change and 
its policy responses.
      ›  Prioritize investments related to curbing greenhouse-gas 
emissions or adapting to climate change when deciding 
on the allocation of limited finance across a large array of 
possible climate actions.
      ›  Deal with di"erent or conflicting interests and objectives.
 The principal way in which MCA4climate seeks to provide 
this assistance is through the application of the MCA4climate policy 
evaluation framework — a powerful analytical tool that has been 
developed specifically for the MCA4climate initiative by UNEP with 
assistance from a number of leading international experts. This 
framework, as the name indicates, is based on a multi-criteria analysis 
(MCA) approach — a well-established technique for aiding decision-
making that has already been successfully deployed in non-climate 
areas of policymaking. The MCA4climate policy evaluation framework 
is intended to be used as a practical step-by-step tool for identifying 
and prioritizing mitigation and adaptation policies, consistent with 
developmental goals. It ensures that all the di"erent dimensions of 
climate policies, including those that cannot be easily measured in 
monetary terms, are taken into consideration. It also facilitates the 
engagement of stakeholders in the policy-planning process. 
 At the heart of this framework is a hierarchical criteria tree 
containing a set of generic criteria, against which climate-policy planners 
can evaluate proposed policy actions and their potential contribution to 
a broad range of developmental objectives. Those policy actions have 
been categorized into 12 areas, or themes — four covering mitigation 
and eight covering adaptation — to provide a comprehensive guide to 
the various policy options available. For each theme, detailed criteria 
and indicators have been developed to enable the multi-dimensional 
e"ects of each policy to be evaluated. Recommendations have also 
been drawn up on appropriate forms of assessment and data sources. 
The potential interactions across the various themes have also been 
identified. In order to test the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework 
and demonstrate that it works, we applied the framework in three 
separate casestudies: two on adaptation (flood risks and infrastructure 
resilience in Mumbai, India and water management in the Sana’a Basin 
in Yemen) and one on mitigation (moving the electricity sector in 
South Africa towards low-carbon sources). Applying the MCA4climate 
policy evaluation framework — or, indeed, any approach to formulating 
climate policy — is confronted by a number of practical issues. We have 
analyzed in depth some of the most critical issues and prepared some 
guiding principles and practical recommendations on how to address 
them. These issues include assessing the economic implications of the 
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various policy options, dealing with risk and uncertainty, developing 
and using baselines, understanding the fiscal implications of climate 
policies and undertaking the measurement, reporting and verification 
of policy actions and their e"ects. This guidance is intended to be of 
practical value to government o!cials directly involved in applying this 
framework or in analyzing climate policies more generally, as well as to 
other stakeholders involved in the climate policymaking process.
 Purpose and structure of this report
 This report is intended to provide a formal record of the 
results of the MCA4climate initiative to date. It contains four 
substantive sections, the findings of which can be used independently 
to address specific issues or as a whole to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation of climate policy plans (Figure 1). The sections are as follows:
      ›  Climate policy options: an overview of the nature of the 
policy challenge posed by climate change and of the policy-
planning process, and a full description of the range of 
climate mitigation and adaptation policy options available 
categorized according to the 12 themes.
      ›  The MCA4climate policy evaluation framework: a description 
of the climate policy evaluation framework, how it works and 
how it can be applied in practice across the themes. This 
includes the MCA4climate criteria tree which is a practical 
tool for evaluating the multiple dimensions of climate policies.
      ›  Case studies: an exploration of the practicalities of applying 
the MCA4climate framework to real policy problems in three 
di"erent locations. Each case study was designed to test di"erent 
elements of the framework, and the lessons learnt contributed  
to the development of the overall MCA4climate initiative. 
      ›  Guiding principles for climate-policy planning: a summary on 
cross-cutting aspects of climate-policy planning and analysis, 
including practical recommendations.
 Further information on the MCA4climate policy evaluation 
framework and approach, all of the detailed reports on each of the 
themes (theme reports), the guidance on critical aspects of climate-
policy planning (also labelled as guiding principles) and the case 
studies, together with more information about the background to the 
MCA4climate initiative, can be downloaded from the MCA4climate 
website: www.mca4climate.info. 
 
 Next steps
 It is hoped that this report will encourage policymakers in 
developing countries and other stakeholders to consult and make use 
of the theme reports and guidance documents and to consider the 
possibility of applying the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework 
at the national level. It is envisaged that applying the framework fully 
will require the direct involvement of external experts who have been 
engaged in the initiative or are familiar with using this framework.
The next steps that UNEP envisages in taking the MCA4climate 
initiative forward are:
Climate Policy Analysis
Identification and prioritization 
of climate policy options
Mitigation
Adaptation
LAND USE
MANAGEMENT
LOW-CARBON
FUEL MIX
CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE
ENERGY 
EFICIENCY
AGRICULTURE
INFRASTRUCTURE TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS
COASTAL
ZONES
MARINE 
ECOSYSTEMS
WATER
EXTREME  
CLIMATE
HEALTH
FISCAL 
LINKAGES
CLIMATE
ECONOMICS
MEASUREMENT,
REPORTING, 
VERIFICATION
BASELINES
PRO-DEVELOPMENT CIMATE ACTION PLANS & STRATEGIES
CLIMATE POLICY OPTIONS
MCA4CLIMATE POLICY 
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
RISK & UNCERTAINTY
Figure 1: The structure of the MCA4climate initiative
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      ›  Building partnerships: UNEP is currently working with the 
French development agency (AFD) and other bilateral 
agencies to promote the goals of the MCA4climate initiative 
at the national level. 
      ›  Piloting in countries: work is underway in Mexico and 
preparations are well advanced in other emerging economies.
 Government o!cials and other stakeholders looking to learn 
more about the MCA4climate initiative and how it could help  
climate-policy planning in your country should contact Mark Radka at 
unep.tie@unep.fr.
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2 Policy options for  
 mitigation and adaptation
 All Parties to the Conference are required to develop climate 
policies in order to contribute to the overall objective of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to stabilize 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system. 
The Convention recognizes the importance of scientifically sound, 
long-term national plans and strategies to mitigate climate change by 
reducing the sources or enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases or to 
adapt to it, though there is no legal requirement on Parties to prepare 
a plan as such. There is also a growing recognition of the need to 
prepare for and adapt to climate change as a certain degree of change 
appears to be inevitable.
 A climate plan sets out how a package of policy instruments 
and specific measures are to be implemented and how they are 
expected to contribute to meeting stated policy goals. In formulating 
that plan, policymakers must identify and evaluate mitigation and 
adaptation policies drawn from the full range of options available, 
taking account of national circumstances.
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 Developing a climate-change policy plan
 
 A national climate policy comprises four elements:
      ›  A statement of objectives, or policy goals. 
      ›  A strategy, or a plan, for achieving them. 
      ›  A set of policy instruments and specific measures.
      ›  An institutional framework, for both formulating and 
implementing the policy.
 A climate-policy plan, therefore, is the means by which a 
government goes about trying to achieve its overall policy goal. That 
goal is usually focused on contributing to international e"orts to 
mitigate the impact of climate change, by reducing anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Increasingly, the goal involves adapting 
to climate change that will result from past and future emissions. 
 The plan may involve quantitative targets for emissions, or 
reductions relative to a baseline: all Annex I and some non-Annex I 
countries have adopted such targets. Those non-Annex I countries that 
have not committed themselves to quantitative emissions reductions 
are required under the Framework Convention to take NAMAs. 
Although there is no strict definition of what a NAMA is, it is typically 
taken to refer to the implementation of a set of policy instruments 
or specific projects that result in a reduction in emissions below a 
baseline or business-as-usual. Although there is no requirement on any 
country under the Convention to adopt NAPAs, the Cancún Agreements 
do include measures, notably the Cancún Adaptation Framework, to 
enhance adaptation e"orts by all countries and help the least developed 
and most vulnerable countries develop and implement NAPAs. 
 The climate-policy plan comprises a specific set of 
instruments or measures (often called simply policies) that are to 
be implemented over a given timeframe. The policies that actually 
make up the plan are drawn from a range of options for mitigating 
the impact of climate change or adapting to it. The MCA4climate 
initiative categorizes these options into 12 areas, or themes — four of 
which concern mitigation and eight adaptation (Table 1). The themes 
chosen for the mitigation actions correspond to the main ways in 
which greenhouse-gas emissions can be abated, while the adaptation 
themes mirror the issues covered by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change in its most recent assessment report (IPCC, 2007), 
with the addition of the theme on extreme-weather events. The 
mitigation themes were not based on those of the IPCC, which is made 
up of sectors such as industry or transport, as it was felt that this 
would result in excessive overlap in view of the type of analysis being 
undertaken for the MCA4climate initiative.
 In practice, governments need to balance action to mitigate 
greenhouse-gas emissions and action to adapt to actual and imminent 
THEME NOTES
MITIGATION
Improving energy  
e!ciency and conserv-
ing energy
Adopting technologies or practices to provide the same energy  
service with fewer energy inputs (increased energy e!ciency) 
and/or changes in behaviour that result in reduced demand for 
energy services (energy conservation).
Improving land-use  
management practices
Increasing carbon absorption or reducing carbon-dioxide  
emissions via changes in forestry or agricultural practices (mainly 
through livestock and fertilizer input management), by reducing 
and avoiding deforestation, forest management, forest restora-
tion, a"orestation and reforestation. 
Increasing the share 
of low-carbon energy 
sources in the fuel mix
Reducing the carbon content of the fuel mix, including switching 
between fossil fuels (for example, from coal to gas) and from fos-
sil fuels to nuclear energy or renewable sources of energy (solar  
energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, biomass energy,  
hydropower, tidal and marine energy).
Encouraging carbon- 
dioxide capture and 
storage
A process involving the separation and capture of carbon dioxide 
from industrial and energy-related sources, and its transporta-
tion and long-term storage underground.
ADAPTATION
Improving coastal zone 
management
Integrating likely ecological and human impacts of climate  
change into management plans and practices for low-lying areas 
and shallow coastal waters.
Reducing human health 
impacts and risks
Adopting emergency preparedness and response mechanisms  
to respond to climate-related causes of ill-health, notably  
under-nutrition, diarrhoeal diseases and malaria. 
Reducing agricultural  
output losses
Maintaining or enhancing agricultural productivity (notably, 
by improving water use, agricultural input, soil management, 
land-use management, and crop-diversification practices), and 
increasing the resilience of crops and livestock to adverse cli-
matic conditions.
Increasing infrastruc-
ture resilience
Adopting emergency preparedness and response mechanisms  
to respond to climate-related impacts on equipment, utilities, 
enterprises, installations and services. 
Improving water 
resource management
Integrating possible impacts of climate change on freshwater  
systems and their management, including seasonal shifts in 
streams flow, salinization, and flooding and drought risks.
Increasing terrestrial  
ecosystems resilience
Adopting natural resource management techniques such as  
expansion of reserve systems and actions to reduce climate 
change-induced stresses on terrestrial ecosystems. 
Increasing marine  
ecosystems resilience
Adopting natural resource management techniques to  
reduce climate change-induced stresses on marine ecosystems  
and their resilience. 
Reducing extreme  
weather event impacts
Adopting emergency preparedness and response mechanisms  
to respond to severe but infrequent climate-related events.
Table 1: Mitigation and adaptation themes
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climate change. This balance needs to take account of the type of 
commitment made to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, the scale and 
nature of the risks from climate change, and the cost of adaptation. All 
these factors depend on national circumstances. 
 Each of the themes is described below, including the principal 
policy options, which are generally categorized according to the type 
of instrument: market-based, regulatory, public investment, information-
based, and voluntary agreements or international co-operation.  
The classification is only indicative and provides a consistent taxonomy 
across all themes. The analysis developed by the theme experts is 
intended to provide an in-depth reference resource to inform  
the development of potential policy and action plans for evaluation.
 Mitigation policy options
 Improving energy e!ciency and conserving energy
 
 Improving energy e!ciency refers to a reduction in the 
amount of energy consumed in providing an energy service, such as 
heating, cooling or mobility. Energy conservation is the savings in 
energy use from forgoing an energy service, such as walking instead 
of using a car. Energy intensity measures the amount of energy 
used in aggregate for economic activity; at the highest level, energy 
intensity is measured as the total primary energy consumption 1 per 
unit of economic output or gross domestic product (GDP), while at the 
lowest level, it can be measured for individual processes or individual 
appliances. Energy intensity is a"ected by energy e!ciency, but also 
by economic structure. A country with a large industrial sector may 
use energy relatively e!ciently but have a high intensity. 
 In many countries, energy is used ine!ciently or wastefully 
in a wide range of applications. Often, this is because the capital 
stock is obsolete and could be replaced by modern equipment and 
appliances which use energy much more e!ciently. In some cases, 
prices are held below market levels, often for social reasons, reducing 
the incentive for energy users to conserve energy or use it more 
e!ciently. Government policies can drive more e!cient energy 
use by persuading, encouraging or obliging households, motorists, 
businesses and public bodies to change their energy-consumption 
behaviour and their purchases of energy-using equipment, appliances 
and vehicles, through a variety of market-based, regulatory and 
information-based instruments. Governments can also directly a"ect 
energy use by investing directly in infrastructure or by negotiating 
voluntary agreements with businesses to reduce energy use (Table 2). 
Major barriers against energy-e!ciency improvements in developing 
countries include lack of awareness on the importance and the 
potential of energy-e!ciency improvements, lack of financing, lack of 
qualified personnel and insu!cient energy service levels. Information 
programmes are especially important in developing countries, where 
lack of information has been identified as a major barrier for energy 
e!ciency and renewable-energy investments. Subsidy reform, 
involving raising energy prices to full market levels, is generally among 
the least-cost policy options and may be ‘no-regrets’, i.e. the net cost to 
the economy is at or below zero, not even allowing for the environmental 
benefits from lower emissions of greenhouse gas and pollutants. This 
is because reducing energy use may bring about important economic 
benefits, including cost savings, lower imports or increased availability 
of energy for export and a reduced burden on the central government 
budget or state-owned enterprises. 
 Improving land-use management practices
 Climate change can be mitigated through improving 
land-use management practices that increase carbon absorption 
or reduce emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). This can be achieved 
through changes in forestry — by reducing or avoiding deforestation, 
better forest management, forest restoration, a"orestation or 
reforestation — or in agriculture — by better soil carbon management 
and the use of bio-char to sequester carbon and by reducing 
emissions with better livestock and fertilizer management. These 
activities are collectively known as Land Use, Land-Use Change, and 
Forestry (LULUCF). Increasing carbon in the terrestrial biosphere is a 
relatively low-cost way to help mitigate the increasing concentration 
of CO2 in the atmosphere, while providing co-benefits, such as 
1   Energy extracted or captured directly from natural resources such as crude oil, hard 
coal, natural gas, or produced from primary commodities or sources, such as uranium, 
hydropower or solar energy. 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Energy/carbon pricing. Tradable certificates. Subsidies and tax  
breaks (exemptions, credits and rebates). Loan facilities.
Regulatory Energy e!ciency performance standards for equipment and 
appliances. Mandatory improvements in e!ciency or intensity 
(such as for fleet vehicle purchases).
Public investment Research and development. Infrastructure provision.
Information-based Labelling. Energy-performance certificates.  
Training and capacity-building.
Voluntary agreements Agreements on energy e!ciency and/or intensity improvements with 
industry.
Table 2: Policy options to improve energy e!ciency 
and conservation
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protecting forests, biodiversity, water quality and soil fertility. 
Land-use management practices in agriculture can mitigate climate 
change through carbon sequestration and emissions reduction. 
Carbon sequestration can be boosted mainly through agronomy 
(on-farm practices that increase crop and pasture productivity, 
thereby generating more biomass and increasing carbon uptake); 
management of residues and water to reduce methane emission 
and increase soil carbon, notably in rice growing; optimized grazing 
practices; and restoration of degraded land. Several agricultural 
practices have shown promise for reducing agricultural carbon 
emissions, including nutrient management; conversion to cover 
crops; fire management; and management of organic soils and 
manure. In forestry, the principal climate change mitigation practices 
include reducing or avoiding deforestation, forest management and 
restoration; and a"orestation and reforestation. The most e"ective 
short-term strategy for mitigating climate change through forestry is 
undoubtedly to reduce rates of deforestation. There is a rich portfolio 
of policy instruments available to governments to promote climate 
change mitigation through improved land-use management (Table 
3). In practice, LULUCF mitigation policies will need to be formulated 
and implemented within the context of broader agricultural and 
forestry policies. In many cases, the objectives of the latter policies 
may conflict with the goal of mitigating climate change, especially 
where they are aimed at maintaining farmer livelihoods through rural 
development and underpinning food security.
 Increasing the share of low-carbon energy sources in the fuel mix
 Globally, nearly 60% of heat of global warming is caused 
by the CO2 that is emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels (IPCC, 
2011). Methane leaks from natural gas and oil production and use and 
other greenhouse gases emitted from burning fossil fuels, as well as 
black carbon from burning biomass, are additional sources. Fossil 
fuels currently account for over 80% of primary energy use worldwide 
(IEA, 2010a). And fossil-fuel consumption is set to continue to grow: 
without a change in government police, global fossil energy use would 
expand by 44% between 2008 and 2035 — a development that would 
be compatible with an increase in global temperature of more than 6˚ 
Celsius (IEA, 2010b). 
 Individuals and businesses consume energy for the 
services they provide, including cooking, lighting, refrigeration, 
communications and entertainment, mechanical work, mobility, 
heating for comfort and hot water. End-use energy to supply these 
services is provided by di"erent energy carriers such as the heat 
generated by burning fuels or electricity. The end-use carriers of 
energy come through a technological conversion process that 
utilizes a source of primary energy such as biomass or fossil fuels, 
nuclear energy, solar, wind, hydro, geothermal or ocean energy. 
With economic development and population growth, the world’s 
demand for end-use energy will certainly grow. Consequently, to 
mitigate climate change, it will be necessary to set in motion a rapid 
transformation of the world’s energy system away from fossil fuels 
as primary energy sources and towards low-carbon alternatives — 
essentially nuclear power and renewable energy sources. 
 There are number of policy instruments that governments 
can use to encourage or force such a transformation (Table 4: See 
next page). In principle, market-based instruments are the most 
economically e!cient approach, but other instruments may prove 
more e"ective as a result of market barriers.
 Because needs for energy services are so di"erent for societies 
at di"erent stages of development, the appropriate policies needed  
to boost the role of low-carbon fuels to supply those services also di"er:
      ›  Least developed countries are in need of the most basic energy 
services. Consequently, the main policy objectives are likely to 
include improving cooking services through the introduction 
of improved stoves; the deployment of distributed renewables-
based technologies such as solar-powered lanterns, radios and 
mobile phone chargers; and creating electricity services for 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Tradable permits for allocating emissions/carbon absorptions.  
Taxes and charges, e.g. to discourage forest clearing.
Regulatory Mandatory actions concerning on-farm practices and  
technologies, such as GPS-assisted precision fossil fuel-based 
fertilizer applications (in agriculture) or a performance standard 
for lowering the rate of forest-to-agricultural land conversion 
(in forestry).
Public investment Research and the development of new knowledge and innova-
tive land-use practices and technologies, e.g. to improve crop 
productivity.
Information-based Public relations and education campaigns and mandatory emis-
sions disclosures to encourage climate change mitigation behav-
iour (e.g. to educate farmers that conservation tillage  
not only increases carbon absorption in the soil, but also 
improves soil water-holding characteristics).
International  
co-operation
Multi-lateral treaties to voluntarily reduce emissions or  
sequester carbon.
Table 3: Policy options to improve land-use management practices
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urban areas such as distributed generation. The most important 
policy actions that governments of these countries can 
establish are those that build capacity. 
      ›  Developing country policies concern primarily more extensive 
low-carbon electrification of services in rapidly growing 
urban regions while still meeting the needs of rural users. 
Economy-wide policy instruments need to be implemented 
alongside the development of specific large-scale low-carbon 
projects. Removing subsidies for fossil fuels is an important 
policy action needed in many developing countries.
      ›  Emerging economies policy needs are similar to those for 
developed countries. Financial as well as regulatory policies 
have proven e"ective in moving to low-carbon technologies 
for delivering energy services. These countries often have 
the capacity to manufacture and install major low-carbon 
technologies, and have policies in place to encourage those 
industries. For example, China and India have become major 
producers of wind turbines and solar PV panels. 
      ›  Developed countries have well-developed energy systems 
that vary enormously in terms of carbon intensity. 
This presents a challenge since there is so much of the 
energy system that is 'locked-in' to existing high-carbon 
infrastructure. These countries need to use a combination of 
policy instruments to shift investment towards low-carbon 
technologies and accelerate the retirement of existing fossil-
energy-based capital stock. 
 
 Encouraging carbon-dioxide capture and storage
 Carbon-dioxide capture and storage (CCS) is a technology 
that reduces greenhouse-gas emissions by separating CO2 from the 
flue gases of a large, stationary point source, transporting it, and 
isolating it from the atmosphere by injecting it into a geological 
reservoir that is suitable for permanent storage, such as a depleted oil 
or gas field (IPCC, 2005). In principle, CCS can reduce CO2 emissions 
from power plants or large industrial facilities that burn fossil fuels by 
up to 85% compared with conventional technology. 
 However, CCS has yet to be deployed commercially in the 
power and industrial sectors, and the e"ectiveness of the technology 
and its cost remain uncertain. There are also uncertainties about 
the safety and integrity of long-term geological storage of CO2 and 
whether su!cient suitable storage capacity exists to make this a 
widespread option. CCS has so far been used solely in the oil and gas 
industry, in instances where there is a need to separate out CO2 from 
natural gas; the CO2 is then used either for enhanced oil recovery, or is 
stored permanently underground. A number of demonstration plants 
involving the use of the technology in power generation are under 
development or planned in several countries, the biggest being the 
1GW FutureGen project in the United States. The demonstration 
Table 4: Policy options to increase the share of low-carbon  
energy sources 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Carbon price or tax. Tax credits. Carbon emission standard.
Regulatory Mandatory deployment of CCS for coal- or fossil-fuelled  
installations.
Public investment R&D support. Demonstration subsidy. Funding pipeline network. 
Funding of storage assessments.
Information-based Academic education programmes. Regulatory capacity building. 
Public engagement programmes around projects. Information 
portal and documentation.
International  
co-operation
Regional technology knowledge networks.International  
demonstration fund for CCS.
Table 5: Policy options to promote CCS
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Carbon cap and trading schemes. Carbon and energy taxes (that  
penalize fossil fuels). Subsidies to renewables and nuclear energy, 
e.g. feed-in tari"s and low interest rates. Remove subsidies to 
fossil fuels.
Regulatory Mandates on the share of low-carbon fuels/technologies. Remove 
barriers to innovation, such as restrictions on distributed generation 
or maximum amounts of renewable energy on the grid. Establish 
clear interconnection rules for power grids and ensure that they 
encourage the use of e!cient low-carbon technologies.
Public investment Direct investment in low-carbon energy infrastructure  
or technologies. Spending on research and development of  
low-carbon sources.
Information-based Awareness-raising and educational programmes. Education  
and training in engineering and policy. Provide assessments of 
low-carbon resources.
International  
co-operation
Co-operative programmes on technology research and develop-
ment, e.g. through partnerships and IEA implementing agreements.
Table 6: Natural system e"ects of sea-level rise
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phase is likely to last for over a decade. In the longer term, CCS could 
emerge as a potential mitigation option in certain locations. There are 
a number of ways in which a government can seek to encourage the 
development, demonstration and deployment of CCS technology if it 
decides that CCS should from part of its portfolio of mitigation actions 
(Table 5: See previous page). Most of these policy options, especially 
related to awareness-raising and public investment, would probably 
be a pre-requisite for CCS to take o". Some economic instruments are 
complementary, especially those addressing di"erent technological 
maturity phases, even to the extent that the one is not e"ective 
without the other; other instruments would address the same problem. 
 Adaptation policy options
 Prioritizing adaptation actions at the global level is hard 
because of the huge array of potential climate impacts, the di"erent 
types of societies they will hit and the wide range of potential adaptation 
strategies and measures. For any given country, the choice of appropriate 
policy options, as well as decisions on timing, sequencing and levels of 
investment, depend very much on the specific national context and the 
range of projected climate changes and their consequences.
 Improving coastal zone management
 Climate change and its causes are expected to lead to major 
changes in coastal areas including decreasing seawater pH, rising sea 
levels and sea surface temperatures, and changing storm, wave and 
run-o" characteristics. Rising global-mean sea levels due to thermal 
expansion and the melting of land-based ice are already being observed, 
and this rise is likely to accelerate through the 21st century: the IPCC’s 
Fourth Assessment Report projects a rise of 20 to 60 centimetres by the 
2090s (IPCC, 2007). Some recent analyses have suggested that, while 
highly unlikely, a rise of 2 metres by 2100 cannot be discounted. There 
is also increasing concern about higher extreme sea levels due to more 
intense storms superimposed on these mean rises, especially for areas 
a"ected by tropical storms. While higher sea levels only impact coastal 
areas, these are the most densely populated and economically active 
land areas on Earth and they also support important and productive 
ecosystems that are sensitive to sea-level change. It is fairly certain that 
sea level will continue to rise due to human-induced global warming far 
beyond the 21st century due to the large thermal inertia of the oceans.
 Three distinct generic types of adaptation actions to rising 
sea levels can be identified:
      ›  Protect, i.e. reduce the probability of rising sea levels occurring.
      ›  Accommodate, i.e. reduce its impacts.
      ›  Retreat, i.e. reduce exposure to it.
NATURAL SYSTEM EFFECT INTERACTING 
FACTORS:  
CLIMATE
INTERACTING  
FACTORS:  
NON-CLIMATE
SOCIO- 
ECONOMIC  
SYSTEM  
ADAPTATION
Inundation,  
flood and storm 
damage
Surge (sea) Wave/storm 
climate; erosion; 
sediment supply
Sediment  
supply; flood 
management; 
erosion; land 
claim
Dykes/surge  
barriers [P].
Building codes/
flood-wise  
buildings [A] 
Land-use  
planning/haz-
ard delineation 
[A/R]
Backwater  
e"ect (river)
Run-o" Surge (sea)
Wetland loss/
change
CO2 fertilization; 
sediment supply
Sediment supply; 
migration space; 
direct destruction
Land-use  
planning [A/R] 
Managed  
realignment/
forbid hard 
defences [R] 
Nourishment/ 
sediment  
management 
[P] 
Erosion Sediment sup-
ply; wave/storm 
climate
Sediment supply Coastal 
defences [P]
Nourishment 
[P]Building 
setbacks [R].
Saltwater intru-
sion
Surface 
waters
Run-o" Catchment man-
agement and land 
use
Saltwater 
intrusion  
barriers [P]. 
Change water 
abstraction 
[A/R]
Groundwater Rainfall
Rising water 
tables/impeded 
drainage
Rainfall 
Run-o"
Land and aquifer 
use; catchment 
management
Upgrade 
drainage  
systems [P] 
Polders [P] 
Change land 
use [A] 
Land-use 
planning/hazard 
delineation 
[A/R]
Some interacting 
factors, such as 
sediment supply, 
appear twice as they 
can be influenced 
by both climate and 
non-climate factors. 
[P] Protection, [A] 
Accommodation, 
[R] Retreat. Sources: 
Nicholls and Tol 
(2006).
 The application of these measures needs to take place within 
the context of coastal management, which is concerned with managing 
all the drivers threatening the coastal zone, not just climate change. 
Given that our scientific understanding is far from complete in coastal 
areas, there is much to be learnt from monitoring our interventions. This 
is consistent with adaptive management approaches (Figure 2). 
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 There is a very large number of individual measures 
available to implement these actions. The main measures concern 
the construction of physical barriers and changes to land use and 
are presented in Table 6 (See previous page). In addition, enhancing 
the capacity for coastal management is also an important step in 
enhancing the capacity to adapt to climate change in coastal areas.
 Reducing human health impacts and risks
 The potential impacts of climate change on population health 
include a wide range of diseases and health outcomes, from infectious 
diseases and chronic diseases to malnutrition and injuries. Adaptation, 
broadly defined, would include all activities or interventions that 
reduce or prevent these additional cases of disease or deaths. An 
obvious example is the health impacts of extreme weather events, 
such as heat waves, floods and droughts. There is a wide range of 
policy options in the area of traditional public health activities that 
focus on disease prevention and control policies in low and middle 
income countries (Table 7). Some of these options can be applied 
equally to developed countries. There are many other actions outside 
the health sector that are also needed to improve health, which 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Subsidize or o"er tax exemptions to pharmaceutical companies  
to provide medications (e.g. cholera immunization).
Regulatory Introduce regulations (e.g. water and air quality standards).
Public investment Improve infrastructure, capacity and access to primary and 
secondary healthcare services. Carry out research to evaluate 
ex ante the e"ectiveness and cost-e"ectiveness of policies to 
reduce attributable health impacts. Increase healthcare work-
force and invest in their training. Provide up-front public invest-
ment to purchase drugs  
(e.g. insecticide-treated bed nets for malaria) or develop new 
drugs (e.g. anti-malarials).
Information-based Develop and implement health forecasting and early warning 
system. Increase investment in health-promotion programmes.
International  
co-operation
Provide global health forecasting systems
Table 7: Policy options to reduce human health impacts and risks
Adaptation
Mitigation
CLIMATE 
VARIABILITY
CLIMATE 
CHANGE
IMPACTS
EXISTING MANAGE-
MENT PRATICES
MONITORING
EVALUATIONIMPLEMENTATION
PLANNING
DESIGN
POLICY CRITERIA COASTAL DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
INFORMATION
AWARENESS
OTHER
STRESSES
Figure 2: Conceptual framework for coastal adaptation 
are addressed by the other climate-policy themes. These actions 
include, for example, the strengthening of coastal and river defences 
against floods and improving water supply and sanitation. Health 
e"ects should always be considered in decision-making concerning 
environmental policies, particularly those policies that may cause 
harm. Climate-change impacts and health priorities will vary greatly 
both between and within countries. 
 Reducing agricultural output losses
 Widespread hunger and rising global food demands 
necessitate better use of the world’s water, land and ecosystems. 
With world population expected to grow to about 9 billion by 
2050, agricultural production will need to increase by about 70% 
globally and by 100% in developing countries. An enormous e"ort 
is required to achieve such growth. Some 1.6 billion hectares of land 
are currently used for crop production, with about 1 billion under 
cultivation in developing countries. As people strive to get the 
most out of land already in production or exploit virgin territory to 
develop more agricultural land to grow food, the damage inflicted 
on the environment will grow. About 40% of the world’s arable land 
is already degraded to some degree and will be further impacted by 
climate change, including by expected extreme weather events and 
climate variability. 
Table 8: Policy options to reduce agricultural output losses
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 Food insecurity is compounded by water scarcity. Some 30 
countries already face water shortages, and by 2050 this number 
could increase to over 50 countries, most of them in the developing 
world. About one-quarter of the world’s population live in areas 
categorized as physically water scarce and one-sixth in areas of 
economic water scarcity (UNESCO [United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization] [2006], Water — A Shared 
Responsibility: The United Nations Water Development Report 2, 
UNESCO/Berghahn Books, Paris/New York). While current research 
confirms that crops would respond positively to elevated CO2 in 
the absence of climate change, human activities — primarily fossil 
fuel burning and deforestation — are causing massive atmospheric 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Review and adjust agricultural subsidies and taxes, e.g. to support 
new technology, crop varieties/seed material, the introduction of 
improved climate-change resistant livestock breeds and improved 
and e!cient irrigation technologies. Water pricing. Payment 
for ecosystem services, such as watershed protection, carbon 
sequestration and  
biodiversity protection. Create local food and feed banks for 
people and livestock. Risk bearing and sharing schemes, national 
disaster funds and crop insurance.
Regulatory Review agricultural policies for consistency with climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policies. Impose caps on irrigation 
water use; regulate irrigation water distribution. Establish inte-
grated land use planning and zoning. Promote stakeholder-led 
development planning and adaptation strategies.
Public investment Develop new crop varieties for improved resistance to drought, 
heat and salt tolerance and climate-change resistant livestock 
breeds. Establish programmes for soil-fertility maintenance. 
Improve management and maintenance of existing water supply. 
Dam construction for irrigation. Build desalination plants. Main-
tain emergency food stocks.
Information-based Raise public awareness on climate change and adaptation. 
Improve forecasting for farming, extreme events and disaster 
management and develop monitoring and early warning systems 
(weather, crop yield; pest & disease). Establish/enhance educa-
tion and outreach programmes on conservation and management 
of soil and water. Provide education and capacity building for 
improving farm level production decisions and for local communi-
ties to assist in disaster relief actions.
International  
co-operation
Negotiate agreements on sharing transboundary water resources, 
technology transfer, gene banks/germplasm, pest and disease 
monitoring and warning, agricultural knowledge sharing. Support 
international data collection and analytical capacity building, 
relief and reconstruction programmes and new risk hedging 
instruments and international insurance pools.
concentrations of greenhouse-gas emissions, leading to higher 
temperatures, altered precipitation patterns, and increased frequency 
of extreme events, such as drought and floods. This combination 
of factors will likely depress agricultural yields and increase food 
production risks in many world regions in the future, particularly in 
many of the current food-insecure countries.
 As noted in IPCC (2007), the array of potential adaptive 
responses available to human societies is very large, ranging from 
purely technological (e.g. sea defences), through behavioural (for 
example, altered food choices) to managerial (e.g. altered farm 
practices) and to policy (such as planning and regulations). There 
are also many barriers, limits and costs for adaptation, ranging from 
environmental, economic and informational to socio-cultural and 
behavioural. There are similarly a range of policy options available to 
governments to drive these responses (Table 8). 
 Increasing infrastructure resilience
 Physical infrastructure, such as water supply, sanitation, 
energy, transportation and communication services, and institutional 
systems like delivering healthcare, security, and fire control and other 
services, are vulnerable to long-term climate change in two ways: 
it influences average weather conditions and can, thereby, reduce 
infrastructure service quality, quantity or reliance; and it can give rise 
to more frequent extreme weather events. Changes in infrastructure 
design, operation or management, including response mechanisms, 
are required to increase the resilience of infrastructure so as to 
minimize the negative impacts of these threats when they materialize. 
 Formulating policies to achieve this is complicated by the fact 
that future climate change is still extremely uncertain. Nonetheless, 
the resilience of infrastructure and risk-management systems in most 
countries is already sub-optimal regardless of any potential change 
in climate, so polices to increase resilience are often 'no-regrets'. 
This would be the case in many developing countries for electricity 
networks or drinking water networks. Such policies cannot, therefore, 
be assessed purely from a climate-change perspective. 
 There is a broad range of options, categorized by type 
of instrument, that can be implemented to increase short-term 
resilience (the ability to cope with extreme weather events) or 
long-term resilience (the ability to cope with longer-term changes 
in environmental conditions, like gradual soil deterioration) or both 
(Table 9). These options are sometimes synergetic, i.e. they increase 
both short-term and long-term resilience, but they sometimes  
conflict, i.e. there is a trade-o" between the two. In practice, there 
can be trade-o"s between infrastructure resilience and e!ciency 
in normal times; for instance, redundancy of assets may increase 
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resilience (for example, an ensemble of two bridges is more resilient 
than a single bridge), but also increases costs. So there may be 
little incentive for infrastructure investors and managers to increase 
resilience without government policies to either oblige or encourage 
them to do so.
 Improving water resource management
 Climate change could have substantial impacts on water 
availability, water quality, the frequency and magnitude of flood 
and drought events, and on aquatic ecology. There is considerable 
evidence that global warming will result in a general acceleration of 
the global hydrologic cycle — the continuous movement of water on, 
above and below the surface of the Earth. Surface water will evaporate 
more readily and the moisture-holding capacity of the atmosphere will 
increase, leading to an overall increase in atmospheric water vapour 
and a greater likelihood of both extremely heavy precipitation events 
and longer, hotter dry spells. Evidence from climate models points to 
increased precipitation in far northern and southern latitudes, drier 
conditions in many subtropical locations and wetter again in some 
areas along the equator, though the extent of these changes is highly 
Table 9: Policy options to increase infrastructure resilience
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Policies to create incentives to promote resilience, such as  
penalties for unreliable infrastructure performance or subsidizing 
enhanced reliability.
Regulatory Technical building codes and construction standards and  
regulations, and procedural standards (such as requirements 
to carry out vulnerability studies, adapted to take into account 
climate change and the resulting change in natural risks).
Public investment Additional investments by government and/or local authorities 
(including through public-private partnerships) to increase 
infrastructure reliance and resilience, either through retrofitting 
existing infrastructure, building new infrastructure or duplicating 
existing infrastructure to augment redundancy and resilience.
Information-based Gathering and dissemination of information by public bodies, for 
example, through the funding of research and development. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, the UKCIP programme handles 
both research and accessibility of information to businesses, 
regional government agencies and households.
Institution-based Pooling of emergency response capability. Adapting crisis-man-
agement systems can be a ‘no regret’ measure as it can often be 
justified by existing natural risks.
uncertain. In addition, warmer air temperatures will have significant 
impacts on the timing of snow-melt run-o", evaporative losses from 
soil and surface water, and plant-water use. Rising sea levels will 
cause saline intrusion into coastal aquifers as well as flooding of some 
coastal areas.
 Many countries are already struggling to manage water 
e"ectively and climate change will complicate that challenge. Water 
and infrastructure management will need to adapt to deal with the 
threats to humans, aquatic environments and to ecosystems generally 
posed by the changes in hydrologic systems that are expected to be 
caused by climate change. The threats to humans include increased 
vulnerability to floods and droughts, and longer-term changes in 
water availability and quality, as well as greater health risks caused 
by contaminated drinking water, insu!cient water for drinking and 
sanitation and exposure to diseases spread by mosquitoes and 
other water-dependent vectors. Ensuring su!cient water supply for 
irrigation, which now accounts for approximately 70% of all water 
withdrawn from streams, lakes and aquifers for human use, will be a 
major focus of attention. Sound water-policy planning has to strike a 
balance between protecting human uses of water as a resource and 
protecting water’s role in maintaining healthy ecological systems. So, 
policymakers need to explicitly consider how any specific policy or 
measure could a"ect the many inter-linked facets of water use and 
its ecosystem services. In doing so, they need to take account of the 
unpredictability of hydrologic systems and the uncertainty about how 
climate change will a"ect them. This requires developing a strategy 
that is robust to the plausible range of future hydrologic change, while 
preserving both resilience to surprises and options to modify plans 
as the need arises. There are many policy options to improve water 
resource management in ways that would help to maintain water 
quality and the reliable provision of water for human and ecological 
uses despite the impacts of climate change (Table 10: See next page). 
In many cases, appropriate policy design will require basic information 
on the state of the water resource system, existing water-use practices, 
hydrologic variability over time, and the status and sensitivity of 
water-dependent ecological resources. Policies focused on building 
that information base are often good candidates for early investment 
and continued support.
 Increasing terrestrial ecosystems resilience
 Terrestrial ecosystems are vital to the maintenance of 
human well-being and play a vital role in the global carbon cycle, 
removing three gigatonnes of carbon from the atmosphere every 
year. Accelerating changes in the global climate are expected to 
have widespread negative e"ects on terrestrial ecosystems, through 
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altered patterns of temperature and precipitation, which govern the 
rates of many biological and chemical reactions and control critical 
ecosystem processes. Global distribution of vegetation is expected to 
shift pole-ward and altitudinally, prompting shifts in species’ climatic 
zones, patterns of migration and abundance, while warmer (equatorial) 
ecosystems are expected to experience increased vulnerability to pests, 
fire and competition. Such shifts in terrestrial ecosystem processes will 
a"ect humans everywhere; communities and regions where livelihoods 
are closely tied to natural resources are especially vulnerable. Profound 
changes in resource-management systems are, thus, required to 
respond to and limit biodiversity loss, reduced access to clean water, 
and altered forest and crop productivity and yields. Improving 
terrestrial ecosystems' resilience — defined as the capacity to maintain 
similar structure, functioning and feedbacks despite shocks and 
perturbations — must form a central part of climate adaptation actions. 
 There are a host of adaptation options for increasing the 
resilience of terrestrial ecosystems, many of which are based on 
Table 11: Policy options to increase terrestrial ecosystem resilience
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Costing ecosystem goods and services to create new markets for 
them. Subsidies to eco-tourism (market-based conservation 
schemes). Permits (tradable or not) for species extraction/use 
and mineral/abiotic extraction. Taxes and tax incentives for 
maintaining ecosystem structure and function.
Regulatory Legal protection of endangered species and habitats.  
Sustainable ecosystem products (e.g. eco-labelling and green 
marketing). Import tari"s and subsidies that protect critical 
species and habitat in other countries and removal of export 
subsidies that lead to species and habitat loss within the country. 
Quotas for species, minerals and water extraction. Water, soil, 
and other abiotic quality standards and controls. Zoning  
requirements (e.g., limiting flood-plain development and build-
ing in sensitive areas).
Public investment Integrated water management and adaptive management  
institutions and programmes. Livelihood-diversification  
programmes to reduce pressure on land, land-based resources, 
and biodiversity. State and local land reserves, including communal 
management of protected areas. Transition programmes that help 
species anticipate climate shifts. Removal of government investment 
policies that can have a negative impact on ecosystems. Targeted 
invasive species elimination and/or harvesting to restore current 
and future habitat for native ecosystems.
Information-based Monitoring levels of ecosystems goods and services within a  
system. Seasonal, annual and decadal climate forecasts.  
Consulting model outputs and scenarios to construct narratives 
of possible future climate conditions (and the respective impacts 
and adaptation decisions). Improved monitoring of weather (e.g. 
through hand-held devices). Improved education and media 
reporting for understanding climate risk.
International  
co-operation
Debt for nature deals. Widespread distribution of alternative 
technologies and practices. International treaties and conventions, 
and bi- and multi-level agreements on cross-boundary resource 
management issues. International agreements outside the envi-
ronmental sector that take ecosystem health into account. 
Table 10: Policy options to improve water resource management
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Introduce metering and volumetric pricing of water use, including  
irrigation. Remove subsidies on electric power and diesel fuel for  
irrigation pumping. Allow water-right owners to sell or lease water 
to other users.
Regulatory Improve documentation of water entitlements, clarify quantitative 
and temporal limits, and define how entitlements will change  
with changes in water availability. Create a formal legal role for 
community organizations in defining, documenting and  
enforcing water entitlements, and forums for watershed to basin-
scale water policy-planning.
Public investment Build reservoirs, flood by-pass infrastructure with active  
groundwater recharge projects (where feasible) and flood-control 
projects as an alternative to traditional dams and levees.  
Encourage investment in small-scale rain-water capture systems 
and urban storm drainage systems. Relocate or redesign  
sewerage-treatment infrastructure to avoid damage/malfunction 
due to flooding.
Information-based Establish network of weather stations, stream gauges and  
monitoring wells, and publish real-time information on  
watershed/aquifer conditions. Establish a phone network to 
convey flash-flood warnings. Set up educational programmes on 
e!cient irrigation practices.
International  
co-operation
Establish joint scientific programmes among nations sharing  
trans-boundary water resources. Identify rigidities in existing treaties 
and environmental agreements relating to these water resources and 
evaluate their potential consequences. Negotiate contingency plans 
and joint investment projects with neighbouring countries. 
well-established, classical natural resource management approaches 
(some of the main types of policies are summarised in Table 11). 
In general, simply implementing what is already known to protect 
terrestrial ecosystems will likely be beneficial for adapting to climate 
change. However, policymakers need to consider a number of 
factors that make some adaptation policies unique, including the 
need to take both fast-moving variables such as extreme-weather 
events and slow-moving variables such as changes in hydrology and 
sediment concentration into account. And the impact on humans 
of changes that have already occurred need to be considered: an 
adaptation policy that restores an ecosystem to its ‘natural’ state, 
Table 12: Policy options to increase marine ecosystem resilience
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such as through dam removal, may improve ecosystem resilience 
at the expense of humans whose livelihoods and security are 
dependent upon the current configuration of the ecosystem, such as 
through flood protection and energy production. The interaction of 
adaptation policies with mitigation measures also needs to be taken 
into account. For example, an adaptation policy that encourages 
reforestation can improve resilience by increasing biodiversity and 
habitat permeability, while also increasing mitigation benefits through 
additional capture and storage of carbon in the enhanced plant and 
soil matter. On the other hand, an adaptation policy that protects 
critical habitat for endangered species might prevent the development 
and commercialization of available renewable energy resources within 
the protected area (such as wind, geothermal and solar energy). The 
most successful adaptations policies are likely to include those that 
emphasize adaptive management and governance, research into social 
sciences, and developing incentives and disincentives for altering 
behaviour. 
 Increasing marine ecosystems resilience
 Empirical observations and models indicate ocean conditions 
have been changing over the last 100 years and will most likely change 
more rapidly in the future. Major changes include ocean warming, 
acidification and expansion of oxygen minimum zones (the zone in 
INSTRUMENT POLICY OPTIONS
Market-based Tradable fishing quotas (e.g. inter-transferable quotas). Fishing  
capacity buybacks. Polluter-paid schemes. Sustainable  
certification schemes. Tax incentives (or disincentives).  
Elimination of bad subsidies.
Regulatory Fishing input controls. Fishing output controls. Legislation for  
the conservation of threatened species. Ecosystem and  
environmental standards (e.g., Marine Strategy Framework  
Directive). Integrated marine spatial planning.
Public investment Sewage treatment facility. Investment in protected marine areas. 
Investment in resource-management research. Development of 
alternative livelihoods for fishing communities.
Information-based Control surveillance and vessel monitoring system. Integrated  
assessment of marine ecosystems. Public education.
International 
co-operation
International agreement on fisheries, shipping, biodiversity and 
dumping. Regional fishery management organizations. International 
research collaboration and agreements on technological transfer.
which oxygen saturation in seawater in the ocean is at its lowest). 
Biological responses to these ocean changes have been observed 
in the marine biomes. Climate change could lead to high rates of 
species invasion in high latitude regions and local extinction along 
the tropics. Marine climate change a"ects primary productivity, 
species distribution and community and food-web structure, which 
have direct and indirect impacts on distribution and productivity of 
marine organisms. These have implications for the goods and services 
provided by the marine ecosystems to human societies. 
 Marine ecosystems are constantly changing as a result of 
changes in environmental conditions or human disturbance. In many 
cases, such changes are reversible, but only when environmental 
changes or disturbances are not too large. Ecosystem resilience is 
the magnitude of perturbation resulting from external human and 
environmental pressures that an ecosystem can withstand before 
such irreversible ecosystem changes occurs. Marine biodiversity, 
productivity and ecosystem functioning have already been altered 
substantially by human activities, (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
2003). The main human impacts include overfishing, pollution and 
habitat destruction, which have increased ecosystem vulnerability and 
reduced its resilience, and exacerbated the impacts of climate change. 
 Improving ecosystem resilience must form an important 
element of climate-change adaptation policies. The main approach 
is to develop e"ective policy responses that regulate and manage 
human activities, and reduce other impacts on marine ecosystems. 
In doing so, it is important to understand the role of di"erent socio-
economic drivers in inducing pressures on the marine environment, 
leading to changes in the ecosystem states and impacts on the welfare 
of people and communities. A range of policy options may be applied, 
most of which aim to manage or reduce pressures from human 
activities on marine ecosystems (Table 12).
 Reducing extreme weather event impacts
 Economic losses and human su"ering caused by extreme 
weather events such as floods, droughts and other climate-related 
events have escalated alarmingly in recent decades. Annual monetary 
losses from large-scale events have risen globally by an order of 
magnitude within four decades, an increase that cannot be fully 
explained by population or economic growth (Mills, 2009). According 
to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, anthropogenic climate 
change is very likely to lead to increases in intensity and frequency 
of weather extremes throughout this century (IPCC, 2007). Low- and 
middle-income countries, and especially vulnerable people within 
these countries, su"er the most. Not only are there considerable 
di"erences in developed and developing countries in the immediate 
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RISK SPREADING
& TRANSFER
Figure 3: Disaster management cycle 
human and economic burden, but also in insurance cover. In the richest 
countries, about 30% of the losses are insured compared with only 
about 1% in low-income countries. 
 Many highly exposed developing countries do not have the 
means to raise capital to replace or repair damaged assets and restore 
livelihoods following major disasters, exacerbating the impacts of 
disaster shocks on poverty and development. Exposed countries 
often have to rely on donors to 'bail' them out after events, though 
only partial relief and reconstruction funding is usually made available 
and, even then, it often does not reach those most in need. Bilateral 
and multilateral donors currently allocate 98% of their disaster-
management funds for relief and reconstruction and only 2% for 
proactive disaster risk management. Nonetheless, over the last few 
years, there has been a shift in international responses to natural 
disasters towards more proactive activity and upgrading the role of 
pre-disaster risk management. These e"orts tie in with the distinction 
in climate-change policies between reactive (gradual coping with the 
consequences over time) and proactive climate adaptation (planned 
actions to prepare for climate change and reduce the associated 
adverse impacts) (Figure 3).
This figure shows 
preparedness (risk 
management) and 
response (responding 
to impacts)
 Policy options to reduce the various impacts of weather-
related disasters and manage risk relate to assessing risk, reducing risk 
(prevention and preparedness), preparing for impacts, transferring and 
spreading it to a larger basis (risk financing) and, finally, responding to 
an event through reconstruction and rehabilitation (Table 13: See next 
page). Prevention and preparedness options reduce the losses, while 
insurance and other risk financing instruments lessen the variability 
of losses by spreading and pooling risks. The policy options cover 
short-term disaster-risk management (aimed at reducing current and 
near-future risk up to, for example, a decade ahead), to long-term 
climate adjustment (for example, land-use planning to respond to the 
risk of flooding) or both.
Table 13: Policy options to reduce extreme weather event impacts
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POLICY OPTION CATEGORY TIME HORIZON
MARKET-
BASED
REGULATORY PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT
INFORMA-
TION 
-BASED
INT’L 
CO- 
OPERA-
TION
SHORT 
TERM 
(<10YRS)
LONG 
TERM 
(>10YRS)
Risk assessment Hazard assessment × × ×
Vulnerability assess-
ment
× ×
Risk assessment × ×
Hazard monitoring  
& forecasting
× × ×
Risk reduction Physical & structural 
risk reduction works
× × × × ×
Land-use planning  
& building codes
× × × × ×
Economic incentives 
for proactive risk 
management
× × × × ×
Education, training  
& awareness raising
× × × ×
Preparedness Early warning sys-
tems, communica-
tion systems
× × × ×
Contingency plan-
ning
× × × ×
Networks of emer-
gency responders
× × ×
Shelter facilities  
& evacuation plans
× × × × ×
Risk financing Risk transfer × × × × × × ×
Alternative risk 
transfer
× × × × × ×
National and local 
reserve funds
× × × × ×
Calamity funds × × × ×
Response Humanitarian assis-
tance 
× × × ×
Clean-up, temporary 
repairs & restoration 
of services
× × × ×
POLICY OPTION CATEGORY TIME HORIZON
MARKET-
BASED
REGULATORY PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT
INFORMA-
TION 
-BASED
INT’L 
CO- 
OPERA-
TION
SHORT 
TERM 
(<10YRS)
LONG 
TERM 
(>10YRS)
Damage assessment × × ×
Mobilization of 
recovery resources
× × ×
Reconstruction 
and rehabilita-
tion
Rehabilitation/
reconstruction of 
damaged critical 
infrastructure
× × × ×
Revitalization for 
a"ected sectors
× × × ×
Macroeconomic  
& budget manage-
ment
× × × ×
Incorporation of 
disaster mitigation 
in reconstruction 
activities
× × × × ×
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3  MCA4climate policy  
evaluation framework 
 Climate plans need to be based on a careful assessment 
of the multi-dimensional impacts that a climate policy may have on 
human societies, the economy and the environment to ensure that 
the policy goals are reconciled with broader development objectives. 
The MCA4climate initiative proposes a framework for policymakers 
to use in evaluating the impacts of policy options across the 
di"erent mitigation and adaptation themes and prioritizing them in a 
systematic, step-by-step way. That framework adopts a multi-criteria 
analysis (MCA) approach, a well-established policy-planning technique 
that is well suited to the complex challenges posed by climate change. 
46 47
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
po
lic
y 
ev
al
ua
ti
on
 fr
am
ew
or
k
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
po
lic
y 
ev
al
ua
ti
on
 fr
am
ew
or
k
 Multi-criteria analysis and its rationale
 Climate change will result not only in serious direct economic 
costs, but will also indirectly hamper economic growth prospects 
and inflict damage on humans and natural systems. Such social and 
environmental damages are di!cult to evaluate, in particular because 
non-market impacts such as e"ects on human health, well-being 
and lifestyles, and ecological systems are often di!cult to assess 
and express in monetary terms. Since the 1990s, the most common 
approach for investigating the costs of climate change and designing 
policies to combat it has been traditional cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA). This involves comparing the marginal costs of a mitigation 
or adaptation policy with the marginal benefits associated with the 
climate change that is avoided. CBA is well suited to pure investment 
projects, where future financial flows may be readily identified and 
predicted, but the approach has major limitations when applied 
to policies, including those designed to address climate change. 
The consequences of mitigation and adaptation policy are often 
not easily quantified in monetary terms and may, in any case, be 
extremely uncertain. Most CBA studies largely ignore non-market 
impacts, or externalities, and do not explicitly take uncertainty and 
risk into account. There are also fundamental concerns about inter-
generational equity and, therefore, the appropriate discount rate to 
use in CBA analysis (see section 5). 
 In response to the shortcomings of the CBA approach, new 
approaches to policy assessment and decision-making tools have been 
developed. One such approach is multi-criteria analysis (MCA) 2 — the 
one adopted for the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework. MCA 
takes into account both monetary and non-monetary impacts and 
distinguishes between the multiple dimensions of the climate-change 
problem, ensuring transparency and accountability. MCA also helps 
determine preferences between policy options by reference to an 
explicit set of objectives that the decision-making body has identified 
and for which it has established measurable criteria to assess the 
extent to which the objectives have been achieved (UK DCLG, 2009). 
MCA techniques can be used to identify a single most preferred option 
or a mix of options, to rank options, to short-list a limited number of 
options for subsequent detailed appraisal, or simply to distinguish 
acceptable from unacceptable possibilities. It can be used both 
prospectively to evaluate policies before they are adopted and help 
decide which ones to choose, or retrospectively to verify whether a 
set of policies already adopted are appropriate. A key benefit of MCA 
is that it can handle disaggregated data on fundamental measures 
expressed in di"erent units across relevant criteria, such as health 
e"ects and environmental impacts, and potentially over di"erent 
time horizons and future scenarios. These data can be progressively 
aggregated in di"erent ways to explore, for example, the impact of 
di"erent views among stakeholder groups.
 This approach is particularly well suited to the analysis of 
climate policies and climate-policy planning for several reasons. It 
can be applied to situations in which socio-economic, ecological, 
institutional and ethical perspectives need to be considered in an 
integrated manner. Its application is not limited to variables expressed 
only in monetary units. Morbidity and mortality, equity, environmental 
damage, catastrophic risks and uncertainty can also be taken into 
consideration in applying MCA, resulting in a more comprehensive 
analysis of all the costs and benefits of climate policies. Of course, 
where specific costs and benefits can be valued in monetary terms, 
either by direct observation of prices if appropriate or indirectly using 
generally accepted techniques, then these values can be used in 
combination with other criteria for which monetary valuations are not 
available. These characteristics make MCA particularly useful and more 
versatile for evaluating the cost of damages caused by climate change 
and extreme weather events which can have an array of market and 
non-market impacts across many sectors. 
 Another practical advantage of MCA is that it does not 
require results to be amalgamated into one final value, though this 
is possible. The impact of climate policies can be broken down into 
separate elements, for which data can be compiled and assessments 
made. These independent assessments can still provide valuable 
insights into overall costs and benefits. Disaggregation means that the 
approach is flexible enough to be applicable to di"erent countries. 
Presenting a coherent overall picture to decision-makers requires 
judgements on scoring and weighting the di"erent criteria, which can 
be a source of disagreement and controversy. However, with MCA, this 
process is carried out in a transparent manner, supporting stakeholder 
involvement and more democratic decision-making. The consequences 
of di"erent scoring systems and weightings can be easily analyzed 
using sensitivity analysis (see the next section on case studies). 
 An important characteristic of MCA is the prominence given 
to the judgement of the policymaker (normally a team) in establishing 
objectives and criteria, choosing the techniques to measure them, 
deciding weights and in judging the contribution of each option to 
each performance criterion. But MCA provides a structured, open 
and transparent way of analyzing policies. In short, it leaves an audit 
trail (UK DCLG, 2009). The choices that the decision-making group 
make throughout the policy-evaluation process are open to analysis 
and to change if they are felt to be inappropriate. Moreover, the 
approach allows for direct participation by stakeholders in making 
those choices. Indeed, a fundamental strength of MCA is its emphasis 
on participative processes and collective judgement and decision-
making. However, the contexts in which the methodology may be used 
2   Throughout the project we use the generic term MCA to refer to an analysis of an 
issue which is based on multiple criteria. In the literature the term MCDA (multi-
criteria decision analysis or aid) is also widely used highlighting that the analysis is 
generally carried out in the context of decision support (Belton and Stewart '2002', von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards; 1986). There are many specific approaches to MCA and the 
one used in our case studies develops and uses a multi-criteria value function. Strictly 
speaking, MCDA forms part of the overall MCA approach. In the literature on MCA the 
words criterion, attribute and objective are all used to refer to the factors which are  
to be taken into account in the analysis/decision (sometimes loosely, sometimes with  
a very specific local definition).
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are such that there are likely to be very many possible ways forward 
and it is important to ensure that decisions are not biased, either as 
a consequence of an initially limited or inappropriate specification of 
options for evaluation, or a failure to see the process as an iterative 
one which can stimulate creativity and the design of new options. 
Subjectivity in this regard can be minimized through the participation 
of multiple experts and stakeholders. 
 Applying the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework
 MCA is increasingly used by governments around the 
world to assist in evaluating projects and policies that have complex 
socio-economic and environmental impacts that are often hard to 
measure in monetary terms. 3 So far, it has rarely been used explicitly 
for evaluating climate policies. MCA4climate is the first major 
international initiative to develop an explicit MCA-based framework for 
climate-policy analysis at the strategic level. 
 The MCA4climate policy evaluation framework is intended to 
be used as a practical step-by-step tool for identifying and prioritizing 
mitigation and adaptation policies to be implemented as part of the 
process of formulating an overall climate strategy that is consistent 
with developmental goals. It ensures that all the di"erent dimensions 
of climate policies, including those that cannot be easily measured 
in monetary terms, are taken into consideration. Importantly, it also 
facilitates the engagement of stakeholders in the policy-planning 
process. The intention is for the framework to be used prospectively, 
or in an ex ante way, to evaluate policies before they are adopted, 
though it is possible for it to be applied ex post.
 The generic criteria tree
 At the heart of this framework is a hierarchical criteria tree 
containing a set of generic criteria, against which climate-policy 
planners can evaluate proposed climate-policy actions and their 
potential contribution to a broad range of climate, environmental and 
socio-economic development objectives (Figure 4). This tree has been 
developed by UNEP through an intensive process of consultation carried 
out in close collaboration with a number of international experts involved 
in the MCA4climate initiative. The tree has evolved as the work on the 
initiative has progressed, especially in the light of the results of the case 
studies (see section 4). The version presented here is likely to change in 
the future as our experience with applying the framework expands and 
our understanding of the practical issues involved improves. 
 The generic tree has been built to ensure that each criterion is 
preferentially independent of the others, an important assumption of 
the MCA approach adopted. That is, the assessment of preference with 
3   For example, it is a legal requirement for central governments in EU countries to use 
MCA in public procurement involving spending over a certain amount. The United 
Kingdom was one of the first countries to use MCA for di"erent types of projects and 
policies, and the approach is now widely used across a wide range of central and local 
government activities.  
PUBLIC
FINANCING NEEDS
ENVIRONMENTALOUTPUTS
INPUTS
CLIMATE-RELATED
PROPOSED 
CLIMATE POLICIES
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
POLITICAL & 
INSTITUTIONAL
MINIMIZE SPENDING ON TECHNOLOGY
MINIMIZE OTHER TYPES OF SPENDING
PROTECT BIODIVERSITY
PROTECT ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 
(QUALITY & STOCKS)
SUPPORT ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
TRIGGER PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
REDUCE POVERTY INCIDENCE
IMPROVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
REDUCE INEQUITY
GENERATE EMPLOYMENT
IMPROVE HEALTH
CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL STABILITY
CONTRIBUTE TO FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
PRESERVE CULTURAL HERITAGE
IMPROVE GOVERNANCE
ALLOW FOR EASY IMPLEMENTATION
COMPLY WITH REQUIRED TIMING
OF POLICY INTERVENTION
REDUCE GREENHOUSE-GAS 
& BLACK-CARBON EMISSIONS
ENHANCE RESILIENCE 
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPLEMENTATION 
BARRIERS
Figure 4: MCA4climate generic criteria tree 
Level 1 Level 2
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regard to the consequences of policy options against any one criterion 
is independent of the preference with regard to any other criterion. 
This is to ensure that the options can be scored on one criterion 
without knowing what the options’ scores are on any other criteria. 
In practice, however, preferences with regard to the policy options 
themselves may not be independent, in that some policy options may 
score di"erently when implemented in combination with others. This 
issue is explored in the case study on Yemen (see section 4). In public 
decision-making, it is important to ensure that the set of criteria on 
which an analysis is based captures all relevant concerns; that is, they 
do not reflect a restricted or partisan perspective on the issue, which 
might lead to a biased evaluation. The involvement of theme experts 
in the MCA4climate initiative has ensured that the generic criteria tree 
presents a comprehensive framework for the evaluation of options, 
based on a range of views about all relevant considerations. The structure 
has been debated, tested and refined through the illustrative case studies 
described in this report. A key benefit of the generic tree is that decision 
makers are alerted to all potentially relevant impacts in any specific 
context without the need to engage in a lengthy problem-structuring 
process or to have direct access to the wide range of expert knowledge 
underpinning this initiative. The generic criteria tree contains three levels:
      ›  1st level: There are two criteria — inputs to (or e"orts 
required) and outputs (or possible impacts) of proposed 
policy options. 
      ›  2nd level: There are seven criteria at this level, two of which 
relate to the impact on the input side (public financing 
needs and implementation barriers) and five to impacts 
on the output side (climate-related, economic — including 
fiscal, other environmental, social, and political-institutional 
dimensions of development). The impacts can be either 
positive or negative. 
      ›  3rd level: There are a total of 19 criteria at this level — four on 
the input side (which include monetary and non-monetary 
costs that need to be met for e"ective policy action) and 
15 on the output side (which relate to specific impacts on 
society, the economy and the environment). 
The 3rd-level criteria evaluate the extent to which policy options meet 
the following objectives:
      ›  Minimize spending on technology: this refers to the financing 
needs required from the public purse in order to support a 
particular mix of technologies. This may refer, for instance, to 
the di"erence between the market price and the guaranteed 
electricity price in the case of a renewable feed-in tari" 
mitigation measure, or to the capital and operating 
expenditures relating to the construction and maintenance of 
a bridge in the case of infrastructure adaptation measures. 
      ›  Minimize other types of spending: financing needs required 
from the public purse in order to support a climate-policy 
measure other than the technology itself. This may refer, 
for example, to the cost of implementing, enforcing and 
monitoring a policy, such as energy-e!ciency standards.
      ›  Allow for easy implementation: the suitability of existing 
regulatory frameworks and the changes in institutional 
arrangements required for pursuing the climate-policy 
option being put forward (for example, changes in law and 
governmental ordinances required). It may also relate to 
ownership issues, such as clearly defined land-property 
rights, social acceptability or stakeholder engagement that could 
condition the e"ectiveness and fairness of some policy measures.
      ›  Comply with required timing of policy intervention: this refers 
to the time necessary for a proposed policy option to become 
e"ective (which may vary from a few months to five to ten 
years or even longer) and how well that fits in with the need 
to respond to the threat posed by climate change.
      ›  Reduce greenhouse-gas and black-carbon emissions: the 
extent to which a climate-policy option a"ects the annual 
rate and cumulative emissions of human-made greenhouse 
gases released in the atmosphere. It typically represents the  
primary objective of mitigation action, though it may be important 
(as a side e"ect) under some adaptation options as well.
      ›  Enhance resilience to climate change: how a policy builds 
(or erodes) the ability of social-economic and ecological 
systems to persist in the face of climate change, as well as to 
transform them into new and more desirable configurations 
when required. It typically represents the primary objective 
of adaptation action.
      ›  Trigger private investments: the potential of a policy to 
leverage investments from the private sector. This may 
be further determined at the macroeconomic, industry or 
sectoral level. Indicators to measure the level of private 
investment triggered may also be expressed in terms of 
net investment costs (for example, the di"erence between 
investment costs and energy savings over time for an energy- 
e!ciency policy).
      ›  Improve economic performance: economic output, 
competitiveness and technological change e"ects arising 
from climate policy. This may refer to a specific industry 
or region, as well as to the economy at the national level. 
In addition, competitiveness impacts may relate to price 
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competitiveness (such as changes in productivity) and 
non-price competitiveness (such as changes in trade flows).
      ›  Generate employment: direct job-creation e"ects of a 
policy on a specific industry or region plus indirect knock-on 
e"ects throughout the rest of the economy. Distributional 
employment impacts across categories of population could 
be also considered.
      ›  Contribute to fiscal sustainability: the e"ect of climate-policy 
actions on the primary and secondary public accounts, including 
both government revenues and government expenditures.
      ›  Protect environmental resources: this covers policy-induced 
impacts on water, land and air quality and the corresponding 
natural resource stocks (where applicable). 
      ›  Protect biodiversity: biological diversity includes here the 
variety of living organisms, the genetic di"erences among 
them and the diversity of ecosystems that they inhabit. 
      ›  Support ecosystem services: this criterion refers to the 
services of natural ecosystems that humans benefit from. 
These services can be classified into four broad groups: 
provisioning services, regulatory services, supporting 
services and cultural services. 4
      ›  Reduce poverty incidence: impacts of a climate policy 
on the incidence of income poverty, access poverty and 
empowerment or social fabric issues. For example, impacts 
may refer to the number of people below an income-poverty 
line. The incidence of access poverty may relate to the 
number of people without access to energy, finance, water, 
land and other resources.
      ›  Reduce inequity: climate policy-induced changes in the 
systematic disparities between groups of population (intra-
generational) or generations (inter-generational) in terms of 
income and access to resources or services. These refer to 
inequity considerations other than employment and health 
distributional impacts included in the other criteria. 
      ›  Improve health: human-health aspects directly or indirectly 
a"ected by climate policy concerning nutrition, vector-borne 
diseases, water and air-related risks and diseases, and the 
overall health of populations. It also includes distributional 
health impacts across di"erent types of population or 
households.
      ›  Preserve cultural heritage: this refers to the impacts of 
climate policy on cultural assets. In the case of adaptation, 
cultural assets at risk due to climate change can be protected 
(though mal-adaptation may increase these risks). In the 
case of mitigation, cultural assets may be either endangered 
(for example, the e"ect of building a wind farm on culturally 
valuable sites) or may be further preserved (for example, 
avoiding deforestation in forests associated with important 
spiritual or cultural values). Cultural heritage may refer to 
tangible cultural heritage consisting of movable assets (such 
as paintings, sculptures and manuscripts) and immovable 
assets (such as monuments and archaeological sites), as 
well as intangible cultural heritage (such as oral traditions, 
performing arts and rituals).
      ›  Contribute to political stability: policy impacts on changes 
in conflict and violence risks related to water-stress, food 
security and migration, as well as on energy security. These 
risks may be avoided but also multiplied depending on how 
climate-change impacts are addressed. Energy security 
refers to changes in the vulnerability of a country’s energy 
supply to external factors beyond its control. Aspects that 
could be considered here include the growing dependence 
on imported fuels from monopolistic sources or produced 
in or transiting unstable countries, as well as the impacts of 
extreme weather events and natural disasters.
      ›  Improve governance: policy impacts on national or local 
governance structures, including institutional setups and 
regulatory frameworks. For instance, organizing action at 
the community-level to help manage and adapt to climate 
change can improve local governance in general, which could 
bring benefits in dealing with other issues.
 In practice, the generic tree can be extended to lower levels to 
allow a more detailed analysis of policy options corresponding to di"erent 
themes. This is explored in two of the case studies set out in section 4. 
 Based on the generic criteria tree, we developed sets of 
indicators corresponding to each of the 12 policy themes — four 
covering mitigation and eight covering adaptation. These indicators 
have been identified to provide practical measures of performance 
of policy options against the 3rd-level criteria. In practice, the 
indicators to be used would draw on these generic sets (though 
additional indicators might be selected depending on national or 
local circumstances). The indicators are expressed in monetary or 
non-monetary terms; in the case of the latter, they are quantitative 
or qualitative. Some indicators are applied across di"erent themes. 
For each theme-specific indicator, general recommendations on the 
most appropriate methods of assessment and sources of data have 
been drawn up. These recommendations take account of the guiding 
principles and practical recommendations on how to address a 
number of critical issues for climate-policy analysis (set out in section 
5). An example of some of the main proposed indicators for three 
themes — two on mitigation (energy e!ciency and CCS) and one on 
4   Based on the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (UNEP, 2005).  
Detailed definition and descriptions can be found at: 
www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.300.aspx.pdf  
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adaptation (health) — are given in Table 14, Table 15 (See next page) 
and Table 16 (See next page). More details about the indicators and 
the recommended methods of assessment for each of the themes can 
be found in the individual theme reports, which are available at  
www.mca4climate.info.
 Steps in applying the framework
 The full process of applying the MCA4climate policy 
evaluation framework involves seven main steps, summarised in Box 
1. These steps are demonstrated in the case studies in section 4. Once 
the context has been established, including clarifying the climate and 
other policy objectives, the key steps are to: identify policy options or 
policy portfolios to be evaluated; agree on the criteria and indicators 
starting from those already suggested under this framework; agree 
on scenarios, the timeline of the analysis and methods of assessment 
(drawing on the guiding principles of the MCA4climate initiative — 
see section 5); score the di"erent options against the agreed criteria; 
weight the criteria to reflect di"erent stakeholder perspectives and 
priorities, and using these values together with the scores to, derive 
a measure of aggregate performance for each option at higher levels 
of the criteria tree; and, finally, explore these initial results through 
sensitivity analyses. 
 The application of the framework up to the fifth step only 
can provide very useful insights into how each policy option performs 
and may be su!cient to inform decision-making, without attempting 
to prioritize those options in an explicit way. The value of this level of 
analysis is illustrated in the case studies. To proceed beyond this step 
CRITERION MAIN INDICATORS
Improve health Environmental conditions of the housing properties, including 
share of households in neighbourhoods with above average  
pollution rate and % of households that cook inside the house
Preserve cultural 
heritage
Not applicable
Contribute to political 
stability
Reduce dependency on energy imports (e.g. % share of  
commercial fuels exported); physical reserves of energy
Improve governance Existing mechanisms to fund energy e!ciency implementation 
and improve energy e!ciency governance (e.g. stimulus funding, 
general appropriations from government budgets)
Table 14: 3rd-level criteria and indicators for improving energy 
e!ciency and conserving energy
CRITERION MAIN INDICATORS
Minimize spending on 
technology
Overall cost of energy-e!ciency improvement policies (including 
investments in innovation and technical capacity, and subsidies 
and tax exemptions/deductions)
Minimize other types 
of spending 
Implementation, administration, enforcement and programme 
costs; as well as investments in training, evaluation and expansion 
of consumer education and market-bases initiatives
Allow for easy  
implementation
Quality of institutions, including number and size of institutes/
organisations involved in policy implementation, execution and 
monitoring
Comply with required 
timing of policy  
intervention
Time required for designing energy e!ciency policies and time 
taken by policies to be e"ective
Reduce greenhouse-
gases and black-carbon 
emissions
Emission reduction in percentage reduction of greenhouse gases  
(& black carbon if relevant) compared to a business as usual
Enhance resilience to 
climate change
Not applicable
Trigger private  
investments
Whether businesses/households invest in energy e!cient  
equipment and target groups (e.g. number of households that 
have implemented energy saving measures)
Improve economic 
performance
Changes in the energy use in industry and households; Costs of 
measures (e.g. cost per tonne of CO2 emissions avoided) and share 
of energy costs in overall costs of industry and household spending
Generate employment Number of jobs created in energy e!ciency services and number 
of technical sta" trained; as well as number of jobs created in 
other sectors linked to those sectors for which energy e!ciency 
improvements occurred
Contribute to fiscal 
sustainability
Development of public investment over time, including projected 
(and realised) public spending on energy-e!ciency policies, and 
changes in government revenue from energy taxes
Protect environmental 
resources (quality and 
stocks)
Indoor air quality indicators such as the use of appropriate fuels, 
pollution control and exposure reduction
Protect biodiversity Changes in number of species if applicable
Support ecosystem 
services
Not applicable
Reduce poverty  
incidence
Basic energy needs covered (e.g. % of households with access to 
electricity and other forms of commercial energy) and changes in 
household energy use (e.g. % of household income spent on fuel and 
electricity; % of households that rely on traditional cooking methods)
Reduce inequity The distribution of number of people with access to energy across 
di"erent types, including number of households connected to a 
local or centralized electricity network); and household energy 
use across income groups
Table 15: 3rd-level criteria and indicators for encouraging carbon 
capture and storage
Table 16: 3rd-level criteria and indicators for reducing human 
health impacts and risks
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CRITERION MAIN INDICATORS
Minimize spending on 
technology
Investment and operating costs
Minimize other types of 
spending 
Costs of assessments.  
Revenue generating potential for enhanced oil recovery
Allow for easy  
implementation
Presence of oil and gas industry or mining law for deep  
underground. Number of specialized workers; existence of  
mandated competent authority
Comply with required 
timing of policy  
intervention
Time needed to issue the respective laws/regulations
Reduce greenhouse-
gas and black-carbon 
emissions
Tonnes of CO2 emissions avoided
Enhance resilience to 
climate change
Not applicable
Trigger private  
investments
Ratio of public/private investment in the technology
Improve economic 
performance
CCS-related turnover
Generate employment Amount of jobs created as a consequence of CCS
Contribute to fiscal 
sustainability
Projected (and realized) public spending on CCS. Projected  
(and realized) tax income resulting from CCS
Protect environmental 
resources
Emission reduction of SOx, NOx, particulate matter and mercury. 
Safety risk of storage operations (probability x impact)
Protect biodiversity Location of storage potential in nature reserves
Support ecosystem 
services
Dependence on groundwater resources for human consumption. 
Projected leakage rate into groundwater resources for human 
consumption under legislative scenarios
Reduce poverty  
incidence
Not applicable
Reduce inequity Inclusion of appropriate stakeholder engagement guidelines  
or obligations in CCS legal framework
Improve health Changes in health expenditures. Incidence of respiratory  
diseases. Mortality or DALYs (disability-adjusted life years)
Preserve cultural  
heritage
Location of cultural assets close to storage potential
Contribute to political 
stability
Dependence on fossil fuels (in particular coal). Additional fuel 
use (GJ)/reduced power supply as a consequence of CCS
Improve governance Community engagement and strengthening of institutions
CRITERION MAIN INDICATORS
Minimize spending on 
technology
Capital and operating expenditures (monetary)
Minimize other types 
of spending 
Spending on strengthening heath systems and assessing  
vulnerability to climate impacts (monetary)
Allow for easy imple-
mentation
Required institutional set-up (number of organizational changes)
Comply with required 
timing of policy  
intervention
Time horizon of implementation and time taken to be e"ective 
(time)
Reduce greenhouse-
gases and black-carbon 
emissions
Reduced carbon footprint of health services (CO2-equivalent  
emissions)
Enhance resilience to 
climate change
Increase in the number and quality of health-related measures 
(number & qualitative description or measure).
Trigger private  
investments
Investments in primary healthcare and in hospitals (monetary)
Improve economic 
performance
Increase in economic output (economy-wide production indices) 
and economic productivity (input/output ratios)
Generate employment Reduction in unemployment due to ill-health (number)
Contribute to fiscal 
sustainability
Health sector jobs (number)
Protect environmental 
resources
Reduction in chemical spraying (amount of chemicals per hectare 
per type of chemical)
Protect biodiversity New drug treatments developed (number by type)
Support ecosystem 
services
Maintenance of healthy environment (quality of air, water and 
soil)
Reduce poverty  
incidence
Increase in household access to healthcare services (% of  
population with access) and household spending on healthcare 
services (monetary)
Reduce inequity Increase in household access to healthcare services and spending 
by age, sex and socio-economic group (distributional)
Improve health Reduced mortality and morbidity rates attributable to  
climate change (number)
Preserve heritage Preservation of lifestyle and diet (qualitative)
Contribute to political 
stability
Avoidance of popular unrest (number and seriousness of riots,  
strikes and demonstrations)
Improve governance Establishment of publicly accountable institutions  
(accountability and transparency)
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5   The analysis up to and including step 5 can be done manually, although an overview  
of the performance of options is facilitated by formal visual presentations of the scores. 
The calculation of aggregate scores and associated sensitivity analyses can be done 
using a spreadsheet, but is greatly assisted by the use of customized decision support 
tools. For example, in our case studies we have used the V.I.S.A (Visual Interactive 
Sensitivity Analysis) software tool (please see www.visadecisions.com).
6   The notion of dominance is an important one in MCA.  Option A dominates Option B if 
it performs at least as well on all criteria and better on one or more criteria.  This means 
that whatever weights are assigned to the criteria, A will always be preferred to B.’ 
Amend all other footnote numbers accordingly.
7   An overview of approaches to scoring can be found in chapter 5 of Belton and 
Stewart (2005). A good example of a process which is aligned with a number of these 
characteristics is the CORWM evaluation of UK options for handling radioactive wastes 
(www.corwm.decc.gov.uk) documented in Catalyze (2006, 2006a). 
calls for judgement in determining the weights to be assigned to each 
criterion, reflecting the prioritization of the impact associated with 
each criterion (step 6). This underpins the calculation of aggregate 
scores at higher levels of the criteria tree in order to come up with a 
definitive comparative evaluation of all of the options and enable the 
exploration of the outcomes through sensitivity analysis (step 7). 5
 Box 1: Key steps in implementing the MCA4climate policy  
 evaluation framework
      1  Establish the context 
Clarify climate policy goals for mitigation and/or 
adaptation. Identify the decision makers and main 
stakeholders. Consider the main national  
socio-economic, political, institutional and environmental 
circumstances .
      2  Identify the options to be evaluated 
Draw up a set of mitigation and adaptation policy options 
(these can be either single policy actions formulated at 
di"erent levels of detail or portfolio or mix of policy options).
      3  Agree on criteria and indicators 
Consider at what level of criteria the analysis should occur 
and whether it is necessary to modify the suggested 
generic or theme-specific criteria and indicators
      4  Agree on scenarios, timeline of analysis and methods  
of assessment 
Establish the climate and socio-economic scenarios for 
the future that are to be considered in the analysis. Agree 
on dynamics and time-frames, short-term, medium-term 
or long term. Agree on the methods of assessment to be 
deployed.
      5  Score the di!erent options 
Asses the performance of each policy option against all 
of the criteria using the chosen assessment methods. 
Based on this assessment, score the options against the 
criteria (in each scenario if di"erent scenarios are explicitly 
modelled).
      6  Weight the di!erent criteria and calculate an overall input 
and output values for each policy option 
 
Assign weights to each criterion. Calculate aggregate 
weighted scores for each option at each level in the 
hierarchy, (keeping the input group separated from the 
output groups). Calculate overall weighted scores on the 
input side and on the output side
      7  Examine and test the results 6 
Examine the results, comparing the performance profiles of 
options at each level of the criteria tree to identify dominating 
or dominated options (i.e. those with the highest and lowest 
scores) and to highlight particular strengths and weaknesses. 
Compare pairs or combinations of options if applicable. Carry 
out sensitivity analysis by altering weights and/or scores  
and examine how those changes a"ects relative rankings of 
policy options. Compare the performance of options across 
di"erent scenarios if explicitly modelled. In light of the results, 
consider new policy options
 Scoring and weighting 
 The process of scoring options against a specified criterion 
perceived their 'added value' relative to a defined reference point. 
There are many di"erent ways of scoring options which vary 
according to the amount of work involved and to the extent to which 
the outcomes are justifiable to a public audience, explainable and 
replicable. Subjectivity in scoring can be minimized by: 7
      ›  Reference to objectively measurable quantities. 
      ›  The use of individuals with expertise in both the concept 
under evaluation (e.g. health impact) and the context of 
application (for example, in a specific region).
      ›  The specification or construction of an appropriate scale 
defined in terms of performance against one or more 
objectively measurable criteria.
      ›  A solid stakeholder engagement process.
      ›  A multi-stage process in which initial scoring of options is 
carried out independently by a number of experts, forming 
the basis for discussion. 
      ›  Use of an experienced facilitator who supports and 
challenges those responsible for scoring the options.
 The MCA4climate policy evaluation framework does not 
impose any particular method for scoring. The case studies described 
in the next section illustrate one possible approach — relative 
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preference scales (more specifically, direct rating on a 0 to 100 'locally 
defined' scale was adopted). But, given the illustrative nature of the 
cases, this was driven by a desire to minimise the workload rather than 
maximise accountability. 
 Relative preference scales are simply scales anchored at their 
ends by the most and least preferred options on a specific criterion. 
For example, the preferred option is assigned a preference score 
of 100, and the least attractive is given a score of zero. Scores are 
assigned to the remaining options so that di"erences in the numbers 
represent di"erences in strength of preference. Modelling can be used 
for some criteria to help convert the impacts of climate-policy options 
into scores that are comparable.
 If the number of criteria is small and a decision can be made 
directly from the scoring information obtained, the evaluation may not even 
require formal weighting and aggregation techniques. However, where this 
is not the case, the criteria will need to be weighted. As with scoring there 
are many di"erent approaches to weighting criteria and it is important to 
ensure that the process used is transparent and robust. Criteria weights 
reflect the relative worth of value added on di"erent criteria; it is important 
to remember that this is defined in terms of the specific scales used to define 
those criteria in the context of a specific analysis, not as vaguely expressed 
generic priorities. In particular the meaning of the weights and the associated 
elicitation process must be well understood by those whose judgements the 
weights reflect, who should be able to explain and justify the outcomes. 
 As with scoring, this can be achieved by a sound, facilitated, 
multi-stage elicitation process, involving a number of individuals 
representing the same stakeholder perspective and forming the basis 
for discussion which seeks to illuminate and reconcile di"erences.
Weighting has a significant impact on the aggregated scores for each 
option. A sound and commonly used method, adopted in all three 
case studies, is swing weighting, which is based on comparisons of 
di"erences in the same way as for scoring using relative preference 
scales. This method is used to determine the weights across the 
bottom level of the criteria tree. This approach first identifies the 
criterion which gives the greatest ‘added value’ in moving from the 
least preferred (with a score of zero) to the most preferred (with 
a score of 100) position on a particular criterion. Given the large 
number of criteria (19 at the third level), it may be helpful to use a 
paired-comparison process to first determine the order of criteria, 
i.e. compare criteria two at a time for their preference swings, always 
retaining the one with the more highly valued swing to be compared to 
a new criterion. Once they have been ordered, a weight of 1 is assigned 
to the criterion that comes out on top, which becomes the standard to 
which all the others are compared. 
 The next step is to determine the relative added value 
associated with each of the other criteria, usually identifying the 
next greatest and assigning a weight (with value less than 1) which 
reflects the relative value of 100 points. When all weights have 
been determined the values are normalized to sum to 1 (simply as 
a mechanism to keep the aggregate scores at all levels of the tree 
within the range 0 to 100). This stage of the analysis is necessarily 
subjective in that there is no 'value-free' or absolute statement of 
the relative significance of impacts as diverse as those captured 
in the MCA4climate criteria tree. It is to be expected that di"erent 
stakeholder groups would prioritize outcomes di"erently and one of 
the strengths of MCA is to enable the exploration of the consequences 
of those di"erences. Yet, the public acceptability of the process will 
be influenced strongly by the consultation process involving di"erent 
stakeholders or their representatives.
 Depending on the extent to which involved parties can be 
expected to have similar priorities, a 'sharing' or 'comparing' approach 
to determining weights may be more appropriate. A sharing approach 
seeks to attain an agreed set of weights, possibly starting with the 
assessment of individual values then seeking to reconcile di"erences 
through a process of discussion. A comparing approach accepts that 
di"erent individuals, or sub-groups of stakeholders, will have di"erent 
priorities and only seeks agreement with the sub-group. 
The consequences of di"erences between groups can be explored 
through the use of sensitivity analysis, with a view to finding options 
which perform well from the perspective of all groups. Even if it proves 
di!cult to reach consensus, explicit awareness of the di"erent weight 
sets and their consequences can facilitate the further search for an 
acceptable compromise. 
 The final step in the process of applying the MCA4climate 
policy evaluation framework is to examine the resulting aggregate 
values that are derived by applying the weights to the set of scores 
for each of the policy options. This should normally be accompanied 
by sensitivity analysis to gain an understanding of the extent to which 
the results depend on the di"erent scores and weights. In many cases, 
the outcomes are relatively insensitive to changes in the scoring and 
weightings, which gives confidence that the priorities that have been 
established are robust. The process of comparing options may also 
lead to the identification of a new or slightly modified option, which 
might o"er many of the benefits of the most beneficial option, but at 
lower cost. Sometimes this is accomplished by reducing the benefits, 
and thus the cost, on those criteria that do not carry much weight. 
Reducing the cost in this way may more than compensate for the loss 
of benefit, giving an option that is quite beneficial without being too 
costly. If new options are generated in this way, they should be added 
to the set of options and evaluated along with the others in a second 
run. Several iterations of the scoring and weighting procedures may be 
necessary to arrive at a final decision.
62 63
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
po
lic
y 
ev
al
ua
ti
on
 fr
am
ew
or
k
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
po
lic
y 
ev
al
ua
ti
on
 fr
am
ew
or
k
 Other techniques for scoring and weighting criteria than 
those described above are possible, which can lead to di"erent overall 
results, for a number of reasons. Firstly, although the underlying MCA 
model is a mathematically simple weighted sum, the meaning of its 
components (i.e. the scores and weights) are precisely defined and 
inter-related, as outlined above. If the processes used to determine 
those scores and weights are not properly specified and aligned, then 
inconsistencies can arise. Secondly, if the decision-maker is unsure of 
their values or has not fully understood what is asked, then di"erent 
ways of questioning (or even the same approach at di"erent times) 
can elicit di"erent responses. These potential pitfalls underline the 
importance of sound processes. 
 However, it is important to note the outcome of any 
intervention using the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework —  
as with any MCA approach — is determined as much by the process 
and the philosophical stance taken by the participants as by the 
particular decision-making or analytical tools that are used. In other 
words, we fully acknowledge that the analysis undertaken is not 
value-free and, although the aim of MCA is to make those values 
explicit and transparent, the participants in the decision-making 
process still have to reach agreement. As with any analysis, subversion 
(intentional or otherwise) is possible if not held in check through the 
critical oversight by others. As outlined above, the approach taken to 
decision-making on climate policymaking is crucial, particularly where 
there is a broad range of stakeholders. That approach has to enable 
multiple values and interests to be taken into consideration, as well as 
help understand the di"erent underlying conflicts and trade-o"s that 
could be associated with a particular set of policy choices. 
 The application of the MCA4climate policy evaluation 
framework in practice requires a certain level of organization and 
co-ordination by the private sector, civil society, local governments 
and other groups at the national or regional level. Where the decision-
making process is highly hierarchical or where climate-policy action 
is the domain of a particular executive power, multiple stakeholder 
participation may not be possible. Nonetheless, the results of applying 
the framework can still be of value, especially where they are made 
available for public consultation.
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4 Case studies In order to test the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework 
and demonstrate that it works, we applied the framework in three 
separate case studies: Mumbai (in India), South Africa and the Sana’a 
Basin (in Yemen). They also provided an opportunity to apply the 
guiding principles of climate-policy planning in a real-world setting. 
The results of these case studies helped to refine the framework, 
particularly the criteria, and provided important insights into the way 
it can best be applied. Because of resource and time constraints, each 
case study focused on a particular theme, and involved a core two-day 
workshop at the UNEP o!ces in Paris. 
 Each study looked at di"erent types of policy options — single 
policies in Mumbai, portfolios of policies in the Sana’a Basin in Yemen 
and broad scenarios in South Africa. The choice of case studies was 
guided by the aim of demonstrating the adaptability of the framework 
to di"erent situations. These case studies pave the way for applying the 
framework in a full-scale pilot project. 
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4 Case studies: Mumbai
Table 17: Policy options to increase infrastructure resilience in Mumbai 
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 The purpose of this case study was to illustrate the evaluation 
of climate adaptation policy options to increase infrastructure 
resilience in Mumbai — an Indian city covering more than 480 square 
kilometres with a population of 12 million (including the suburbs). 8 
Mumbai is prone to severe flooding, which now occurs almost annually 
— the consequence of the climate and the way the city has developed. 
Climate change is expected to increase the severity and frequency 
of flooding. Strengthening the city’s infrastructure to better resist 
flood risks is di!cult for several reasons: land is scarce, making it 
hard to impose a zoning policy that allows construction only outside 
flood-prone areas; the population is still growing rapidly, increasing 
demand on transportation, electricity and water services; most of the 
population still lives in informal settlements; institutions are weak and 
land tenure uncertain, making land-use or building regulations di!cult 
to enforce; and the city is politically unstable, with latent conflicts 
between di"erent population groups.
 Criteria and policy options
 The first step in the exercise was to identify sub-sets of 
criteria relevant to the theme of infrastructure resilience for each of 
the 3rd-level criteria in the generic criteria tree. 9 This was achieved 
through wide-ranging discussion within the group of participants. 
The results are shown in Figure 5 (See next page). Because of time 
constraints and since the purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate 
the applicability of the MCA4climate framework, operational indicators 
were not specified and the evaluation of the options was based solely 
on the criteria. 
 The next step was to identify a set of policy options to be 
evaluated drawn from a larger set of possible options. The final set of 
five options was selected to represent a broad range of options that 
could be expected to have impacts that could be measured using the 
infrastructure theme-specific criteria (Table 17).
 Scoring the options
 To simplify scoring, the approach described in section 3, 
involving direct rating of options against a 0 to 100 ‘locally defined’ 
scale, was adopted. In other words, the scale was defined for each 
infrastructure theme-specific criterion by the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ of 
the five options, which were positioned at 100 (best) and 0 (worst) 
on the scale. The other options were then scored according to their 
performance relative to these two reference points, the position of each 
being determined by the relative di"erence between it and the reference 
points. Thus, scoring option X at 50 means that the value-added by 
moving from the worst option to option X (50 points) is judged to be 
equivalent to the value added in moving from option X to the best 
option. 10 The results are shown graphically in Figures 6 to 10 (See pages 
71–73) for the profiles of each of the five policy options considered in 
this case study. Some patterns emerge from this analysis, which confirm 
the complementary nature of the policy options selected for analysis:
8   An OECD report on Yemen was used as the starting point for this case study 
(Hallegatte et al. 2010).
9   This process contributed to the set of indicators that were still being developed for the 
increasing infrastructure resilience theme, as well as to the development of the generic 
criteria tree. At the time of the workshop, an earlier version of the generic criteria tree 
was used for this analysis.
POLICY INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION
PT: Public Transport Infrastructure development 
would be funded through a 
combination of taxation and 
public investment.  
Build the planned transport link on 
stilts as opposed to underground 
(which represents a decrease in 
financial cost and an increase in  
co-cost like noise and views).  
Significant new infrastructure would 
be required to complete the project, 
which would bring the opportunity 
to link to the wider transport net-
work (monorail and roads) creating 
better city-wide mobility.
BC: Building Codes Command and control type 
regulatory instrument.
Amend existing building regulations 
and introduce new regulations 
where necessary to ensure that in 20 
years’ time all floodplain buildings 
are on stilts, and earthquake-proof. 
Unauthorized colonies must be  
prevented and regulations enforced.
WS: Warning 
Systems  
and Emergency 
Response
A combination of public invest-
ments (e.g. setting up of new 
centres and services) and 
information-based instruments 
(targeted education and com-
munication). 
The formation and coordination 
of a ‘disaster management’ cell – 
including government, emergency 
services, logistics and weather-
forecast services. It would also 
involve the building of designated 
safe shelters, as well as targeted 
communication and education to 
relevant sectors of the population. 
I: Insurance Public investment since this is 
a government financed scheme 
(although there is the potential 
to support this through  
taxation). 
A government scheme aimed at 
low-income households and the 
informal sector. The insurance 
would be compulsory. The aim of 
this policy option is to achieve 80% 
coverage within ten years.  
ER: Enforced 
Retreat
A command and control  
regulatory instrument.
The definition of high-risk priority 
areas, the enforced movement  
of people living in those areas, the 
location and development of  
alternative settlements and the res-
toration of vacated areas.  The target 
would be up households and small 
businesses. Although this would be 
government supported policy, the 
opportunity for public/private  
partnerships would be promoted in 
the development of new settlements.
10   More details about the software and how it works can be found at:  
www.visadecisions.com
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      ›  Against the input criteria, the Retreat option clearly fares badly 
compared with the other options for financial inputs,  
as this option would obviously be very expensive to implement. 
Against the output criteria, the performance of this option is 
extreme in that it is, or is close to, the best or the worst of the 
options considered on the majority of the criteria: it performs 
particularly badly against the environmental criteria but is the 
best option on some other criteria, notably economic impacts.
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FINANCING 
NEEDS
ENVIRONMENTAL
INPUTS
SOUND CC  
POLICY
NON-MONETARY
IMPLEMENTATION
'COSTS', BARRIERS,..
CAPEX
OTHER 
CONSIDERATIONS
TRIGGER ADDITIONAL 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT
IMPROVE ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE
CONTRIBUTE FISCAL 
SUSTAINABILITY
GENERATE 
EMPLOYMENT
REDUCE PORVERTY
REDUCE INEQUITY
IMPROVE HEALTH
PRESERVE
HERITAGE
PRESERVE  
ECO-SYSTEM
IMPROVE POLITICAL 
SECURITY
IMPROVE ENERGY 
SECURITY
OWNERSHIP
IMPROVE LEGAL/ 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
POLITICS
PUBLIC
PRIVATE
FINANCIAL RISK
OPEX
LOCAL  
EXPENDITURE CO
AVOIDED  
DAMAGES/LOSES
ADDITIONAL  
ACTIVITY
REDUCTION OF  
RETROFIT COSTS
LACK OF THREAT/
RETROFIT
REVENUE
LACK OF THREAT IN 
EXTREME EVENTS
ADDITIONAL  
EMPLOYMENT
REGULAR BASIS
EXTREME
REGIONAL
LOCAL
REGULAR:
MORTALITY /  
MORBIDITY
EXTREME  
MORTALITY /  
MORBIDITY
PROTECT ENV QUAL
PROTECT BIO-DIV
PROTECT 
ECO-SYS SERV
REDUCE GLOBAL 
WARMING  
POTENTIAL
OUTPUTS
Figure 5: Mumbai case study criteria tree Figure 6: Scoring profile for option Public Transport (PT)
Figure 7: Scoring profile for option Building Codes (BC) 
Figures 6–10: The 
scale was defined for 
each infrastructure 
theme-specific 
criterion by the ‘best’ 
and ‘worst’ of the five 
options, which were 
positioned at 100 
(best) and 0 (worst) 
on the scale.
Figures 5: This tree 
was based on an 
earlier version of the 
criteria tree shown in 
Figure 4. Furthermore, 
the criteria selected 
for this case study 
represent, in some 
cases, theme-specific 
sub-criteria of the 
generic 3rd-level 
criteria as proposed 
by our theme expert.
Figure 8: Scoring profile for option Warning Systems and Emergency Response (WS) 
Figure 9: Scoring profile for option Insurance (I)
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      ›  The Warnings and Insurance options have similar 
performance profiles across the input criteria and the 
economic, environmental and political output criteria, mostly 
contrasting with that of Retreat. Their performances diverge 
with respect to the social output criteria. 
      ›  The Building Codes option performs in a similar way to Warnings 
and Insurance on the input criteria; on the output criteria, it performs 
strongly with regard to the environmental and political criteria.
11   V.I.S.A (Visual Interactive Sensitivity Analysis) software – a web-based multi-
criteria decision-making tool. More details about the software and how it works can 
be found www.visadecisions.com.
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Figure 10: Scoring profile for option Enforced Retreat (ER)
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      ›  The profile of the Public Transport option is distinct from the 
others, performing generally very well on the input criteria 
and showing some strengths and weakness within each of the 
four 2nd-level output criteria.
 None of the five options dominates or is dominated by any  
of the other options at this level of analysis. 
 The next step was to determine weights for each of the 
criteria to enable the combination of the scores to reflect the 
aggregate performance of options at higher levels of the criteria tree. 
The weighting of sub-criteria within each of the five criteria families/
groups (Inputs, Economic, Social, Environmental and Governance), was 
carried out by the relevant theme expert using the swing-weighting 
method (described in section 3).
 These values were processed using a decision  
support software — a web-based multi-criteria decision-making 
tool to enable further analysis (i.e. no option is obviously the best or 
worst). 11 Higher-level criteria were not assigned weights by the group 
as they did not have enough information about the likely preferences 
of the main stakeholders to be able to make this judgement. Instead, 
extensive sensitivity analyses were carried out to explore the impact of 
di"erent weightings of the input criteria.
 A real benefit of using decision-support software is the ability 
to play with the assigned criteria weights in order to understand the 
impact of changing these  — small changes reflecting the consequences of 
imprecision in their specification and large changes potentially reflecting 
di"ering stakeholder perspectives, or changing priorities in di"erent 
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scenarios. This process enables us to identify any ‘tipping points’ — points 
at which the definition of the e!cient frontier 12 is changed.  
 Results and sensitivity analysis
 The scores assigned to options for each of the infrastructure 
theme-specific criteria were aggregated using the criteria weights to 
determine the overall performance of the options at higher levels of 
the value tree. The results of the weighted scoring of the five options 
(shown in Figure 11) revealed the following: 
      ›  2nd level: the pattern of performance against the six 
2nd-level criteria is markedly di"erent for each of the 
options: the Retreat option, again, exhibits the biggest range, 
performing very well on economic criteria but badly on 
non-monetary implementation costs. The range of scores is 
narrowest for Public Transport. But no one option stands out 
as performing consistently better than any other. 
      ›  1st level: Figure 11 shows the aggregate input and output 
scores for the options in three di"erent visual displays. 
Retreat clearly performs less well than the other options; 
in particular in comparison to Building Codes which has 
notably higher scores on both outputs and inputs. Retreat is 
dominated by Building Codes, Public Transport and Insurance 
at this level of analysis, each of which has higher scores on 
both inputs and outputs.  Public Transport also dominates 
Warnings, performing better on both input and output 
criteria. The plot of inputs against outputs (known as an 
‘e!ciency plot’ —the chart on the bottom left of Figure 11—) 
indicates the e!cient frontier as a line linking Building Codes, 
Insurance and Public Transport. 
 Sensitivity analysis was performed using di"erent weightings 
for the 2nd-level output criteria. The outcome was that all of the policy 
options appeared on the e!cient frontier in at least one of the cases 
examined. In the case of the Retreat option, this only happened when 
the economic criterion was given a bigger weight. The Building codes 
and Public transport options were robust to changes in weights and were 
close to or on the e!cient frontier in all the cases. The Warnings option, 
which had an aggregate input score very close to Public Transport stayed 
close to the e!cient frontier, but was just ‘dominated’ by Public Transport 
(i.e. the latter had a slightly higher score) except when a bigger weight 
was given to the environmental criterion. The Insurance option also had 
an input score close to Warnings and Public Transport; it was dominated 
by Public Transport when a bigger weight was given to the economic or 
social criteria, but was otherwise on the e!cient frontier.
12   E!cient frontier: the curve generated by the those options that have the highest 
expected output or return possible for the given level of input.
Figure 11:  Performance of policy options for a given set of weights 
 The impact of changing the relative weights of input criteria, 
with the same set of output criteria weighting considered above, was 
also examined. Generally, the positions of Building Codes and Public 
Transport improved slightly (i.e. they were more e!cient relative 
to the other options as a consequence of their consistently good 
performance on the financial input criteria). When the emphasis was 
reversed and a bigger weight was given to non-monetary inputs, the 
aggregate input scores of Building Codes and Public Transport, which 
did not perform well on this criterion, were significantly lower.
This chart shows 
the performance of 
di"erent options for a 
given set of weights. 
The top left chart 
displays the set of 
weights chosen for 
the 2nd level input 
criteria. The middle 
left chart displays the 
set of weighs chosen 
for the second level 
output criteria. The 
top right and top 
middle charts show 
how the options 
performed across the 
2nd level input and 
output criteria. The 
input-output chart at 
the bottom left shows 
the performance 
of each of the five 
infrastructure policy 
options against 
aggregated inputs 
and aggregated 
outputs. A high input 
score reflects better 
performance in 
terms of minimizing 
inputs (e.g. less 
expensive) and is 
therefore preferred. 
A high output score 
is also preferred. 
This e!ciency plot 
shows that, if the 
criteria are weighted 
as shown, Building 
Codes, Insurance and 
Public Transport are 
candidates for the 
best option. Choice 
between these 
would depend on 
the relative weights 
assigned to outputs 
versus inputs.
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4 Case studies: Yemen
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Figure 12: Yemen case study criteria tree
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 The main aim of this case study was to test the MCA4climate 
policy evaluation framework in a situation where policy options are 
interdependent. A secondary aim was to apply the framework under 
di"erent climate scenarios and account for climate uncertainty. Yemen 
was chosen because it has pressing near-term problems with water 
management that would need to be addressed in conjunction with any 
planning for adaptation to the e"ects of climate change. 13
 Given Yemen’s heterogeneity, we decided to focus on the 
impacts and performance of policy options in a single hydrologic 
basin. In other words, policies might be implemented at a national 
level, but we would evaluate their likely performance locally. The 
Sana’a Basin was selected as the target basin because it contains both 
extensive irrigated agriculture and the rapidly-growing capital city, for 
which water and sanitation services are inadequate. In addition, the 
basin is facing rapid depletion of its limited groundwater resources as 
a result of the explosive growth of groundwater pumping for irrigated 
agriculture that followed the introduction of diesel pumps in the 1970s 
and heavily subsidized diesel prices. This has resulted in a short-term 
agricultural boom period, but alarming drops in aquifer levels and 
loss of springs that formerly provided critical community water 
supplies. Only in recent years has the central government reduced 
fuel subsidies and launched a programme of legal reform intended to 
constrain further expansion of groundwater use. Climate change could 
exacerbate an already worsening water crisis in the Sana’a Basin. Any 
climate adaptation options would, therefore, need to reinforce e"orts 
to address the current crisis. Thus, the set of adaptation options 
selected for analysis reflects the types of policies that are being 
implemented, or have been suggested, to deal with the on-going 
over-exploitation of groundwater resources. The major di"erence is 
that we would propose a more rapid and larger e"ort for each option 
than is currently planned. 
 Criteria and policy options
 
 The first step was to adapt the generic criteria tree to evaluate 
the relative merits of alternative water-sector adaptation options (see 
Figure 12). The tree was extended to include more detailed water 
theme-specific criteria. However to facilitate the exercise of evaluating 
the policies, we decided to concentrate on scoring options at the 
higher, 3rd-level criteria, using the water theme-specific criteria only to 
inform our thinking about how we would do this. 
 We selected a set of eight options for analysis, including 
three basin-wide options (labelled BW1, BW2 and BW3); three focused 
on the urban water sector (U1, U2 and U3) and two focused on rural 
agricultural water use (R1 and R2). Some of these are themselves 
actually packages of measures that would be implemented together. 
13   As indicated, these weights represent only an arbitrary starting point. Weights  
at higher levels of the criteria tree are determined by the sum of the weights of their 
sub-criteria, the approach adopted is an ‘equitable’ assumption. However, criteria 
containing a larger set of sub-criteria should not necessarily be given more weight  
than criteria with a smaller set of sub-criteria.
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The adaptation options are described in Table 18. It was known at 
the start of the work on this case study that the adaptation options 
are not independent of one another. This became clearer as the work 
progressed. In particular, the presence or absence of governance 
reforms would have significant impacts on behavioural responses 
to other policy options, and therefore on their e"ectiveness. Such 
governance reforms would first clarify who has the right to use water, 
the quantitative limits on the use rights, and the locus of decision-
making authority to modify use rights. The reforms also would create 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with legally-defined 
rights and obligations. Similarly, monitoring systems are a necessary 
component of any water management programme. As a result, we 
assumed that basic physical monitoring systems would be in place 
(even where they are currently inadequate) and that monitoring of 
water use, and of activities that could jeopardize water quality would 
occur as part of a package of governance reforms. 
 Scoring the options
 Before the options were scored, it was necessary to decide 
how to take into account the uncertainty surrounding the impact of 
climate change on Yemen. Two climate-change scenarios prepared 
by the World Bank (2010) were selected: a mid-range scenario with 
moderate warming (an increase of 3.1°C over 1990 levels by the 2080s) 
and small precipitation changes (decrease 3%), and a hot-dry scenario 
with amplified warming (increase 4.5°C) and significant declines in 
precipitation (decrease 24%) resulting in major reductions in runo" 
and recharge. These di"erences would have large impacts on water 
availability and on policy e"ectiveness over the long term. The initial set 
of scorings rated the options individually and did not assume that the 
governance reforms (which make up option BW1) were in place when 
other options were scored. Because many of the other options would 
perform poorly in the absence of governance reforms, and because 
there are likely to be other interactions among the options, climate 
adaptation policymakers would, in reality, need to compare portfolios 
of options. Another issue that policymakers would need to consider 
is the sequencing of policies. Clearly, low-hanging fruit — actions that 
cost little, but promise significant improvements — should be pursued 
first. In practice, the issue of interdependence among options a"ects 
the appropriate sequencing and packaging of options into portfolios of 
activities that need to be pursued in tandem in order to be most e"ective. 
 In the case study, the individual options were initially scored 
for each scenario according to how well they would serve each 
criterion when viewed from the perspective of the end of the period of 
analysis — the decade of the 2080s. As with the Mumbai case study, 
a score of 100 was given to the policy that seemed to best serve 
POLICY DESCRIPTION
BASIN-WIDE
BW1: Strengthen 
basin-wide water p 
lanning & governance
The most complex and comprehensive of the options considered. 
Accelerated implementation of the following reforms, which are already 
underway, was assumed: Establishment of a process for basin-wide 
determination of limits on total water use by area and type. Require-
ment for full coverage of irrigated land within water user associations 
(WUAs). Enhanced powers and responsibilities of WUAs to implement 
and enforce limits on well-drilling and water extraction. Legal mecha-
nisms for transfers of water extraction rights and land easements 
BW2: Retire lands 
from agricultural use
Creation of a public programme to purchase land currently used 
for irrigated agriculture and to return it to a natural state. A 
target of 25 % reduction (c.6 000 ha) in irrigated hectares was 
assumed. The e"ectiveness of this option would depend heavily 
on implementation of other governance measures, because  
without those reforms, there would be nothing to keep other 
land-owners from expanding irrigation operations on other lands.
BW3: Integrate land 
and water management
A set of projects to augment groundwater recharge and limit 
drawdown by instituting a low-cost loan or matching grant 
programme to maintain and restore terraces for soil and water 
conservation, and build spate check dams and recharge basins. 
URBAN
U1: Protect the quality 
and usability of  
existing water 
resources
Reverse the present trend of urban-source pollution of shallow 
groundwater resources, primarily from untreated sewerage, by 
improving sewerage and waste-water treatment systems and by 
providing other waste management services.
U2: Provide desalinized 
sea-water to Sana’a
Install solar-powered desalination plants on the coast and use solar 
power to pump the water uphill to the Sana’a Basin. Assumes a 1 
billion cubic metre/year plant and pipeline at a capital cost of USD 
$6 billion with a cost of delivered water of USD 1 per cubic metre.  
U3: Implement  
urban water demand 
management
Reform public water tari"s for the purpose of collecting su!cient 
funding for system improvements, including developing a system 
for metering, billing and revenue collection that would use increas-
ing block rate pricing to keep lifeline water rates low while charging 
higher rates to households that use large amounts of water. It was 
assumed that this policy would provide enough revenue to pay for 
major system improvements that would allow all urban households 
to have access to safe, reliable public water supplies, although not 
necessarily in-home taps. 
RURAL
R1 Create incentives  
to promote e!cient 
use of agricultural 
water.
Eliminate remaining subsidies on diesel, as well as the agricultural 
import restrictions that had helped to spur the race to exploit ground-
water reserves for irrigated agriculture. It was assumed that the govern-
ment would continue raising diesel prices to world-market levels, and 
would eliminate import restrictions/tari"s on fruits, vegetables and qat.
R2: Create incentives  
to promote  
demand-side  
technology uptake.
Extend current programmes aimed at increasing crop output 
and income per unit of irrigation water consumed (e.g. provide 
low-cost loans to install piped irrigation systems, mulching and 
similar investments to conserve water).  It was assumed that the 
government would make these programmes available to any 
willing farmer in the Sana’a Basin.  It was also assumed that the 
policy would be implemented without any restrictions on eligibil-
ity or on the total extent of irrigated land in the basin. 
Table 18: Policy options to improve water management in Yemen 
82 83
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s
the criterion and a zero to the one that would be least e"ective (or 
even damaging). There are some striking di"erences in the scorings 
between the two scenarios, for example:
      ›  BW2 and R2 perform better in the mid-range scenario. In the 
case of BW2 (retiring agricultural lands) there is a dramatic 
reduction in the expected environmental benefits in the 
hot-dry scenario compared to the mid-range scenario, as 
seen in Figure 13. This reflects the assessment that if the 
governance reforms are not strengthened significantly 
beyond those already underway, there will be very little water 
available by the 2080s and little groundwater-based irrigation 
left to manage in the hot-dry scenario. In the mid-range 
scenario, it was assumed that the reforms currently underway 
would be successful in extending the life of the aquifer 
and that steady-state groundwater abstractions could be 
maintained at a rate equivalent to average annual recharge.
      ›  U2 (desalinized water for Sana’a), BW1 (strengthen 
basin-wide planning and governance) and R1 (promote 
e!cient use of agricultural water) all perform better in the 
hot-dry scenario relative to mid-range scenarios, as seen in 
Figures 14, 15 (See next page) and 16 (See next page). 
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BW2-Mid
BW2-Dry
Figure 13: Scoring profile for option BW2 under di"erent climate scenarios
U2-Mid
U2-Dry
Figure 14: Scoring profile for option U2 under di"erent climate scenarios
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 Results and sensitivity analysis
 The weighting of criteria at the 3rd level of the tree used 
the swing-weighting process described earlier (in section 3). As the 
analysis is illustrative and the group did not know what the priorities 
of real decision-makers would be, a rough five-point scale was used to 
capture these initial judgements. 
 As a starting point, the weighting of criteria at the 2nd level 
of the criteria tree put greater emphasis on implementation barriers 
within inputs and weighted the four output families proportionally to 
the number of 3rd-level criteria (so the political-institutional family 
weight is half that of each of the economic, environmental and social 
families). The weights were combined with the scores for the 3rd-level 
criteria to yield aggregate results at the higher levels of the criteria 
tree. The results comparing the aggregate input and output scores are 
shown for the mid-range scenario in Figure 17 (See page 86) and for 
the hot-dry scenario in Figure 18 (See page 87). 
 The options performed quite di"erently on the input and 
output criteria: generally, R1 (incentives to promote e!cient use 
of agricultural water), and R2 (incentives to promote demand-side 
technology uptake) performed well on inputs in both scenarios, while 
BW1 (strengthening of basin-wide water planning and governance) 
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Figure 15: Scoring profile for option BW1 under di"erent climate scenarios
BW1-Mid
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Figure 16: Scoring profile for option R1 under di"erent climate scenarios
R1-Mid
R1-Dry
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performed best on outputs. There were also di"erences in performance 
between the mid-range and hot-dry scenarios. For example, looking at 
BW2 it can be seen clearly from the bar charts (in Figures 17 and 18) that 
its score on both inputs and outputs is higher in the mid-range scenario. 
The e!cient frontier is defined by BW1 and R2 in the mid-range scenario 
and by BW1 and R1 in the hot-dry scenario. The position of the other 
options relative to the frontier is unchanged between the two scenarios; 
BW2, U1 and U2 are dominated by BW1 in both scenarios and BW3 and 
U3 are dominated by R2 in the mid-range scenario and R1 in the hot-dry 
scenario. Sensitivity analysis was then carried out by varying the weights 
on each family of criteria. In the mid-range scenario increasing the 
weight on environmental factors moved option R1 closer to the e!cient 
frontier, while increasing the weight on social factors moved option U3 
(urban water demand management) onto the frontier midway between 
R2 and BW1. Increasing the weight on the other two output criteria 
families did not change the composition of the e!cient frontier.  In the 
hot-dry scenario U3 once again moves onto the frontier when increased 
weight is given to social factors. 
 The analysis so far had focused on the evaluation of individual 
options. However, as mentioned above, there are clear synergies rising from 
the combination of certain options (see also Box 2). To explore this, we 
created portfolios by combining the original eight options into portfolios 
of two or more options. This created 255 permutations. As a first step we 
made the simplifying assumption that the total associated inputs required 
and outputs generated are simply the sum of the inputs and outputs of the 
individual projects. The performance of each of the portfolios is shown in 
Figure 19 (See page 88), plotting the total outputs against the total inputs. 
 Box 2: Approaches to evaluating portfolios of policy options
 The evaluation of portfolios can be approached in di"erent 
ways. One way is to pre-define portfolios of options for which 
there would be significant interaction e"ects and to score each of 
these portfolios alongside the individual options. This ensures a 
robust evaluation of the portfolio options, but if there are many of 
these it substantially increases the work involved in scoring them. 
 Another approach is to make a broad assumption about 
the nature of the interaction e"ects and to mathematically 
generate scores for all possible portfolios based on this.  This 
approach, which we adopted for this case study, greatly eases 
the evaluation burden, but the value of the analysis depends on 
the realism of the assumptions made.
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Figure 17: Performance of policy options in the mid-range scenario Figure 18: Performance of policy options in the hot and dry scenario
 The portfolios which are of greatest interest are again those 
which lie on the e!cient frontier, which, in this case is towards the top 
left-hand corner of the plot. The frontier is defined by the portfolios 
which generate the greatest outputs for a given level of input. It 
defines what is sometimes referred to as ‘the order of buy’. If limited 
resources were available, the first option that we should invest in is 
R2 (a portfolio of one option), which generates the greatest output 
for the lowest level of input. If more resources (input) are available, 
then the best use of these is achieved by stepping up the e!cient 
frontier adding options to the portfolio as indicated by the labels in 
Figure 19. The next option to add to the portfolio is R1 (giving the 
portfolio R2+R1), followed by BW3, and so on. All the portfolios which 
lie below the e!cient frontier are ine!cient — this means that greater 
output could be achieved for the same input, or the same output 
for less input. The last option to be added to the portfolio moving 
up the e!cient frontier is BW2, which, as the initial scoring showed, 
The top left and top 
middle charts display 
the set of weights 
chosen for the 2nd 
level input and output 
criteria. The top right 
and top middle charts 
show the aggregate 
scores for inputs 
and for outputs 
across the eight 
water management 
adaptation policy 
options considered in 
the Yemen case study. 
The input-output chart 
at the bottom shows 
the performance of 
each of the eight water 
policy options against 
aggregated inputs and 
aggregated outputs: 
this e!ciency plot 
suggests that BW1 
(strengthen basin-wide 
water planning 
and governance) 
and R2 (promoting 
demand-side 
technology uptake) are 
the best options for this 
allocation of weights. 
Choice between these 
would depend on 
the relative weights 
assigned to outputs 
versus inputs. 
The top left and top 
middle charts display 
the set of weights 
chosen for the 2nd 
level input and output 
criteria. The top right 
and top middle charts 
show the aggregate 
scores for inputs 
and for outputs 
across the eight 
water management 
adaptation policy 
options considered in 
the Yemen case study. 
The input-output chart 
at the bottom shows 
the performance of 
each of the eight water 
policy options against 
aggregated inputs and 
aggregated outputs: 
this e!ciency plot 
suggests that in the 
hot-dry scenario BW1 
(strengthen basin-wide 
water planning and 
governance) and R1 
(promoting e!cient 
use of agricultural 
water) are the best 
options for this 
allocation of weights. 
Choice between these 
would depend on 
the relative weights 
assigned to outputs 
versus inputs. 
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Figure 19: Performance of all portfolios of policy options Figure 20a: Original plot highlighting all portfolios which 
incorporate options BW1 and BW2
Figure 20b: Revised plot taking account of synergy between 
options BW1 and BW2 
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 C
as
e 
st
ud
ie
s
generates low outputs in relation to the inputs required. However, the 
performance of this option would be substantially improved if it was 
implemented in conjunction with improved governance measures such 
as those incorporated in option BW1. Further analysis, which took 
account of this synergistic e"ect by doubling the scores where both 
BW1 and BW2 are included in the portfolio, resulted in a significant 
shift in the e!ciency frontier (Figure 20). 
The results are based 
on the scores for the 
mid-range scenario 
and the weighting 
of criteria at the 2nd 
level is shown.   The 
input scores had to be 
inverted to allow for 
the portfolio analysis: 
a high input score in 
the portfolio analysis 
corresponds to a high 
input requirement, i.e. 
less preferred (more 
expensive).
The results are based 
on the scores for  
the mid-range scenario
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4 Case studies: South Africa
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LEVEL 3 CRITERIA DRAFT IRP 
2010 CRITERION
SCE-
NARIO
1 2 3 4 5 6
UNITS BASE 
CASE
EMIS-
SION 
LIMIT
RE-
GIONAL 
DEVELOP-
MENT
EN-
HANCED 
DSM
REVISED 
BAL-
ANCED 
SCE-
NARIO
RENEW-
ABLE 
ENERGY
Minimize spending  
on technology
Present value  
of total cost
ZAR mil-
lions
789481 1257457 832388 826429 848906 1540000
Minimize other  
types of spending
0 0 0 0 0 0
Allow for easy  
implementation
Portfolio risk  
or uncertainty
687 521 699 686 611 699
Comply with 
required timing of 
policy intervention
0 0 0 0 0 0
Protect environmental 
resources
0 0 0 0 0 0
Protect biodiversity 0 0 0 0 0 0
Support ecosystem 
services
Average annual  
water consumption 
ML/ 
annum
327 283 326 324 318 338
Trigger private 
investments
% % 5 10 5 35 85 100
Improve economic 
performance
Peak price 
of electricity
c/kWh 100 172 101 104 111 115
Generate  
employment
0 35 25 55 75 100
Contribute to fiscal 
sustainability
% 35 85 35 55 55 95
Reduce poverty inci-
dence
14 6 0 37 26 100
Reduce inequity 50 50 35 55 85 100
Improve health 0 75 45 65 85 100
Preserve cultural 
heritage
0 0 0 0 0 0
Contribute to  
political stability
Regional develop-
ment
687 385 1040 687 863 0
Improve governance 50 55 45 65 55 100
Reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions
Average annual CO2 
emissions
Mt/ 
annum
303 236 301 299 271 249
Enhance resilience to 
climate change
0 65 55 80 75 100
Table 19: Mapping IRP 2010 criteria against MCA4climate 3rd level criteria
 This case study focused on the application of the MCA4climate 
policy evaluation framework to a policy and planning process 
which was undertaken in South Africa in 2010 to determine a more 
appropriate fuel (and technology) mix for electricity generation 
over the next 20 years — namely the Integrated Resource Plan 2010 
(IRP-2010). The case study was based on the energy-modelling 
outputs for five scenarios in the IRP-2010 process and one additional 
scenario from a parallel energy modelling process that was conducted 
for the Revision of the White Paper on Renewable Energy Policy 
(REWP). The aim was to compare and contrast the results of applying 
the MCA4climate framework with the multi-criteria decision making 
framework (MCDF) that was used to prepare IRP-2010, so as to 
demonstrate the impact of incorporating broader developmental 
concerns (as well as an additional renewable energy scenario) into the 
analytical framework and decision-making process.
 Although this case study considered energy scenarios 
reflecting di"erent technology/fuel-mix investment options rather 
than policy scenarios, they can nonetheless be seen as representing 
the outcomes of climate policies (without specifying the types of 
energy-policy instruments or measures). Using these scenarios 
(already modelled in the IRP study) enabled us to make use of more 
data in the form of quantitative indicators than in the two other case 
studies. Clearly, an appropriate combination of policies would still 
need to be identified (or developed) to shape the investment decisions 
which would result in the optimal energy scenario.
 Background
 South Africa’s electricity generation — and the energy 
system generally — is heavily reliant on fossil fuels and is consequently 
highly carbon-intensive. Approximately 85% of the net capacity in the 
country is based on coal-fired thermal generation. The power sector 
is dominated by the national electricity utility, Eskom. It generated 
232 TWh in 2010, equal to more than 95% of total generation in South 
Africa. Eskom has installed capacity of 44 GW, comprising 13 coal-fired 
power stations (38 GW), one nuclear plant (2 GW), four hydro and 
pumped-storage schemes (2 GW) and four gas-turbine stations (2 GW). 
The balance of the generation capacity in the country is provided by a 
handful of municipal and private generators. In addition, the country 
imports electricity, mainly from the 2 GW Cahora Bassa hydropower 
plant in Mozambique. South Africa has su"ered from persistent power 
shortages in recent years, leading to blackouts and brownouts (a drop 
in voltage), mainly as a result of rapid growth in demand. Nationally, the 
reserve margin — the di"erence between available capacity and peak 
load — fell to under 6% in March 2008, though it has since increased 
to around 15% through operational improvements, including improved 
Opposite:  
The rightmost 
column represents an 
additional scenario 
analysed in this 
case study using 
the MCA4climate 
criteria tree; Zeros 
correspond to missing 
information on the 
indicator measuring 
the associated criteria
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Table 20: Integrated resource plan scenarios in South Africa 
SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
BC: Base Case This provides for limited regional development options and 
makes no allowances for externalities (such as a carbon tax) or 
climate-change targets.  Key features:  
— Committed build and decommissioning  
— Some imported hydro  
— Combined-cycle gas-turbine (CCGT) plants  
— Imported coal  
— Fluidised bed combustion coal technology  
— Pulverised fuel (PF) + flue gas desulphurisation (FGD)  
— Open-cycle gas turbine (OCGT) plants for peaking
EL: Emission Limit This scenario adopted the imposition of an annual limit for CO2 
emissions from the electricity sector of 220 Mt CO2-eq from 2020. 
Key features:  
— Committed build and decommissioning  
— Wind capacity (17.6 GW starting in 2015)  
— Solar capacity (11.25 GW commissioned between 2017 and 2021)  
— 9.6 GW of nuclear capacity  
— CCGT  
— OCGT for peaking (6.5 GW)
R: Regional This scenario included additional regional projects as options, 
such as:  
— Increased hydro imports  
— Increased coal-fired imports  
— Includes transmission upgrades
DSM: Enhanced DSM This scenario included a more aggressive demand-side manage-
ment programme with an additional 6 TWh per year of electricity 
demand reduction imposed by 2015.
RB: Revised Balanced This scenario represents a trade-o" between least-cost invest-
ment, climate change mitigation, diversity of supply, localisation 
and regional development.  It includes solar, wind, cogeneration, 
nuclear power and imported electricity.
RE: Renewable Energy This scenario is based on energy modelling in the revision of the 
RE White Paper of various renewable energy options in addition 
to grid-connected electricity generation, including:  
— 9.2 million solar water heating systems  
— 330,000 solar home (PV) systems  
— 60,000 household biogas digesters
coal-supply management. The prospect of continuing increases in 
electricity demand — driven in part by expanded electricity access for 
poor households — and the need to replace some existing capacity that 
will have to be retired mean that a significant amount of new capacity 
will have to be added in the coming years, unless demand growth can 
be curbed. New generating assets may include less carbon-intensive 
technologies. A central energy-policy challenge, therefore, is to 
reconcile energy poverty- and climate-policy goals. 
 
 Scenarios and criteria
 The six scenarios that were assessed are set out in Table 20. 
Notably, only the sixth scenario, the REWP scenario, would meet the 
climate commitments of the South African government. All of the 
scenarios were based on a 20-year planning horizon, extending to 2030. 
 Scoring and weighting the scenarios
 For this case study, the data underlying the IRP-2010 multi-
criteria analysis was used to inform the scoring of the scenarios against 
the more development focused and comprehensive MCA4climate 
criteria. IRP-2010 used five criteria: cost, climate change mitigation, 
portfolio risk or uncertainty, localization benefits and regional 
development benefits. For some of the MCA4climate criteria, 
quantified data for specific indicators were available from the energy 
modelling carried out as part of the IRP process; where data were 
not to hand, more subjective judgements were used by the workshop 
participants to score the performance of di"erent scenarios against 
the MCA4climate criteria. 
 Table 19 (See previous page) shows the mapping of the six 
indicators used in the draft IRP-2010 on to the MCA4climate criteria 
tree and the associated scoring. For the criteria for which data were 
available from the energy modelling the quantitative scores were 
transformed to a 0 to 100 scale, where 100 represents the preferred 
performance. Subjective judgement by experts was required to score 
and rank the unquantified criteria. Where possible, this was done 
using the same process of direct rating of the options against a 0 to 
100 ‘locally defined’ scale as described in the previous case studies. 
It was not possible to score five of the level-3 criteria due to lack of 
information (all scores for these criteria are shown as 0 in Table 19).
 Figure 21 (See next page), which shows a graphical 
comparison of three of the six options highlights the strength of the 
Renewable Energy option across the output criteria. However, this 
is achieved at the expense of a zero score on the two input criteria 
(reflecting the highest level of inputs of all 6 options). Comparing the 
other two options shown in Figure 23, Enhance DSM and Regional 
Development, it can be seen that the former almost dominates the 
latter; whilst both have very similar inputs, Enhance DSM outperforms 
Regional Development on all but one of the outputs (improve 
economic performance).
 Criteria weights were then defined and the scoring was carried 
out in the same way as for the other two case studies (see above). As 
with the previous case studies, the group did not have access to real 
decision-makers thus this part of the analysis is only illustrative. Public 
financing needs were given a bigger weighting than implementation 
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Figure 21: Comparative scoring of three energy planning scenarios 
barriers on the input side; the policy criteria were weighted more heavily 
than the other four groups of criteria on the output side. The results 
aggregated to the level of Inputs and Outputs can be seen in Figure 22.
 Three options, the Renewable Energy scenario, Emissions 
Limit scenario and Revised Balanced scenario lie on the e!cient 
frontier given this initial specification of weights. Which of these is 
preferred overall will depend on the relative weights assigned to 
Inputs and Outputs; if the weight on outputs exceeds 0.8 then the 
Renewable Energy scenario performs best overall, if it is less than 0.6 
the Revised Balanced scenario performs best and between 0.6 and 0.8 
the Emissions Limit scenario is preferred. IRP-2010, which allocated 
weights across the six criteria considered, found that the Revised 
Balanced scenario was optimal. The Base Case scenario exhibits the 
lowest output / input relationship (ratio) in our analysis; together with 
Regional Development and Enhanced DSM it is dominated at this level 
by the Revised Balanced scenario. Sensitivity analysis was then carried 
out to test the results by varying the weighting of sub-criteria of inputs 
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Figure 22: Performance of di"erent energy planning scenarios 
and outputs. Figure 23 (See next page) shows the consequences 
of increasing the weight on Social outputs, which are particularly 
important in the case of South Africa when poverty issues such as 
access to energy services are taken into consideration. The Emissions 
Limit scenario has moved away from the e!cient frontier, which is 
now defined by just the Renewable Energy and Revised Balanced 
scenarios. The position of the other three options (Enhanced DSM, 
Regional Development and Base Case) is unchanged; they are still 
dominated by the Revised Balanced scenario and remain so for all 
The top and middle left 
charts represent the 
weights given to the 
input, and respectively, 
the output criteria. 
The top and middle 
charts show the scoring 
of the six energy 
planning scenarios 
when aggregating 
across inputs,  and 
respectively outputs. 
The bottom left chart 
shows the performance 
of the di"erent energy 
scenarios at the highest 
level (inputs versus 
outputs) for the 
weights given.
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Figure 23: Performance of energy planning scenarios when more 
weight is given to social outputs
combinations of weights considered. The Revised Balanced scenario 
remains e!cient whichever input criterion is weighted highly. 
 When economic or social factors are weighted more highly, 
the Renewable Energy scenario also remains on the e!cient frontier 
but the Emission Limit scenario moves away from it. If environmental 
factors are emphasized then the situation is reversed and the frontier 
is defined by the Emission Limit and Revised Balanced scenarios, with 
the Renewable Energy scenario moving o" it.
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This figure shows 
the performance of 
the di"erent energy 
scenarios, when the 
weighting on social 
output criteria is 
increased.  The results 
are shown at the highest 
level (inputs versus 
outputs). 
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 Lessons learned 
 Although the three case studies are intended only to be 
illustrative, each highlights a di"erent aspect of good practice in the 
specification of options for evaluation: in the Mumbai case study, 
the options for evaluation were deliberately chosen to reflect the 
wide range of possibilities to solve the problem; the Yemen case 
study demonstrated the importance of looking not only at individual 
activities but also at the potential synergies between them; and 
the South African case study illustrated the process of iterative 
development. The latter involved the ability to build upon existing 
work (e.g. the initial IRP-2010 study for South Africa) and improve 
policy planning processes by applying the MCA4climate initiative and 
widening the criteria to cover important developmental impacts such 
as poverty and energy access. 
 The three case studies attempt to demonstrate the value 
of the MCA4climate policy evaluation framework as a practical aid 
to policy-making, as well as the usefulness of the theme-specific 
operational guidance and the guiding principles of climate-policy 
analysis. The results also helped to refine the framework, particularly 
the design of the criteria tree, and provided important insights into the 
way it can best be applied in a real world situation. Among the specific 
lessons learned were the following:
      ›  There can be important interactions among di"erent types 
of mitigation and adaptation options that have important 
implications for how well the individual options will work 
in practice. Consequently, policy assessments should 
consider alternative portfolios of options as well as e!cient 
sequencing of options within a portfolio.
      ›  The weighting of di"erent criteria can have a profound e"ect 
on the relative value of di"erent policy options.
      ›  It is preferable to identify and agree on criteria and carry out 
initial scoring of policy options before undertaking detailed 
energy and economic modelling in a climate-policy planning 
process to ensure that the outputs of the modelling are useful 
in applying the MCA4climate framework or any other multi-
criteria analysis tool.
      ›  The framework provides a powerful means of enabling a wide 
range of stakeholders to engage in the complex  
climate-policy decision-making process to ensure that 
appropriate weights are given to di"erent criteria, including 
those concerned with social and economic development. 
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5  Guiding principles for 
 climate-policy planning
 Evaluating the various climate-policy options in order to 
come up with a coherent and sound plan is confronted by a number of 
practical issues, including how to assess the economic implications of 
the various policy options, how to deal with risk and uncertainty, how 
to develop and use baselines, how to evaluate the fiscal implications 
of climate policies and how to go about measuring, reporting and 
verifying policy actions and their e"ects. The MCA4climate initiative 
has developed some guiding principles and practical recommendations 
on how to address these issues, which are summarized in this section. 
This guidance is intended to be of practical value to government 
o!cials directly involved in formulating climate policies, as well as to 
other stakeholders involved in the climate-policy making process.
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 Economic analysis of climate-policy options
 Evaluating the future socio-economic impacts, benefits and 
costs of climate mitigation and adaptation policies typically involves 
the use of detailed empirical research and modelling. That inevitably 
involves a number of choices about the methodological approach 
and underlying assumptions, which have important consequences for 
the projections and, therefore, the ultimate selection of policies to be 
implemented. Chief among these choices are the following: 
      ›  Macroeconomic assumptions.
      ›  Technological innovation, learning, dynamics and feedbacks.
      ›  No-regrets options for mitigation and adaptation.
      ›  Monetary valuation and non-marketed impacts.
      ›  Discounting future costs and impacts.
      ›  Time horizon of the analysis.
 Traditional approaches to these issues are arguably ill-suited 
to analyzing climate policies because monetizing human preferences, 
ecological properties and technological possibilities is di!cult and 
because the associated techniques neglect important ethical questions. 
A new thinking on the economics of climate change is emerging which 
seeks to take these shortcomings into consideration. That thinking is 
based on the following principles:
      ›  Climate-policy analysis needs to consider, in addition to  
economic aspects, health, equity, environmental, institutional and 
ethical perspectives, as well as the interactions between them.
      ›  Due consideration needs to be given to the evolution 
over time of changes in technologies, which may occur 
as a response to climate policy and which are themselves 
influenced by institutional factors and past experiences. 
      ›  By avoiding the exclusive use of monetary valuations, important 
inter- and intra-generational equity and other social and 
environmental concerns can be included in the analysis.
      ›  Uncertainty and risk, which are central to the assessment 
of climate-change impacts, should play a major role in the 
formulation of policy (this issue is discussed in detail below).
 Macroeconomic assumptions
 Most greenhouse-gas emissions are the direct result of 
economic activity. Thus the anticipated growth of population and 
per-capita production and consumption are major drivers of future 
emissions (see Developing baseline projections, below). The faster the 
growth in populations and the economy, the faster emissions will tend 
to grow. So assumptions about these factors are central to projected 
emissions growth, which will a"ect the costs and impact of climate-
policy action. 
 For example, faster assumed rates of economic growth 
typically imply higher costs for switching to low-carbon technologies, as 
well as greater potential benefits — i.e. avoided costs — from emissions 
reduction. The prices of fossil energy and competing technologies 
are another important driver, as they a"ect incentives to conserve 
and use energy more e!ciently and the relative attractiveness of 
investing in low-carbon sources of energy, as well as social welfare. 
There is no single, standard source of projections on these and other 
macroeconomic drivers, either at the national or international level. 
There are three main practical options for dealing with this issue:
      ›  Option 1: Use a very detailed model of climate economics, 
making as many variables as possible endogenous. This is 
theoretically appealing, but expensive and di!cult in practice.
      ›  Option 2: Select a range of available studies that provide 
the needed projections of macroeconomic factors (ensuring 
as much consistency as possible) and calculate the 
corresponding averages.
      ›  Option 3: Select projections to ensure consistency with other 
planning studies in the same country.
 For assumptions at the international level, it is recommended 
to apply option 2 to existing sets of projections for exogenous 
global variables, such as GDP, population, population health and oil 
prices, unless a global endogenous model su!ciently disaggregated 
is available (for which option 1 would apply). For macro-level 
assumptions at the national level, the recommendation would be 
option 3. If nationally sourced projections are not available or are limited 
to the short term, other external studies (option 2 may be applied if there 
are several) or other countries’ projections could be used as proxies.
 These recommendations apply to the analysis of both 
mitigation and adaptation policies, though macro-level assumptions 
play somewhat di"erent roles in each case. Mitigation typically 
involves decisions about emissions, which are directly tied to 
production and consumption, so the link between policy and 
macro-level assumptions is immediate and inescapable. Adaptation 
actions involve diverting economic resources, and are frequently 
designed, in part, to protect economic activity. 
 For both adaptation and mitigation, sensitivity analysis 
should be carried out to determine the extent to which the 
assessment of climate-policy options using the MCA4climate policy 
evaluation framework (as described in section 3) is a"ected by the 
macro-level assumptions. 
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 Technological innovation, learning, dynamics and feedbacks
 In long-run climate scenarios, assumptions about the 
flexibility of technology and the pace of technological change are 
crucial to the projections. Of critical importance are assumptions 
about whether technology improves automatically (such as in the 
‘autonomous energy e!ciency improvement’ assumed in some 
models), or whether such improvements are driven endogenously 
by public policy, investments in research and development, and past 
experience (as in ‘learning curve’ or ‘learning by doing’ analyses). 
Endogenous technology models generally project lower costs of 
climate policies, as they are assumed to stimulate a virtuous circle of 
cost-reducing innovation and emissions reductions.
 There is a trade-o" between aggregate or top-down 
approaches to technology, spanning society as a whole (or major 
branches of the economy), and bottom-up approaches that 
incorporate a more detailed representation of specific technology 
options in individual sectors. Closely related to this is the question of 
modelling economic, health, political and environmental dynamics in 
general, through tools such as systems dynamics modelling. Dynamic 
models with multiple feedback loops, which rely on extensive time 
series and cross-sectional datasets, are undoubtedly more realistic, 
but are also more complex, more di!cult to estimate and more 
sensitive to small fluctuations in technology assumptions. Learning 
and dynamics also play an important role in adaptation analyses, as 
they a"ect vulnerability and adaptive capacity. The main options for 
dealing with technological change are to:
      ›  Option 1: Assume a fixed pace of technical change, on the 
grounds of simplicity and ease of calculation of results,  
even though it does not capture the potential for crucial 
changes over time.
      ›  Option 2: Assume a limited form of endogenous 
technological change, and a small number of crucial feedback 
and dynamic e"ects of policy choices. This incorporates 
some of the recent advances in modelling of system 
dynamics, while stopping short of the full complexity of 
real-world social processes.
      ›  Option 3: Attempt a full-scale dynamic model with numerous 
causal pathways and feedbacks, as in some systems-
dynamics approaches. 
 Our general recommendation is option 2, as this approach 
involves the appropriate level of complexity for most studies. Where 
resources for policy analysis are limited, option 1 may be more 
appropriate, though the likely costs and impacts of climate policies 
may be badly miscalculated. Similar considerations again apply to 
both mitigation and adaptation, though for slightly di"erent reasons. 
In analyzing mitigation policies, there is naturally a trade-o" between 
model complexity and the ease of evaluating climate policies. This 
requires using a particular model of endogenous technical change 
and relying on econometric techniques where data are available. For 
adaptation, the emphasis is less on long-term technological change 
and more on shorter-term feedbacks and dynamics; the process of 
learning about hazards and how best to adapt to them is crucial to 
reducing vulnerability.
 No-regrets options for mitigation and adaptation
 Many bottom-up analyses, such as the McKinsey cost curves, 
have identified substantial opportunities for mitigation at zero or 
negative net cost. Similar opportunities for adaptation may also exist. 
Policies to exploit these opportunities are known as ‘no-regrets’ or 
‘win-win’. Such opportunities may not be exploited in practice because 
of market barriers, such as a lack of information about them or 
because some of the benefits of the investment that reduces emissions 
do not accrue to the investor. Co-benefits include, for example, 
improved health from reducing fossil fuel combustion through less 
air pollution, and the increased resilience and reduced vulnerability 
to non-climate shocks that can result from successful adaptation 
measures. Both mitigation and adaptation policies may bring also 
benefits of economic diversification and increased employment in 
new industries or protective investments. In practice, it can be hard 
to measure co-benefits. How they are taken into account in evaluating 
climate-policy options can have a large e"ect on their estimated net costs. 
There are two main options for how best to handle no-regrets policies:
      ›  Option 1: Use the best available, disaggregated information 
on no-regrets options. These options will normally be the first 
priorities in any climate policy proposal, as they reduce the 
overall costs of a comprehensive climate-policy.
      ›  Option 2: Reject the possibility of no-regrets options, and accept 
the theoretical economic argument that there must be large 
hidden costs such that all policy options have positive net costs.
 For both adaptation and mitigation, option 1 is the best 
approach, as it makes better use of the available information about 
real-world costs. It is important to examine any potential no-regrets 
options carefully and assess the transactions or programme costs 
needed to realize the projected savings. Those costs may reduce, 
but not necessarily eliminate, the projected savings. In general, 
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co-benefits should be included, whenever data are available, in full 
life-cycle analyses of climate impacts and policy costs; the inclusion of 
co-benefits can substantially a"ect the results. 
 Monetary valuation and non-market impacts
 The practice of assigning monetary values to the 
environmental, health and other social costs and benefits of policy 
actions has become more common, but remains controversial because 
of several ethical and analytical dilemmas. These include whether it is 
necessary to monetize every significant benefit, the availability and 
use of standard values for non-market benefits and whether to base 
values on willingness to pay or income (economic logic suggests that 
they must vary, but are public health and the environment worth more 
in a rich country?). It is also questionable whether the most important 
costs or benefits can be reported in natural (physical or health) units 
as well as in monetary equivalents. For health, for example, values 
can be calculated for individual outcome categories, such as numbers 
of cases of bronchitis; total Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) or 
similar measures; and monetary valuation of DALYs. But the ability of 
DALY calculations to adequately represent health outcome is disputed: 
does a single monetary measure adequately represent the value of a 
DALY and should the value of a DALY depend on income? Three main 
options for assessing non-market impacts are available:
      ›  Option 1: Apply the best available estimates of monetary 
valuations of all health and environmental impacts. This has 
the advantage of internal consistency and establishing a 
numerical estimate for any scenario, which is required for 
cost-benefit analysis.
      ›  Option 2: Apply only the most established and least 
controversial valuations of non-market benefits, such as the 
externality prices for common air pollutants used in energy-
sector analyses. In addition, report all major health and 
environmental impacts in their natural units, such as DALYs, 
and use qualitative assessments in parallel for impacts that 
do not easily lend themselves to quantification.
      ›  Option 3: Avoid all use of monetary valuations of non-market 
benefits and report all market costs and benefits in monetary 
terms and health and environmental impacts in natural units. 
Avoid DALYs to avoid the ethical paradox of pricing the 
priceless values of life, health and nature.
 For both mitigation and adaptation analysis, Option 2 is 
recommended, since it allows comparison with other studies using 
standard monetary values for some externalities and DALYs for 
health impacts, while retaining essential information about impacts 
in natural units — an important element in communicating results to 
non-specialists. Both options 2 and 3 are preferable to option 1, since 
any attempt to monetize all costs and impacts would run the risk of 
producing a set of results that depend heavily on subjective measures, 
particularly in the areas of health and environmental impacts. 
Rather than embedding these measures in the impact estimates or 
assessment of likely e"ects, it is better to adopt an approach based 
on multi-criteria analysis — which underpins the MCA4climate policy 
evaluation framework (described in section 3) — at the policy scoring 
and ranking stage in evaluating and prioritizing climate policies.
 Discounting
 Given the long time-spans involved in analyzing climate 
policies, the discount rate that is applied to future costs and benefits 
of any climate-policy action makes a big di"erence to comparative 
costs and benefits. Discounting plays a major role in any economic 
analysis of costs and benefits extending over a period of several 
years. For conventional project analysis or investment decisions, 
it is appropriate to use an economic discount rate, based on the 
opportunity cost of investments in capital markets.
 However, for public policy decisions, especially those 
with very long-term consequences, it is appropriate to use a social 
discount rate, reflecting society’s preference for weighting present 
against future costs and benefits. several of questions have been 
raised regarding the choice of a social discount rate for climate-policy 
analysis, which are set out below (with recommendations on how to 
answer them).
 Should future costs and benefits be discounted at all?
 There is a long-standing debate about the use of discount 
rates. Some moral, philosophical and ethical arguments have been 
raised against discounting, as it favours the well-being of current 
over future generations. Critics have suggested alternatives such as 
summing undiscounted future quantities up to a fixed time horizon 
of, say, N years, and then ignoring later years (which, for a constant, 
unending data series, is mathematically equivalent to discounting at an 
annual rate of 1/N).
 Our recommendation would be not to discount quantities 
that cannot be adequately expressed in monetary terms, such as 
many health and ecological impacts. However, since the practice of 
discounting is widely accepted, even in climate analyses,  
it is recommended to use discount rates for quantities that lend 
themselves to monetary valuation.
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 Should the discount rate be constant or decline over time?
 Constant discount rates have long been the norm in comparing 
future costs and benefits. They simplify calculations and follow the 
logic of financial markets. There is a strong-case for their use in short 
or medium-term financial calculations. But for inter-generational 
public policy choices, there is less need for consistency with markets. 
Discount rates that decline over time have been proposed on two 
grounds: the results of psychological research suggest that individuals’ 
preferences change over time; and uncertainty about future interest 
rates and growth rates. Declining discount rates are starting to appear 
in climate-policy analyses; for example, the UK government in its 
Treasury Green Book (HM Treasury, 2004) proposes their use for 
o!cial approval of projects with long-term impacts.
 It is recommended that the e"ects of declining discount rates 
be explored through sensitivity analysis using constant rates as the 
base case. This is a relatively straightforward task using spreadsheets. 
In view of the sensitivity of long-term calculations to the discount 
rate, it may make sense to analyze the implications of more than one 
discount rate scenario and even to back-calculate the discount rate at 
which a policy proposal ‘breaks even’ (i.e. discounted costs are exactly 
equal to discounted benefits).
 What rate of return should be used?
 There are two main approaches to discount rates, sometimes 
called ‘descriptive’ and ‘prescriptive’. There is no correct approach: 
the choice depends on attitudes to inter-generational equity. With the 
descriptive approach, the appropriate rate is that which savers and 
investors actually apply in their day-to-day decisions; for investments 
with returns that are not correlated, or negatively correlated, with 
the broader market, the appropriate rate is considered to be the rate 
of return on risk-free assets such as long-term government bonds in 
developed countries, which typically averages 1% or less in real terms. 
Climate mitigation and adaptation actions have a higher return in 
scenarios where climate damages are severe, so they can be seen as 
social insurance against disaster, rather than ordinary profit-seeking 
investment. As is typical for insurance, their returns are uncorrelated or 
negatively correlated with the broader market. Thus the risk-free rate 
of return is the recommended choice under the descriptive approach 
to discount rates.
 The prescriptive approach involves the use of the so-called 
social discount rate, which is the sum of the rate of pure time-preference 
and the rate of increased welfare derived from higher per-capita 
incomes in the future (the so-called Ramsey equation, after the 20th 
century economist Frank Ramsey who came up with it). The rate of pure 
time preference is the discount rate that would apply if all generations 
were known, with certainty, to have identical incomes and resources. 
We recommend the use of a near-zero rate of pure time preference 
on the grounds of the ethical principle that all generations are equally 
important; this is in line with the position taken by the Stern Review 
(Stern, 2006). The income-based component of the discount rate is a 
multiple of the rate of growth of per capita consumption. This reflects 
the principle that the marginal benefit of another dollar of income 
is lower for richer people and therefore, benefits to richer, future 
generations should be discounted. Many studies have used values in the 
range of 1% to 2%, which is our recommendation.
 An uncertainty-based component of the discount rate is 
not part of the simple Ramsey equation, but needs to be taken into 
account in analysis of climate policies. This component is a negative 
multiple of the variance in future growth rates. In other words, the 
more uncertain the future is, the lower the discount rate should be to 
reflect the greater need for precautionary savings in a more uncertain 
world. Failure to include this in the Ramsey equation amounts to 
assuming that the future is known with certainty. 
 Time horizon of the analysis
 The time dimension of the climate-change problem is 
crucial. Climate science deals with long time horizons of at least 
100-200 years. Robust climate policy needs to take account of 
long-term climate changes. Climate policy on both mitigation and 
adaptation will need to adjust as our understanding of the mechanics 
of climate change improves, as this will a"ect the costs and impacts 
of responding to it. Projecting far into the future also helps to improve 
our understanding of potential links with fiscal sustainability. But the 
longer we project into the future, inevitably the larger the uncertainty 
in estimating the costs and impacts of policy action. Policy analysis 
can focus on di"erent time horizons: 
      ›  Option 1: The short term; for example, up to the year 2020. 
The advantage of this approach is that more information and 
modelling applications are available. Moreover, it minimizes 
the importance of the choice of discount rates and the 
treatment of uncertainty, avoiding those di!cult questions. 
However, much of the economic, social and environmental 
impact of policies could be seen after one or even two decades.
      ›  Option 2: A time horizon extending to 2050 at least and up 
to 2100. This would allow for a more complete assessment 
of the extent to which greenhouse-gas stabilization targets 
could be met, how e"ective adaptation to climate change 
could be, potential changes in long-term economic cycles and 
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technological innovation, and the potential for co-benefits. 
However, as the time horizon increases, the greater the 
uncertainties will be.
      ›  Option 3: A time horizon up to 2200. Whilst this would 
allow socio-economic analysis over the time spans relevant 
to climate science, the uncertainties may be too large to 
generate any reliable results.
 Option 2 would be preferable for long-term planning of 
mitigation policies. However, the short-to medium-term impacts 
of long-term plans also need to be explored. For adaptation, 
both options 1 and 2 are reasonable choices. Many policies have a 
short-term focus, yet there is need to consider longer-term adaptation 
measures, which can have time horizons up to 2050.
 Developing baseline projections
 Sound climate policymaking must be based on reliable 
projections and robust analysis of the drivers of greenhouse-gas 
emissions and sinks and their links to future climate change. This must 
be underpinned by climate and economic modelling. An important 
first step is the construction of a ‘baseline’ or ‘business-as-usual’ 
scenario that projects emissions trajectories, climate damages and 
other relevant macro-level developments on the assumption of no 
change in climate policy beyond that which has already been decided 
and is expected to be implemented. This ‘business-as-usual’ scenario 
maps out the costs and benefits of inaction — that is, choosing not to 
implement any new climate policies. Starting from this baseline, it is then 
possible to examine the likely e"ects of a proposed change in policy at a 
global, regional, national or even local level. Specifically, baseline analysis 
allows policymakers and other stakeholders to:
      ›  Predict underlying trends in greenhouse-gas emissions by 
source, including agricultural and land-use sources.
      ›  Demonstrate links between emissions and the development of the 
energy system, especially where emissions are rising quickly.
      ›  Help in assessing how far a policy or project takes us beyond 
business-as-usual, a concept referred to as additionality. 
 National economic models need, at a minimum, to be able 
to capture the main drivers of emissions and related environmental 
impacts. They also need to represent interactions with the rest of 
the world economy, including through trade and technology transfer 
(though usually in a stylized and fairly simple manner). Some relevant 
baseline projections already exist at the global level, such as the 
International Energy Agency’s annual World Energy Outlook, and 
in many cases at the national level, such as economic projections. 14 
For many countries, however, detailed climate-policy analysis may 
require the development of national data sources. In practice, many 
models focus primarily on the costs and benefits of mitigation options. 
This is in part because widespread recognition of the importance of 
adaptation is comparatively recent, and in part because adaptation is 
more di!cult to model. 
 Climate modelling involves many choices, few of which 
have definitive right or wrong options. We describe below a number 
of issues related to these choices in preparing baseline projections, 
concerning model design and data inputs, specifically: which 
macroeconomic variables to consider; how to incorporate national 
baseline greenhouse-gas emissions and which sectors to analyze; 
macroeconomic modelling of the public sector and financial markets; and 
modelling environmental impact, including climate changes and forestry.
 Critical macroeconomic variables to consider
 The main macroeconomic variables that need to be taken into 
account in developing a baseline set of projections include the following:
      ›  Population, by sub-national region where appropriate.
      ›  Distribution of age, race-ethnicity and income.
      ›  Health status of the population, such as distribution  
of major diseases.
      ›  Employment by economic sector.
      ›  Gross domestic product, and the contribution of energy-
intensive economic sectors to it.
      ›  Investment.
      ›  Exports and imports.
      ›  Prices of fossil fuels.
      ›  Taxes and other government policies that a"ect the prices  
of fuels or emissions.
      ›  Prices and quantities of key commodities impacted by  
climate change.
 In practice, the more of these factors that are incorporated into 
the modelling framework, the more resource-intensive the exercise will 
be. An alternative is use a basic set of variables, such as population, GDP, 
employment, and emissions by economic sector. The appropriate choice 
depends on the available data and modelling resources. Whatever that 
choice may be, the projections of each variable, where they are treated 
exogenously, should ideally come from the same source and be derived 
consistently from one standard set of underlying assumptions. That data 
should be adjusted for inflation. Consideration also needs to be given 
to the method of comparing economic data across countries: market 
14   Some leading sources of international data and projections can be found in Annex B.
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exchange rates, whereby national monetary values are converted to a 
single currency (usually US dollars) at the prevailing exchange rate is the 
appropriate basis for cross-country comparisons of economic activity in 
sectors where international trade plays a big role, for example production 
of oil; purchasing-power parity is a better basis for comparing activity in 
non-traded sectors, such as locally consumed services.
 Incorporating national baseline greenhouse-gas emissions
 Most national climate-economic models include estimates of 
national baseline greenhouse-gas emissions. Data for an initial year 
are taken from national emissions inventories. Future years’ baseline 
emissions may be modelled in one of two ways: endogenously, by 
combining economic projections with information about the emissions 
intensity of national industries; or exogenously, using projections by 
national environmental or energy agencies. In either case, models 
commonly distinguish between emissions from fossil-fuel combustion, 
from agriculture and forestry with existing land-use patterns, and from 
land-use change. Modelling emissions endogenously within the model 
allows for the greatest consistency of economic and climate projections. 
However, projections generated endogenously should be cross-checked 
for accuracy against projections made by national agencies.
 Number of sectors to analyze
 The degree of aggregation or disaggregation is another 
modelling choice for which there is no single right answer. Many global 
models are highly aggregated, in order to focus on the big-picture 
interactions between climate change and long-run economic growth. 
On the other hand, some national economic models, such as input-
output models, may represent the short-run behaviour and interactions 
of hundreds of economic sectors. Between these extremes, there 
are many useful models with a moderate number of separate 
economic sectors. More sectors allow more precision and detail; 
more aggregation (i.e. fewer sectors) clarifies the understanding of 
the problem as a whole. Using a highly aggregated macroeconomic 
model with up to three economic sectors is useful primarily for initial 
exploration; while it may provide a starting point, it will not generally 
produce adequate analyses of the interactions of climate and the 
national economy. On the other hand, applying a highly disaggregated 
model, representing a large number of separate sectors would be 
prohibitively expensive, in time and money, if a new model has to 
be created. It is appropriate only when a detailed economic model, 
such as a national input-output model, is already available for use. 
In most cases, the preferred alternative would be to a compromise 
by modelling an intermediate number of economic sectors (perhaps 
between 10 and 30). In this case, it is important to distinguish between 
sectors most vulnerable to climate change, such as agriculture, fishing, 
forestry, tourism, and construction; the most emissions-intensive 
sectors, such as transportation, electricity generation, mining, oil 
refining, agriculture (especially livestock), and heavy industry; and the 
most trade-a"ected sectors (top export and import industries).
 Government budgets
 The e"ects of government fiscal and monetary policies can 
be subsumed into GDP projections, except where important targeted 
investments in emission-intensive sectors are expected. Depending 
on the areas in which the public sector is active, it may be important 
to examine government spending on transportation, electricity and 
other infrastructure; management of public oil and gas deposits, 
forests, and other natural resources; and energy-e!ciency initiatives, 
emissions taxes, and other climate and energy policies. In general terms, 
government spending can influence the level of employment, the rate 
of economic growth, and the balance of trade. Changes in tax and 
subsidy incentives can play an important role in climate policy, through 
such measures as the removal of fossil-fuel subsidies, the introduction 
of subsidies for renewable energy and tax incentives for low-emission 
vehicles. The structure of the available economic models, as well as 
the complexity of the modelling e"ort, will a"ect how best to treat the 
public sector. Some government activity is directly tied to economic 
growth: tax revenues normally increase as the economy expands, while 
welfare payments normally increase during economic downturns. These 
components of the public sector should be endogenous in an economic 
model. Other government activity, such as expenditure on infrastructure 
or exploitation of natural resources, is more likely to be exogenous, 
driven by actual policy choices.Including government activities only 
as a source of emissions is most appropriate to a very simple climate-
economics model. The most complex models will require government 
activities to be modelled fully, including investment in infrastructure and 
endogenous economic e"ects related to taxes and transfer payments 
(such as unemployment or welfare support). But in most cases, the 
preferred option would be to include government emissions as well as 
the likely e"ects of key policy initiatives related to climate and energy, 
so that the main e"ects of government on emissions are included 
without making it necessary to incorporate a level of detail that would 
be inconsistent with other parts of the model.
 Financial and monetary sectors
 The financial sector, along with monetary policy, plays a 
central role in determining interest rates and exchange rates, which 
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a"ect economic growth and trade. The financial crisis of 2008 
provided a clear illustration of the importance of the financial sector 
for economic growth and, hence, greenhouse-gas emissions. In a 
detailed economic model, financial institutions and monetary policies 
play an important part in determining the pace of growth.
 In a model focused more specifically on climate finance 
and investments, the policies of lending institutions toward energy 
e!ciency and renewable energy may be important; the transition 
to a more sustainable economy could be eased by ‘green finance’, 
or blocked by its absence. Many economics models, however, do 
not include specific financial data or a separate representation of 
the financial sector. Instead, these models use projections of GDP 
and its components that take into account the likely future impacts 
of financial and monetary policies. In most cases, national climate-
economics models will need to use the standard projection of GDP 
and its components made available by the national economic bureau. 
In some case, it may be possible to make strategic corrections to 
standard GDP projections, based on assumptions about financial and 
monetary policy that enhance consistency with other projections used 
in the climate-economics model. Only the most complex models ought 
to attempt to fully incorporate a financial sector and government fiscal 
and monetary policy into the model, including public investments in 
energy e!ciency and renewable energy.
 Incorporating climate damages
 Climate damages include reductions to the annual output 
of many vulnerable sectors and large-scale replacement costs for 
infrastructure damaged by flooding and other serious climatic e"ects. 
Economic models of climate change often calculate damages as a 
fraction of output, either for the economy as a whole or for vulnerable 
sectors such as agriculture. Based on primary research on climate 
damages, these models often specify a relationship between output 
losses and changes in temperature (or, in some cases, changes in 
precipitation or sea level). Thus, a scenario with greater climate 
impacts would project greater economic losses. However, damages 
calculated in this manner result in an underestimate of the welfare 
cost of climate change because they fail to account for the disutility 
of having to bear the risks of climate change (even if the potential 
damages never actually occur). 
 The expected magnitude of damages and their relationship to 
climate change are still being debated, so there is no consensus about the 
appropriate estimates to use in economic modelling. Some models have 
predicted net benefits to agriculture from the first few decades of climate 
change, either for the world as a whole or for high-latitude regions. But 
newer research on agricultural damages has led many economists to 
reject this view. There is, however, virtual unanimity that agriculture, like 
other sectors, will su"er from climate change in the long run.
 Inclusion of climate damages in an economic model requires 
that they be assigned prices. Some climate damages are naturally 
expressed in economic terms, but others, such as damages to human 
health and the natural environment, do not have prices. There are 
three main options:
      ›  Option 1: Measure climate damages as the expected 
reduction in vulnerable sectors’ contribution to GDP, 
especially agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and tourism.
      ›  Option 2: Include both expected GDP losses in key sectors 
and the expected replacement cost of buildings and other 
infrastructure damaged by climate change.
      ›  Option 3: To these estimates of economic losses and 
replacement costs for damaged infrastructure, add a monetary 
value for damages to human health and the natural environment.
 Option 1 leaves out what are expected to be some of the 
most serious economic costs of climate change, including damage 
to infrastructure from coastal flooding and higher temperatures 
(especially in high latitudes). Option 2, which includes both economic 
losses and infrastructure costs, will provide the best climate damage 
estimates for most models. It will be important, however, to report 
model results along with a clear discussion of what is and is not 
included. While option 2 includes only market damages, option 3 has 
the added category of monetary values for non-market damages. 
This is a complicated area of modelling, where errors, conjecture, 
and implicit normative choices can easily dominate results. Often, a 
separate discussion of expected impacts to health and environment 
will be of more use to decision-makers than model results that lump 
together market and non-market e"ects.
 Forestry and deforestation
 Forests have an important role in several aspects of climate 
modelling: changes in forest coverage due to climatic factors or 
land-use changes will impact on emission sequestration, while 
investment in a"orestation is expected to be a critical component of 
global mitigation policy. Forests sequester large amounts of carbon, 
which is removed from the atmosphere as trees grow, and ‘stored’ 
in living trees for decades. Deforestation releases much of this 
sequestered carbon when trees are cut down; deforested soil also 
loses carbon over time. Many studies, including the Stern Review, have 
concluded that reductions in deforestation, or increases in a"orestation, 
are among the world’s lowest-cost options for greenhouse-gas 
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mitigation (Stern, 2006). This is of particular importance in countries 
with large tropical forests. For countries where forestry is important 
to greenhouse-gas inventories, there is a need to prepare baseline 
projections of forestry sequestration and deforestation (though forest 
protection and forest-based industries are generally quite separate 
from the principal sources of fossil-fuel emissions). At the very least, 
climate-economics modelling needs to include a simple forestry 
module, in which forest sequestration is driven by assumptions about 
land-use changes, including deforestation and a"orestation, which 
in turn would be a function of economic growth. For nations with 
significant current-day forest sequestration and future a"orestation 
potential, it may be appropriate to link a detailed forestry model — 
most likely an existing national forestry model — to the main climate-
economics model. This decision would depend on the availability of an 
existing national forestry model that can be adapted to use in climate-
economics modelling.
 Interactions with the world economy 
 For nations with large economies that account for a large 
share of global greenhouse-gas emissions, it is essential to model the 
two-way interactions between the world economy and climate system 
on the one hand, and domestic economic output and emissions on 
the other hand. At a global level, there are two major interactions 
between economic activity and the climate system. First, emissions 
from production and consumption lead to climate change, which 
causes economic damages; second, investment in abatement reduces 
emissions, and therefore slows climate change, which in turn could 
accelerate long-term economic growth relative to a business-as-usual.
Investment in adaptation can also reduce climate damages, but does 
not a"ect the pace of climate change, as discussed above. In a global 
climate-economics model, the interplay between these forces should 
be at the core of the model’s dynamics. 
 For a larger country, or for a major exporter of oil or other 
important commodities, it may be appropriate to model these 
complex interactions with the world economy. The largest developing 
countries and emerging industrial economies may be big enough to 
influence world markets and prices. In such cases, the model needs to 
be su!ciently complex to represent the two-way interactions. 
 
 Interactions with the energy system
 The energy system, both global and national, also 
has important interactions with national economic growth and 
greenhouse-gas emissions. Indeed, energy use is the source of 
the great majority of emissions. Including one or more separate 
energy sectors in climate-economic models is essential to achieve a 
comprehensive representation of the consequences of national policy 
choices. Depending on the level of detail in the model, the energy 
sector may be treated separately, including electricity, heating fuel, 
and energy used in transportation and industry. Energy prices, taxes 
and subsidies influence energy use. Total energy demand and the 
composition of energy sources used are likely to change as temperatures 
rise, reducing the need for heating fuels and increasing the need for 
electricity to run refrigeration and air-conditioning systems. 
 In the short run, the key variables to model are often the 
use of di"erent modes of transportation and the energy e!ciency 
of each mode, and the demand for electricity and mix of fuels used 
to generate it. For later years, in a model with a longer time horizon, 
technological development will determine the rate at which new 
energy options become available and the projected prices for various 
energy sources. Much will depend on the model’s assumptions about 
oil supplies, market power of oil producers and the availability of 
unconventional sources of oil, such as shale and tar sands, which can 
be more environmentally damaging than conventional sources. 
 In most cases, it would su!ce for national modelling to treat 
energy use separately from other economic activities, but assume 
an exogenous decrease in carbon intensity over time and a simple 
relationship between temperature change and energy use. This 
approach o"ers an appropriate level of detail while avoiding undue 
model development costs. A more sophisticated approach, which 
may be beyond the means of most countries, would be to model 
both carbon-based and zero-carbon energy sources separately from 
other economic activity, and introduce endogenous technological 
improvements, so that greater investment in alternative energy 
reduces the relative cost of similar future investments. 
 Dealing with risk and uncertainty
 Defining risk and uncertainty
 Risk and uncertainty are inherent characteristics of both  
climate science and the formulation of climate policies. Climate and 
economic systems are characterized by long time lags and complex 
causal connections, and long-term outcomes are inevitably very 
uncertain. For analytical purposes, it is helpful to distinguish between 
risk and uncertainty. In conventional economics, risk refers to events 
with known probabilities, while uncertainty refers to events with 
unknown probabilities (sometimes called ‘Knightian uncertainty’, after 
the economist Knight, 1921). In the field of risk assessment, on the 
other hand, risk is often interpreted as combining the likelihood of an 
undesirable event and its consequences (Daneshkhah 2004), while 
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uncertainty refers only to questions of likelihood. In this definition, 
there are two types of uncertainty: known uncertainty, where the 
distribution of probable outcomes can be deduced from established 
principles or determined from empirical research; and unknown 
uncertainty, referring to cases where the distribution of probable 
outcomes cannot be determined (equivalent to Knightian uncertainty).
 The risk assessment definition of risk and uncertainty is most 
appropriate for climate-related analysis. In this approach, known 
uncertainty can be divided into two inter-related categories:
      ›  Internal uncertainty, which stems from a lack of su!cient 
knowledge about the phenomena under study and can be 
reduced through improved analysis and additional empirical 
research (Daneshkhah, 2004). 
      ›  External uncertainty, which arises from outside the field 
of study, and is not reducible through additional e"ort 
in the same area, although it can be quantified. External 
uncertainties are sometimes referred to as aleatoric or chance 
events, or as irreducible uncertainties (Daneshkhah, 2004). 
 While internal uncertainties are relevant for both mitigation 
and adaptation assessments, external or aleatoric uncertainty applies 
most directly to adaptation, in the case of the natural variability 
in the climate and weather system resulting from natural hazards 
and extreme events. Known uncertainties are common in climate 
assessment. They include the links between anthropogenic emissions, 
atmospheric concentrations, radiative forcing and climate responses, 
particularly extreme weather or catastrophic events. Socio-economic 
system uncertainties include trends in demography, health projections, 
economic growth, technological change, fluctuations in energy prices 
and the rate of anthropogenic emissions. 
 Climate scenarios address uncertainty by presenting a 
coherent, quantitative picture of a possible future, driven by a set 
of scenario assumptions (see Economic analysis of climate-policy 
options, above). With this approach, there are several methods 
available to analysts to quantify the uncertainties in the chain of causal 
models linking the climate to population health, ecology and the 
environment. These include deterministic and probabilistic methods:
 The deterministic approach to uncertainty is popular in 
cost-benefit analysis. It involves converting the range of possible 
outcomes to a ‘certainty-equivalent’ estimate, based on an assumed 
probability distribution which is used to construct a weighted average 
of likely outcomes. This technique converts known uncertainties into 
deterministic ‘expected values’. The starting point for this procedure 
is the implicit assumption that the probability distribution of possible 
outcomes is known. In some cases, however, the adoption of a familiar 
probability distribution, such as the normal, or bell-curve, distribution, 
is based on little or no information, thus inappropriately converting an 
unknown uncertainty into an apparently known uncertainty. 
 The probabilistic approach is more suitable for large, rare or 
unique events, such as the long-term evolution of the climate system — 
especially given the expectation of catastrophic damages and deeply 
uncertain probabilities associated with worst-case outcomes. Under 
such conditions the expected value of an incremental reduction in 
emissions could, technically speaking, be infinitely large (Weitzman 
2009). Extreme climatic events, or climate catastrophes, may have 
low probabilities of occurrence but very high, discontinuous, and 
irreversible impacts if they do occur. Use of heavy-tailed distributions 
is crucial in modelling the uncertainty in low-probability, high-impact 
events. The threat of such events, which become more likely as 
emissions increase and global warming accelerates, may call for 
di"erent approaches to climate policy and analysis.
 Options for analyzing uncertainty
 The extent of uncertainty involved in climate assessment 
is daunting. Despite the wide range of possible outcomes, many 
adaptation measures, such as improvements in sanitation and public 
health, may make sense as they would be desirable under virtually 
any climate scenario, i.e. they may fall into the category of no-regrets 
policies (see above). However, the value of other policy options 
depends critically on climate uncertainties. For example, should 
planning for a river basin include large-scale investments in preparing 
for floods or for droughts? 
 Dealing with uncertainty is an inescapable part of climate-
policy planning, particularly for the low-probability, high-cost risks 
that emerge from global climate projections. How should a national 
climate assessment address the uncertainty surrounding both normal 
and catastrophic risks? Furthermore, how should such an assessment 
treat the uncertainties about key macro-level indicators that inform 
the analysis? The deterministic approach is best suited to answering 
the first question, with the probabilistic approach is more suited to 
answering the second. Two main options are available:
      ›  Option 1: For climate-related uncertainties, assign the best 
available guesses at the relevant probabilities to all possible 
outcomes and calculate the certainty-equivalent value, or 
weighted average. For macro economic uncertainties, carry 
out a sensitivity analysis that would look at a few subjectively 
chosen cases. This produces a single numerical ‘bottom line’ 
estimate, weighting rare events based on their likelihood as 
well as their magnitude of risk. 
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      ›  Option 2: For climate-related uncertainties, perform analyses 
and calculations for at least two distinct scenarios, one 
representing most likely outcomes, and one representing 
credible worst-case risks. For macro economic uncertainties, 
carry out a fully fledged uncertainty analysis based on robust 
statistical techniques examining multiple possible values 
or pathways. The available information typically does not 
support precise estimates of probabilities of the worst-case 
outcomes included in the second climate scenario. 
 In the case of mitigation, option 2 is generally the 
recommended approach. For climate-related uncertainties, option 
2 provides a better way to reflect uncertainty and worst-case risks, 
as arbitrary guesses at unknown probabilities (which are needed for 
option 1) are not particularly helpful in cases of acute uncertainty, 
which is typical in climate analysis. For macro economic uncertainties, 
option 2 is preferable whenever the necessary expertise is available. 
It is also important to address the uncertainty in policy selection 
when comparing alternative climate policies for decision-making. This 
could be done using either deterministic or probabilistic approaches. 
In the case of uncertainty in decision-making with catastrophic risks, 
normal decision analytical methods based on expected utility theory 
are not appropriate, because they are insensitive to low-probability, 
high-impact events. For adaptation, a combination of options 1 and 2 is 
likely to be the best approach. While option 1 is desirable whenever it 
can be applied, it has demanding data and analytic requirements. For 
example, for the impacts of extreme events, a probabilistic approach 
is necessary to account for fat-tailed events (where the probability 
distribution deviates from the norm), yet this would require data on daily 
variability, rather than the more frequently available monthly or annual 
averages. Given these limitations, the comparison of most likely and 
worst-case scenarios under option 2 may be all that is possible in practice.
 Evaluating fiscal implications
 Policies to mitigate and adapt to climate change potentially 
have significant implications for the public finances, both through their 
direct impact on public spending and tax revenues, and their indirect 
impact on economic activity more generally (which a"ects spending 
and tax revenues). Of all policies for the mitigation of climate change, 
the use of economic instruments has the most obvious relevance for 
a country’s fiscal position and sustainability, because they can raise 
revenues as well as (like other instruments) change economic structure 
and incentives. 
 The main economic instruments than can be used to mitigate 
climate change include:
      ›  Energy and carbon taxes and charges.
      ›  Trading schemes, especially CO2 
  emissions trading (covering industrial emissions). 
      ›  Feed-in tari"s and renewable-energy obligations.
      ›  Subsidies, either environmentally friendly or harmful 
subsidies (both types have a negative e"ect on the public 
finances but di"erent climate implications).
      ›  Payments under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or 
Joint Implementation (JI) introduced under the Kyoto Protocol.
      ›  Payments (currently being negotiated) for ecosystem 
services, such as those being negotiated for the Reduction of 
Emissions from Forest Destruction and Degradation (REDD), 
and REDD Plus, which also includes enhancing existing 
forests and increasing forest cover.
      ›  Green fiscal reform, which entails a systematic shift in the 
tax base away from taxes on incomes and profits (sometimes 
characterized as ‘goods’) towards taxes on resource use and 
pollution (sometimes characterized as ‘bads’) 
 The di"erent types of economic instruments to address 
climate change have very di"erent implications for fiscal sustainability, 
which need to be carefully considered by governments. Some 
may generate state revenues (taxes and charges and through the 
auctioning of emission allowances as part of trading schemes, receipts 
from CDM, JI or REDD), while others may involve spending them 
(subsidies, payments under the CDM, JI, or REDD). Carbon and energy 
taxes, and auctioned tradable permits, raise revenue, which allows 
increased public expenditure or the reduction of other taxes. However, 
these revenues change over time, as carbon emissions or energy use 
changes. Governments need to assess how such revenue streams will 
change over time to ensure that they continue to receive the revenues 
they need. The take-up of subsidies needs to be projected and carefully 
monitored to ensure that they remain a"ordable. Finally, it may be that the 
government is already providing environmentally perverse subsidies (i.e. 
subsidies that e"ectively increase carbon or other greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission. Removing such subsidies may yield an economic as well as an 
environmental dividend. This, too, should be assessed.
 Compared with mitigation policies, adaptation policies more 
often involve public spending, for example, on infrastructure, coastal 
protection and early warning systems etc. The level and nature of 
these public expenditures are crucial to fiscal sustainability. 
 Modelling baseline fiscal sustainability 
 Governments need realistic short-term projections of public 
revenues and expenditures, and plausible projections as to how 
124 125
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 G
ui
di
ng
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
fo
r 
cl
im
at
e-
po
lic
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 G
ui
di
ng
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
fo
r 
cl
im
at
e-
po
lic
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
these will develop in the future. Clearly the further into the future the 
projections go, the more uncertain they become. Governments should 
distinguish between the short term, say three months to one year, 
over which time outcomes should be carefully monitored; the medium 
term (one to three years ahead), when underlying trends should be 
identified, perhaps through econometric techniques (see below); and 
the long term (more than three years ahead), when a much wider 
range of possible outcomes need to be considered. 
 Fiscal systems vary enormously across countries, as do the 
levels, types and sophistication of analysis and projections that are 
carried out. However, for countries to have any idea of the impact of 
climate change or climate change policies on their fiscal system, they 
must have a model of their fiscal system and some projections of how 
the public finances will develop in the absence of climate change. This 
model needs to include at a minimum projections of economic growth, 
population and demographic change, investment, government taxes 
and spending and trade. Of critical importance in assessing baseline 
fiscal sustainability is the type of economic model to use. Most work 
in the areas of the economics of climate change and fiscal policy 
assessments has been carried out using two types: 
      ›  Macro econometric models: These models use econometrics 
(the combination of economic theory and empirical analysis 
based on large historical datasets) to identify past trends 
in an economy, and then project those trends (perhaps 
modified in some way) into the future. The major advantage 
of econometric models is that they incorporate economic 
theory, are consistent with and can make use of economic 
accounting frameworks, and are based on real data about the 
economy. Their major disadvantage is that they are data intensive. 
      ›  General equilibrium economic models: This kind of model 
assumes that the economy will develop in a broadly balanced 
way, with clearing markets and economically rational actors. 
The model is calibrated to represent the economic outcome 
for a single year and is then allowed to develop into the future 
according to theoretical relationships and any exogenous 
assumptions (such as population growth) that have been 
specified in it. The advantage with using this type of model 
is its strong theoretical basis and its ability to give insights 
into the longer term (more than 20 years). This means that 
the model can be more easily linked to climate models. The 
disadvantage is that the model is not based on empirical data 
and its validity depends entirely on that of the assumptions.
 The utility of a model depends not only on the validity of 
the relationships and assumptions embedded in it but also on the 
maintenance of an expert team that can run, develop and interpret 
that model in the light of current events. Econometric models are 
generally to be preferred for short- and medium-term analysis, 
including the e"ects of policies, which makes them the preferred 
option for analysis of fiscal sustainability.
 
 Mitigation ancillary costs and co-benefits
 Policies to mitigate greenhouse-gas emissions may lead to a 
range of secondary (or ancillary) benefits and costs. Potential benefits 
include the economic gains from lower imports of fossil fuels that may 
result from increasing energy e!ciency or by substituting fossil fuels 
with domestic low-carbon energy sources. Such economic impacts 
will have fiscal implications. In addition, collective mitigation e"orts 
will not only reduce the damage from climate change but also reduce 
the need to spend revenues for adaptation measures, the implications 
of which for public finances could be very considerable. Ancillary 
costs from the mitigation of climate change include any negative 
environmental impacts from substitutes for fossil fuels (e.g. nuclear 
waste from nuclear power or technology imports where the new 
carbon-free sources cannot be produced domestically). These impacts 
too need to be assessed for their possible impact on the public finances. 
There are three main approaches to assessing these ancillary impacts:  
      ›  Option 1: A bottom-up, often partial equilibrium, approach. 
This is used to assess impacts in purely physical terms, such 
as reduced concentrations of air pollutants and improved 
health. The implications of these changes for the public 
finances would then need to be calculated, in terms of 
the extra income and, therefore, extra tax revenues from 
improved health and productivity, and a corresponding 
reduction in spending on public health.
      ›  Option 2: A full, top-down economic model. This would assess 
the interactions throughout the economy and the economy-wide 
fiscal e"ects, based on the bottom-up calculations of option 1. If 
adequate resources were available, the model outputs could be 
further coupled to bottom-up physical or other types of models 
to capture specific secondary e"ects.
      ›  Option 3: Monetary valuations of non-market e"ects (for 
example, the well-being e"ects from improved personal 
health). Such e"ects will not have a direct impact on the 
public finances, but it would, in principle, be possible to 
assign to them a monetary valuation (see the section, 
Monetary valuation and non-market impacts, above). 
However, the valuation of non-market costs and benefits can 
be a di!cult, expensive and controversial exercise, requiring 
substantial expertise and research inputs. 
126 127
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 G
ui
di
ng
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
fo
r 
cl
im
at
e-
po
lic
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
M
C
A
4
cl
im
at
e 
   
   
 G
ui
di
ng
 p
ri
nc
ip
le
s 
fo
r 
cl
im
at
e-
po
lic
y 
pl
an
ni
ng
 Option 1 is essential if any insight is to be gained into 
the size of the ancillary benefits of mitigating climate change. It is 
desirable to pursue option 2, but being able to do so depends on 
having an appropriate macroeconomic model and adequate data. 
Many developing countries may not have such a model, although as 
noted earlier, it is very di!cult without such a model to get adequate 
insights into the implications of climate policy for the public finances. 
Whether to proceed to option 3 depends on the specific issues to be 
addressed and available resources.
 The stimulation of mitigation technology
 Low-carbon technologies will need to be developed and 
deployed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Some new technologies, 
especially those related to energy e!ciency, are already cost-e"ective, 
but are not taken up because of a range of market failures. These can 
be addressed by government policy. Where a policy is successful in 
encouraging the deployment of such technologies, the country may 
derive competitive advantage from their deployment and export of 
these technologies. Depending on the countries’ fiscal system, this 
could generate substantial tax revenues. Countries need to assess 
the prospects of such developments in order to estimate their fiscal 
impact. This requires the use of macroeconomic models as described 
above. However, it is possible to assess the di"erent e"ects arising 
from di"erent policy instruments that may be used to stimulate the 
uptake of new technologies. It is easiest to model public policy support 
for new technologies through economic instruments (described at the 
start of this section) and policymakers should attempt this. Subsidies, 
in particular, may have negative fiscal implications in the short to 
medium term, but positive impacts in the longer run as export of these 
technologies may increase. It is harder to model the e"ects of regulatory 
measures, such as standards and mandates, which can also be used to 
stimulate the di"usion of new technologies. While the direct budgetary 
implications of this approach may be limited, as regulations specify 
the technologies to be used, their wider economic e"ects may have 
significant fiscal impacts. Where regulatory measures lead to a faster 
uptake of low-carbon technologies than market-based instruments, 
then the longer-run positive impacts on the tax base may be greater. 
Although it is far from straightforward, consideration should be given to 
modelling these impacts, and those of other types of policy instrument, 
in order to identify the most cost-e"ective policy approach.
 
 Mitigation technology transfer and use of the Kyoto mechanisms
 Direct financial support from the developed to developing 
countries to support the latter’s mitigation and adaptation actions, 
including via the purchase of certificates under the clean development 
mechanism and joint implementation, will inevitably have implications 
for all countries’ fiscal positions, which should be assessed. 
Contributions to international funds, such as the newly created Green 
Climate Fund, may have negative budgetary implications for donor 
countries. For the developed countries, the fiscal impacts should 
ideally be assessed against the implications of the countries that are 
to receive support achieving their emissions targets through domestic 
action (which could be more expensive). For the developing countries, 
the fiscal impacts could be positive, through the beneficial e"ects on 
their economies.
 A first estimate of the significance of such transfers for fiscal 
balances can, of course, be derived by calculating their absolute 
size, and then considering this in relation to the overall size of the 
economy. The advantage of this option is that it is relatively simple, 
and the data are likely to be readily available. Its disadvantage is 
that it fails to capture the wider economic impacts of the transfers. 
Where the transfers are large, their full impacts can only be assessed 
through the use of macroeconomic models. The model should be 
su!ciently detailed to allow, for example, the impact of the transfers 
on specific economic sectors in the receiving country to be assessed. 
Care should be taken to take into account the use of the funds by the 
receiving country over time, so that the implications of the transfers 
for international trade are also taken into account. However, this would 
require a fairly sophisticated model. 
 Adaptation policies
 Most adaptation measures will have fiscal implications, 
mainly through public expenditure. These need to be taken into 
account in evaluating and prioritizing policy options. At a minimum, 
an assessment of the fiscal implications should include not only public 
expenditures incurred when adapting to climate change but also the 
public expenditures saved and/or government revenue loss avoided 
due to climate damages avoided by the adaptation measures. As with 
some of the issues discussed above, the full economic, and therefore 
fiscal, implications of implementing adaptation actions can be 
assessed only by using a macroeconomic model. Such an assessment 
is highly desirable, but will depend on developing adequate analytical 
and modelling capacity. 
 Creating mechanisms for long-term fiscal planning
 There are powerful arguments for countries to engage in 
long-term fiscal planning in relation to climate change, though the 
uncertainties involved mean that such planning is very challenging. 
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For most countries, it will require new institutions and new tools for 
modelling and analysis, incorporating the impacts of di"erent events 
of di"erent severity arising from climate change, and or government 
responses to these. So far, even for industrial countries with the 
institutions, models and requisite expertise, such planning is in its 
infancy. The annual budgetary process, which is still dominant in most 
countries, is completely inadequate for such considerations. Bodies 
like the OECD are advocating multi-annual budgeting to promote 
fiscal stability even without any reference to climate change, and 
the uncertainties in the prospects of climate change considerably 
reinforce their arguments. Another example is the long-term budget of 
the European Union (multi-annual financial framework) to account for 
investments in pan-European public goods. 
 Multi-year budget forecasts need to firstly establish a 
framework for fiscal sustainability in the absence of climate change, 
giving insights into the evolution of such variables as expenditure, 
income, and any financial deficit under existing law and a given 
economic framework. 
 It should include a medium-term expenditure forecast, and 
should be explicitly constructed to overcome the all-too-common 
failure to link policy, planning and budgeting adequately. It should 
also span elections and, to reduce political bias, should be carried 
out by an independent institution such as, in the UK, the recently 
established O!ce for Budgetary Responsibility. The impacts on 
fiscal sustainability of climate change, and of measures to address 
it, can then be evaluated against this baseline. This will involve the 
consideration and modelling of multiple and pervasive uncertainties, 
as described above. Di"erent scenarios should be built that span the 
range of likely climate e"ects, with sensitivity analysis around the major 
impacts to see which have the most e"ect on fiscal sustainability. 
 Finally, measures to increase fiscal sustainability should be 
proposed and, if possible, modelled in the same framework as that 
used for the baseline and impacts from climate change and climate 
change policies. Such policies may include the imposition of carbon 
taxes or auctioning of permits to raise revenues; or the imposition of a 
requirement for people to take out private insurance against climate-
change impacts (where it is being o"ered) to reduce the exposure of 
government revenues to these events. The purpose of such scenarios 
is to provide policymakers, especially Ministries of Finance, with 
insights into the implications for fiscal sustainability of climate-change 
and related policy responses, so they can prepare for them.
 Measurement, reporting and verification
 Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) has 
emerged as a central issue in international climate negotiations. It 
is seen as essential to the e"ective tracking of progress by parties 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in meeting 
their national commitments and achieving the Convention’s overall 
goals. In particular, it is seen as a way of providing a basis for mutual 
accountability between developed and developing country parties, 
to ensure that both sides take appropriate mitigation actions and 
commitments, and that the developed world provides support for the 
actions of developing countries The 2010 Cancún Agreements involved 
important steps toward an operational system for MRV by agreeing to 
establish an international registry for financial and technical support, and 
enhance regular reporting and review processes for mitigation actions. 
 MRV of mitigation actions and monitoring and evaluation 
systems for adaptation actions are related in that both can play a 
role in tracking climate finance. Some of the problems in monitoring 
and evaluating adaptation actions are common to MRV of mitigation 
actions. These include dealing with uncertainty, establishing baselines, 
attributing cause and e"ect and identifying appropriate performance 
measures or indicators. Others are more specific to adaptation, such 
as determining adaptive capacity. With careful design, monitoring and 
evaluation systems for adaptation and MRV systems for finance could 
be made complementary to each other, and could promote e!ciency 
by drawing upon the same data resources. The Framework Convention 
and the Kyoto Protocol contain a number of provisions relating to the 
MRV of information on national climate actions. Under the Convention, 
all parties are required to submit national communications and national 
greenhouse-gas emission inventories. However, the requirements on 
what type of information that must be reported and how often di"er 
substantially between Annex I countries (developed countries and 
former Soviet Union states) and non-Annex I countries (developing 
countries). Reporting requirements for Annex I countries were 
strengthened under the Kyoto Protocol and the Cancún Agreements, 
though much remains to be agreed to implement fully those decisions.
 In light of the existing climate regime, there are a number of 
practical issues concerning MRV and monitoring and evaluation that 
national governments need to take into consideration in formulating 
their mitigation and adaptation actions. These issues include:
      ›  Reporting of mitigation actions: a critical question facing 
policymakers in developing countries is what level of aggregation 
or detail and type of information is appropriate in reporting 
mitigation actions? At a minimum, the information on mitigation 
actions reported should be su!ciently detailed and presented in 
such a way as to enable third parties to understand what types of 
mitigation actions are planned or have already been taken, what 
their impact is expected to be across di"erent sectors and how that 
impact has been projected — where possible, in quantitative terms.
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      ›  Measurement of mitigation actions: accurate measurement 
of mitigation actions and their e"ects on emissions is crucial 
to providing an accurate picture of the overall national 
mitigation e"orts. The appropriate degree of aggregation 
and sophistication of the measurement techniques will depend 
on the scale of the emissions reductions that are expected to 
be achieved, the type of commitment (NAMA or quantified 
target), the types of policies and measures as well as the 
technical capacity of the government to carry out this exercise.
      ›  Institutional changes to improve MRV of climate policy 
actions: meeting the additional requirements for MRV 
of mitigation actions under the Cancún Agreements will 
undoubtedly be very challenging for many countries. This 
can be achieved through internal capacity building (technical 
capacity and human resources), reliance on outside expertise, 
or some combination of the two. 
      ›  Reporting of climate finance: a pressing issue facing 
developing countries concerns the type of information on 
financing requirements that should be reported to best 
enable lenders to meets those needs. The type and amount 
of information that ought to be reported on financing needs 
will depend to a large degree on national circumstances and 
institutional capacity, and the nature of the project in question. 
In general, the information reported needs to take account of 
the way in which donor countries prioritize their financing. 
      ›  Management and monitoring of climate funds: donor 
governments need to be confident that the funds provided 
for climate mitigation or adaptation actions are properly 
utilized and well-managed. In order to obtain such funds, it is 
therefore essential that recipient governments demonstrate 
transparency and accountability in their use. 
      ›  Dealing with risk and uncertainty in monitoring and 
evaluating adaptation actions: monitoring and evaluation 
systems will need to be a prominent feature of adaptation 
strategies and projects as they evolve. For those systems 
to be e"ective in a context of enormous uncertainty about 
the impacts of climate change, they need to be consistent 
with results-based management, maintaining flexibility and 
encouraging learning. 
      ›  Measuring the success of adaptation actions: given all 
the uncertainties surrounding climate change, it is vitally 
important that national governments devise good measures 
and indicators to help measure and evaluate the success of 
both the adaptation process and its outcome in enhancing 
adaptive capacity. These indicators need to be used to track 
progress over the long term.
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 The UNEP Division of Technology, Industry and Economics 
(DTIE) helps governments, local authorities and decision-makers in 
business and industry to develop and implement policies and practices 
focusing on environmental protection and sustainable development.
In 2008, UNEP’s new Medium Term Strategy (MTS) was adopted 
along six strategic priorities: climate change, disasters and conflicts, 
ecosystem management, environmental governance, harmful 
substances and hazardous waste, and resource e!ciency. The 
selection of these six themes was guided by scientific evidence, the 
UNEP mandate, and priorities emerging from global and regional 
forums. UNEP’s mandate has five main interrelated areas:
      ›  Keeping the world environmental situation under review. 
UNEP provides access to environmental data notably through 
the Global Environment Outlook, which regularly assesses 
environmental change and its impact on people’s security, 
health, well-being and development. 
      ›  Providing policy advice and early warning information, 
based upon sound science and assessments. UNEP has 
created several international scientific panels such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, jointly 
established with the World Meteorological Organization in 
1988 to assess the state of existing knowledge about climate 
change. The IPCC’s reports helped raise awareness among 
the media and the general public about the human-made 
nature of climate change. UNEP also set up the International 
Panel for Sustainable Resource Management in 2007 and the 
Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services in 2008. These complementary initiatives are aimed 
at providing policymakers with the science on which to base 
their decisions.
      ›  Facilitating the development, implementation and evolution 
of norms and standards and developing coherent links 
between international environmental conventions. UNEP 
has helped establish and implement many international 
environmental agreements – such as the Montreal Protocol 
to restore the ozone layer, a growing number of treaties that 
governs the production, transportation, use, release and 
disposal of chemicals, and the family of treaties that protects 
global biodiversity.
      ›  Catalyzing international co-operation and action and 
strengthening technology support and capacity in line 
with country needs and priorities. UNEP encourages 
decision-makers in governments, industries and businesses 
to develop and adopt environmentally sound policies, 
strategies, practices and technologies. This involves raising 
awareness, building international consensus, developing 
codes of practice and economic instruments, strengthening 
capabilities, exchanging information and initiating 
demonstration projects.
      ›  Raising awareness and promoting public participation. 
UNEP publications and outreach activities help disseminate 
scientific information to decision-makers and provide them 
with policy guidance. Moreover, special public events like 
the World Environment Day (every 5 June) or the Billion Tree 
Campaign stimulate worldwide awareness of environmental 
issues, encourage political action and promote behavioural 
change. 
The Division works to promote:
      ›  Sustainable consumption and production.
      ›  E!cient use of renewable energy.
      ›  Adequate management of chemicals.
      ›  The integration of environmental costs in development 
policies.
 The O!ce of the Director, located in Paris, co-ordinates 
activities through:
      ›  The International Environmental Technology Centre – IETC 
(Osaka, Shiga), which implements integrated waste, water 
and disaster management programmes, focusing in particular 
on Asia.
      ›  Production and Consumption (Paris), which promotes 
sustainable consumption and production patterns as a 
contribution to human development through global markets.
      ›  Chemicals (Geneva), which catalyzes global actions to 
bring about the sound management of chemicals and the 
improvement of chemical safety worldwide.
      ›  Energy (Paris), which fosters energy and transport policies 
for sustainable development and encourages investment in 
renewable energy and energy e!ciency.
      ›  OzonAction (Paris), which supports the phase-out of ozone 
depleting substances in developing countries and countries 
with economies in transition to ensure implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol.
      ›  Economics and Trade (Geneva), which helps countries to 
integrate environmental considerations into economic 
and trade policies, and works with the finance sector to 
incorporate sustainable development policies.
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 Set up in 1975, three years after UNEP was created, the 
Division of Technology, Economics (DTIE) provides solutions to policy-
makers and helps change the business environment by o"ering 
platforms for dialogue and co-operation, innovative policy options, 
pilot projects and creative market mechanisms.
 DTIE plays a leading role in three of the six UNEP strategic 
priorities: climate change, harmful substances and hazardous waste, 
resource e!ciency. 
 DTIE is also actively contributing to the Green Economy 
Initiative launched by UNEP in 2008. This aims to shift national and world 
economies on to a new path, in which jobs and output growth are driven 
by increased investment in green sectors, and by a switch of consumers’ 
preferences towards environmentally friendly goods and services.
 Moreover, DTIE is responsible for fulfilling UNEP’s mandate 
as an implementing agency for the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund 
and plays an executing role for a number of UNEP projects financed by 
the Global Environment Facility. 
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MCA4climate is a major new UNEP initiative providing practical 
assistance to governments in preparing their climate change mitigation 
and adaptation plans and strategies. It aims to help governments, 
particularly in developing countries, identify policies and measures that 
are low cost, environmentally effective and consistent with national 
development goals. It does this by providing a structured approach 
to assessing and prioritizing climate-policy options, while taking 
into consideration associated social, economic, environmental and 
!"#$!$%$!&"'()*&#$#)'"+),-"-.$#/)0")+&!"1)#&2)!$)#--3#)$&)*&%"$-4)$5-)
widely held perception that tackling climate change is costly, highlight 
$5-)6&$-"$!'()+-7-(&68-"$'(),-"-.$#)&9)'++4-##!"1)*(!8'$-)*5'"1-)'"+)
encourage action to that end.
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For more information, contact:
UNEP DTIE
Energy Branch
15 rue de Milan
75441 Paris CEDEX 09, France
Tel: +33 1 4437 1450
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